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 Abstract  
 
This Ph.D. thesis joins the debate regarding the social benefit of HFT with the aim of 
contributing to HFT research originally. My research design integrates both HFT and market 
fragmentation and extends analyses within and across markets. I use the European equity 
markets as a laboratory as Europe has been confronting the issue of HFT influx and market 
fragmentation since the adoption of the Market in Financial Instruments and Directives 
(MiFID) in November 2007 by the European Parliament. I employ an extremely large dataset 
with the highest granularity, which gives the most recent and longest coverage of data in HFT 
research to date. I mainly examine the effects of HFT and market fragmentation on market 
liquidity within and across European markets.  
       In chapter 1, I review the literature and develop my arguments that rationalise the studies 
presented in this thesis.    
      In chapter 2, I examine the impact of HFT and market fragmentation on market liquidity 
within a market by applying three alternative estimations: OLS, IV-GMM and simultaneous 
equations model. I document that HFT improves liquidity, but market fragmentation appears 
detrimental to liquidly. I show that the interaction between HFT and market fragmentation has 
significant impact on market environment.  It seems that in the absence of HFT, a fragmented 
market would be more detrimental to liquidity.   
      In chapter 3, I extend the analysis of the previous chapter to incorporate all fragmented 
markets, and present a novel approach to creating full view HFT image from HFT activities 
across markets.  I primarily examine how HFT and fragmentation affect market liquidity 
across markets by using the simultaneous equations model. The results show that HFT 
improves liquidity across markets, whereas market fragmentation harms liquidity in the 
primary exchange but improves in alternative exchanges. I also provide evidence that HFT 
activities are linked across markets, and HFTs provide liquidity when spreads are wider. It 
seems that HFTs concentrate in the primary exchange during periods of high market volatility. 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
For the last two decades, the advent of sophisticated computing technology has been
changing the financial market structure unprecedentedly. Machines are gradually
occupying the places for which formerly human interaction was necessary. The rise of
machines’ intelligence has enabled the human civilization to do things at ease, speed,
and economy, and at the same time, raised the concern of welfare damaging inequitable
competition between man and machines. Among many, High Frequency Trading
(hereafter referred to as HFT) is one of the instances of such competition, and there
has been debate since 2009 about its effect (Menkveld, 2016). Recent financial market
regulations in the US and EU have opened the avenue for order flow fragmentation in
equity markets and augmented the process of creating access for more machines amid
regulators’ concern for promoting greater transparency and competition. The rise of
machines has also given rise to the proliferation of machine-friendly trading venues
and their high speed connecting channels. At present, society is facing a real dilemma,
mainly to support or hinder the proliferation of HFT, and a wrong decision might come
at a high social cost. I join this debate with the aim to provide empirical evidence. This
Ph.D. thesis takes an intra market microstructure approach motivated from the recent
HFT literature and attempts to address the issue holistically which is often overlooked in
the heated debate. I develop my arguments in the subsequent paragraphs.
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The arrival of HFT coincided with the entry of new markets, and subsequently, strong
fragmentation of order flow. The existing market microstructure literature has considered
HFT and market fragmentation as two separate strands so far and their interaction has
been ignored mostly. As academics, practitioners and regulators strive on this issue, new
realities of the high frequency world become more visible. Menkveld (2014, 2016) argues
“Electronic trading, new venues, and HFTs1 are intimately related. There is arguably a
symbiotic relationship between new electronic venues and HFTs. These new venues need
HFTs to insert aggressively priced bid and ask quotes, and HFTs need the new venues to
satisfy their requirements in terms of automation, speed, and low fees.’’ When market
fragmentation is overlooked in HFT research or vice versa, at least in the existing equity
market structures of EU and US, one risks missing the complexity of the problem and it
could lead misspecification.
In a highly fragmented marketplace, the potential counterparties for HFT
market‐makers have a large selection of trading venues on which they can trade.
To interact with this order flow, HFT market makers must be present on all these trading
venues (The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, 2016). This cross-market
HFT market making makes the order books linked and so, too, order flows and price
behaviour. Studying HFT in a traditional empirical setup which generally focused on a
market in isolation often misses the fact that individual markets are tied together, and
incorporating market links in the analysis is crucial for determining how well overall
market functions in equilibrium. O’Hara (2015) argues that traditionally employed
empirical methods might no longer be appropriate to tackle this cross-market HFT
complexity. She suggests “Theoretically modelling such interrelation is daunting, so
empirical analyses focusing on the predictive power of market variables both within and
across markets can be a good place to start.”
Besides, the literature examining the effect of HFT on market quality in a fragmented
market setting is comparatively new and seems to be in its infancy. Since HFT got its
momentum in the 2000s, a vibrant and large literature has developed in this area mostly
1High Frequency Traders (HFTs)
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focused on a single venue, notably NYSE or NASDAQ in US markets. HFT research on
EU equity markets data started to increase in recent years, but no comprehensive study to
date has examined the effect of HFT on the European market environment. This thesis
aims to shift the traditional HFT research focus to an intra market microstructure approach
that is capable of answering the interrelated questions in market microstructures. My
research design integrates both HFT and market fragmentation and extends analyses
within and across markets. I use the European equity markets as a laboratory as Europe
has been confronting the issue of market fragmentation and HFT influx since the adoption
of the regulation Market in Financial Instruments and Directives (MiFID) in November
2007 by the European Parliament.
Research outline
The primary goal of this thesis is to examine the effects of HFT and market fragmentation
on market quality across European markets. In doing so, it also sheds light on the
drivers of HFT and market fragmentations. It concentrate on the liquidity dimension of
market quality and use the liquidity, HFT and market fragmentation measures that are
commonly employed in empirical market microstructure literature. It uses the millisecond
time-stamped trades and quotes data stemming from the Thomson Reuters Tick History
(TRTH) for the selected LSE listed stocks traded across four rivalry exchanges in Europe:
the London Stock Exchange (LSE), BATS Chi-X Europe (CHIX), BATS Europe (BATS)
and Turquoise (TURQ). This Ph.D. thesis specifically examines the following research
questions within and across markets:
• How do HFT and market fragmentation, and their interaction impact liquidity?
• Does the impact of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity change over time?
• Does the impact of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity change across cross
sections?
• What drives HFT and market fragmentation?
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Structure of the thesis
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews the literature
relevant to studies presented in chapters 2 and 3, and section 1.3 presents a brief overview
of the European equity market structure in which the studies of this thesis are designed.
Chapter 2 examines the impact of HFT and market fragmentation on market liquidity in
a traditional HFT research setting focusing on a single market (LSE). Unlike the existing
literature, my research design incorporates both HFT and market fragmentation. First, it
provides details on data preparation, relevant measures and research strategies. Second, it
analyses the relation between market liquidity, HFT and market fragmentation using three
alternative estimation methods—OLS, IV-GMM and simultaneous equations model, and
discusses the results. Chapter 3 examines the impact of HFT and market fragmentation
on liquidity in a cross-market setting by integrating all major lit trading platforms in
Europe that facilitate trading on LSE listed stocks. It provides details on data, measures
and models specification. It analyses the relation between market liquidity, HFT and
market fragmentation across four markets applying the simultaneous equations model,
and discusses the results.
1.2 Literature Review
This thesis is relevant to two main strands of literature in market microstructure, HFT and
market fragmentation. The HFT literature is relatively young and growing with respect
to the research in order flow fragmentation. The main contribution of this thesis is to
focus on a new issue, i.e. the interaction of HFT and order flow fragmentation within and
across markets and covers three related aspects (i) HFT (ii) order flow fragmentation (iii)
interaction of HFT and order flow fragmentation and their impacts on market liquidity.
Before moving to the literature discussion, it is useful to clarify some terminology
which is used extensively in HFT research. Many papers (Gomber, Arndt, Lutat and
Uhle, 2011; The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, 2010; Aldridge, 2013)
attempt to distinguish among the prevailing terminologies applied to modern electronic
4
exchanges providing definitions. HFT and Algorithmic Trading, hereafter referred to
as AT, are the mostly referred two also in this thesis. Often, it creates confusion when
they are used interchangeably without mentioning the context, as both are dominant in
literature but have different roles to play in the market. To be on the safe side, I take the
definitions which are well founded in academic literature and use them within the context
interchangeably to refer a HFT firm.
Practically, HFT andAT share features like low-latency in order routing and execution,
use of algorithms, less human intervention, direct and high speed market access but differ
in the use of algorithms, inventory position taking, proprietary/agency trading, frequency
of quote update, market strategy etc. Gomber et al. (2011) provide an excellent coverage
on the concepts of HFT and AT. The distinct characteristics of HFT are high-speed quote
updates, reflected in huge number of orders and rapid order cancellation, proprietary
trading, generation of profit from market making, very short holding period with zero
net inventory, use of low-latency technology like colocation, sponsored market access
and direct data feeds. On the contrary, agent trading, trading to minimize price impacts,
relatively long holding period possibly days/week/months characterize AT. Therefore,
HFT is considered a subset of AT.
1.2.1 Theoretical predictions
The literature has identified the possible mechanisms through which HFT and
fragmentation and also their interaction might affect liquidity. Biais and Foucault
(2014) suggest the economic channels through which HFT could impact market liquidity.
HFT can be imagined as a low-latency based modern trading and perform the same
functions that are expected from a traditional market maker but differently. HFT
firms develop dynamic algorithms based on real-time feed and perform market making
automatically at millisecond speed, which essentially does not change the economic
role of a market maker. Modern technology enables HFT to (i) get fastest access to the
market (ii) acquire and processes information in almost real time (iii) watch and routes
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orders across markets. Thus, as a market maker, HFT should be able to provide liquidity
at a lower cost. But the concern is that slow traders are at an information disadvantage
relative to HFT, which might create adverse selection cost.
Foucault, Pagano and Roell (2013) and Cantillon and Yin (2011) explain the possible
effects of order flow fragmentation. As per market fragmentation concerns, there are two
opposite views, one holding that fragmentation improves liquidity, and another that it
harms liquidity. The main arguments against fragmentation or in favour of exchange floor
monopoly are scale economics and the existence of network externalities in trading. In a
concentrated market, it is easier to find a counter party, which minimizes search costs.
The price impact of transactions also tends to be smaller in markets that attract higher
trading volume. The dominant argument in favour of order flow fragmentation is that
it places competitive pressure on the transaction fees charged by the exchanges. It also
forces exchanges to install cutting-edge trading technology and intensifies competition
among market makers.
Menkveld (2014) has explained the possible effect of interaction between HFT and
electronic market fragmentation, and concludes that HFT may benefit or hurt market
quality through adverse selection on price quotes, a technology arms race, or high-risk
trading strategy. This thesis particularly contributes to this research topic, by examining
the net impact of HFT on liquidity in the fragmented market.
Models describing the effect of HFT on market quality are not enormous, limited
to a few aspects of HFT and market fragmentation, and generate different predictions
depending on their assumptions and focuses. Goettler, Parlour and Rajan (2009) predict
when market makers like HFT are more informed about fundamental value it can improve
liquidity. In Biais, Foucault and Moinas (2011), HFT generates adverse selection problem
which harms market liquidity. Some other models also predict detrimental liquidity
effect of HFT through front-running in Li (2014), winner’s curse in Han, Khapko and
Kyle (2014) and a wasteful arms race for speed in Budish, Cramton and Shim (2015). In
contrast, Jovanovic and Menkveld (2015) and Ait-Sahalia and Saglam (2017) predict both
positive and negative liquidity effects of HFT depending on the market environments in
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which HFT works.
1.2.2 Empirical evidence
The empirical HFT literature has been growing on several strands. I concentrate here the
ones which are relevant to this thesis.
Hendershott et al. (2011) and Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) are considered to be the
seminal papers in empirical HFT literature to propose HFT identification measures based
on limit order book updates. Hendershott et al. (2011) is the first to examine causality
between AT and market quality, where they introduce an algorithmic trading proxy
based on electronic message rate (order book update). They target a market structure
change—the introduction of the auto quote in 2003 in NYSE—which made the exchange
more accessible to algorithmic traders. To address the suspected endogeneity between
algorithmic trading and market quality they use a dummy variable instrument based on
the event date. Using monthly observations for NYSE listed 943 common stocks for
the period 2001–2005, they report positive impact of AT on liquidity, for large stocks
in particular. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) propose a different low-latency measure,
‘strategic-run’ based on a particular trading executing behaviour of HFT and use the same
to assess the impact of low-latency trading on market quality. Their findings suggest that
low-latency activity improves liquidity. Boehmer, Fong and Wu (2015) study the effect
of AT on market quality using data on 42 equity markets for the period 2001–2011. They
use colocation as an instrument variable to tackle the endogeneity and provide evidence
that AT improves liquidity.
In recent years, the speed competition forced exchanges to provide cutting-edge
technology, and which eventually benefitted HFTs to update their quotes more rapidly.
Many papers examine the impact of speed on market quality. Riordan and Storkenmaier
(2012) study the system upgrade of Deutsche Boerse with the 8.0 release of Xetra
on April 23, 2007 which reduced system latency from 50ms to 10ms. Frino, Mollica
and Webb (2014) examine the impact of allowing traders to co-locate near exchange
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server on the liquidity of future contracts traded on the Australian Securities Exchange.
Murray, Pham and Singh (2016) investigate the role of latency in market quality in the
Australian Securities Exchange following the introduction of the Integrated Trading
Platform and ASXTrade which reduced latency from 70 ms to 30 ms. Frino, Mollica,
Monaco and Palumbo (2017) examine the impact of AT on market liquidity following
the implementation of proximity hosting service by Borsa Italiana. Hendershott and
Moulton (2011) study the impact of introducing hybrid market in New York Stock
Exchange in 2006 which reduced the execution time of market order from 10 seconds
to less than one second. Brogaard, Hagströmer, Nordén and Riordan (2015) exploit an
optional colocation upgrade at NASDAQ OMX Stockholm to assess how speed affects
market liquidity. All of these papers on external HFT shocks other than Hendershott and
Moulton (2011) provide evidence that reduction in system latency or enhancing speed
improves liquidity, and the converse is shown in Hendershott and Moulton (2011).
The literature examining the effect of HFT on market quality in a fragmented
market setting is comparatively new. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan (2014b)
study the interaction of HFT and fragmentation to help understand the role HFT have
in enhancing or harming market quality via market integration/fragmentation based on
Canadian market data. Their preliminary results show that HFTs play a key role in
tying market together, but are inconclusive regarding the impact on liquidity. Aitken,
Cumming and Zhan (2014) use the joint modelling of AT and market quality in their
research. They examine the relation between market quality, AT, market fragmentation
and market manipulation in U.S. equity market following the fragmentation regulation
RegNMS using a simultaneous equations model. They find that fragmentation of the
lit market order flow and the ensuing increase in competition, especially from HFT/AT
and alternative trading systems, impact market liquidity positively. This thesis mainly
contributes in this research area, by adopting a novel approach with a rich panel dataset.
Several papers provide evidence regarding HFT market making within and across
markets. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) examine the role of algorithmic traders in
liquidity supply and demand in the 30 Deutscher Aktien Index stocks on the Deutsche
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Boerse in January 2008 and report an AT participation rate of 52% and 64% in marketable
limit order and nonmarketable limit order volume respectively. They find that algorithm
traders take liquidity when spreads are narrow and provide liquidity when spreads are
wide, and when spreads are narrow algorithmic traders are less likely to submit new
orders and less likely to cancel their orders. Algorithmic traders cluster their trades
together and initiate trade quickly when quoted spreads are small. Carrion (2013) also
reports similar findings using a sample of NASDAQ trades and quotes that directly
identifies HFT participation. He provides evidence that HFTs supply liquidity when it is
scarce and consume liquidity when it is plentiful. Jarnecic and Snape (2014) compare
the liquidity supply by HFT with the remainder of participants in the order book on
LSE data for April 2009–June 2009. The evidence is consitence with the view that HFT
improves liquidity. Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi (2014) use the technology
upgrades that lower the latency of London Stock Exchange, following which the level of
HFT increased, to examine a claim that execution cost could be increasing because of
HFT. They use data for the period 2007—2011, and provide no clear evidence that HFT
impact institutional execution costs. Menkveld (2013) studies the strategies of a large
HFT firm that started trading after CHIX entered as a new venue for European equities.
His evidence suggests that HFTs supply liquidity across markets.
Several recent papers examine the impact of market fragmenatation on market
quality. O’Hara and Ye (2011) is an original study which documents the causality
between fragmentation and market quality on a dataset of 262 U.S. stocks over six
months in 2008. They find that more fragmented stocks are associated with lower
transaction cost and fastest execution speed. Unlike O’Hara and Ye (2011), some recent
papers, mostly focused on order flow fragmentation, analyse the cross market liquidity.
Upson and Van Ness (2017) study the volume fragmentation, cross market competition
of AT, and their impact on liquidity using NYSE data only for the first quarter of 2012.
They find that volume fragmentation has a positive effect on the best depth level across
markets but venue competition and excess AT activities harm market liquidity. Degryse,
De Jong and Kervel (2015) is the first to address the issue of fragmentation in European
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equity markets by introducing cross market measures of depth and spreads similar to
Foucault and Menkveld (2008), but it does not consider any aspect of HFT. They study
51 Dutch stocks across European venues for the initial post-MiFID period (November
2007–December 2009) and provide evidence that lit fragmentation improves liquidity.
Gresse (2017) also assesses the impact of both lit and dark fragmentation in European
markets in a cross market setting. She uses data on the LSE and Euronext’s blue-chip
stocks for the period October 2007–November 2009 and establishes control for AT
in regressions. Her findings suggest that lit fragmentation improves liquidity across
markets.
Competition for order flow is at the core of exchange competition. Foucault and
Menkveld (2008) study the rivalry between Euronext and the LSE in the Dutch stock
market. They test hypothesis about the effect of market fragmentation and provide
evidence that fragmentation of order flow can enhance liquidity. He, Jarnecic and Liu
(2015) examine the market share drivers of CHIX in an international context. Their
evidence shows that alternative venue’s market share is negatively related to trading fees
and latencies and positively related to liquidity relative to primary exchanges. They also
show that trading tend to concentrate on the primary exchanges during market stress and
tick constraint in primary exchanges moves order flow to alternative exchanges. Riordan,
Storkenmaier and Wagener (2011) study the market quality of FTSE 100 constituents
traded on the LSE, and three MTFs for April–May 2010 to examine the impact of
alternative trading venues on market quality. They provide evidence that alternative
trading venues contribute positively to market quality and exchange competitions benefits
investors.
1.3 Market Background
Two of the most recent striking changes in global equity market design (those have been
proliferating trading venues) are the adoption of ‘Regulation National Market System
(RegNMS)’ in the US in 2005, and the enactment of MiFID in Europe in 2007, following
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the development in the US. After the enactment of MiFID, traditional stock exchanges in
Europe lost monopoly on trading which existed until the beginning of 2007. The types of
trading venues defined by MiFID include regulated markets (RMs), multilateral trading
facilities (MTFs), and systematic internaliser (SIs) 2.
In broad terms, RMs and MTFs operate in a similar fashion, providing an electronic
platform for users to transact orders multilaterally. These trading venues generally match
orders on a non-discretionary basis according to pre-defined rules that establish price and
time priority for submitted orders. RMs andMTFs are required to publish pre-trade quotes
and report details of executed trades to the market (CFA Institute, 2011). Both RMs and
MTFs are allowed to organize primary listing, however, they differ in that. RMs are legally
authorised to list regulated financial instruments, while financial products listed by MTFs
are considered to be unregulated instruments. In practice, only RMs offer primary listing
service. MTFs prefer not to do so and they may be viewed as equivalent to electronic
trading networks (ECNs) in the US (Gresse, 2017). A firm choose onwhich RM to list, and
once listed, MTFs may decide to organize trading in that firm as well. SIs are investment
firm that internalise order flow to deal on their own account on an ‘organised, frequent
and systematic basis’. SIs are required to report trades to the market and to publicise
pre-trade transparency information under certain conditions. Trades executed through SIs
are reported as the over-the-counter (OTC) trades.
The largest RMs include the LSE Group (operator of the London Stock Exchange
and Borsa Italiana), NYSE Euronext (which operates exchanges in France, Belgium, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and the United Kingdom), and Deutsche Borse Group (operator
of the Frankfurt Exchange and the Xetra trading system). In the midst of trading venue
proliferation, CHIX, BATS, Turquoise and NASDAQ-OMX Europe were among the few
MTFs which started operations at the beginning of the post-MiFID period in Europe,
eventually, the latter closed the operations in 2010. At present, CHIX, BATS and
Turquoise are the three leading alternative trading venues to execute more than one third
2In order to capture ‘dark pool’ operators and other alike trading systems, a new category of trading
venue called Organised Trading Facility (OTF) is introduced for non-equity instruments in MIFID II which
came into effect on 3 January 2018
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of the European lit equity trading (see Table A.1).
Market design. The LSE runs electronic order books on which buy and sell orders
are continuously matched from the open to the close according to the price-time priority
rules. Automated trading sessions start at 8:00 and close at 16:30 in local time. MTFs also
run transparent order books in which anonymous orders are matched continuously for the
same trading hours relative to primary exchanges. MTFs differ in terms of the speed
of execution, the number of securities traded, and trading fee structure (Degryse et al.,
2015). Their market models are adapted to the needs of high-frequency traders by offering
low-latency tradingwith high throughput rates. MostMTFs follow a so-calledmaker/taker
fees model—offer a transaction rebate to those who provide liquidity (the market maker),
while charging customers who take that liquidity. The LSE also followed the maker/taker
fees model before switching back to a traditional fee schedule on September 1st, 2009.
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Chapter 2
The Impact of High Frequency Trading
and Market Fragmentation on
Liquidity
2.1 Introduction
MiFID repealed the concentration rule1 in November 2007 and paved the way for
the electronic trading venues to compete with the traditional established exchanges.
Afterwards, exchanges have been investing heavily to minimize the latency2and several
alternative exchanges have been launched. Consequently, order flow has spread across
many trading floors, creating a fragmented market place. The beneficiaries from this
massive investment in technology appear to be a new breed of high frequency traders
who implement low-latency strategies (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013). MiFID has made the
necessary breakthrough in spreading HFT market access across European equity markets.
Menkveld (2016) points to this reality, “...the two most salient trends in securities markets
since the turn of the century—order flow fragmentation and HFT entry—are intimately
related and both driven by technology and regulation.”
1The concentration rule led to a situation where a single stock exchange dominated each member state
in EU.
2According to Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), latency is viewed as the time it takes to learn about an event,
generate a a response, and have the exchange act on the response.
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The motivation of this chapter is centred on the view that HFT and fragmentation
of orderflows are closely related and should be examined together. A research design
based upon both HFT and market fragmentation avoids over simplification of market
complexities, and is methodologically more sensible than the one where either HFT or
fragmentation is addressed alone. My thesis contributes to this research niche in this
chapter which is relatively new and so far unexplored in the context of the European equity
market.
The goal here is to examine the impact of HFT and market fragmentation on market
liquidity within a market. Thereby, I investigate several aspects: i) how HFT impacts
market liquidity; ii) how order flow fragmentation impacts market liquidity; iii) how the
interaction of HFT and order flow fragmentation impacts market liquidity; iv) whether the
impact changes over time; and v) the determinants of HFT and market fragmentation.
To investigate these questions, I use millisecond time-stamped TRTH dataset for
the period 2005–2016, from which I exploit both HFT footprint and order flow
fragmentation across exchanges in European equity markets. The dataset includes 132
large capitalized stocks, primarily listed in the LSE and also traded across main alternative
exchanges/MTFs—CHIX, BATS and Turquoise. The dataset provides the coverage for
both pre and post-MiFID eras, and is the largest dataset employed in the HFT research
to date. I take the data for LSE (a traditional exchange) and develop daily measures
for liquidity, HFT and fragmentation from the millisecond records and use them in the
analyses. I specify six models and estimate them using OLS with proper control. To
check the robustness of OLS estimates, I take two alternative approaches which tackle
the possible endogeneity that could arise from simultaneity, by applying i) IV-GMM
estimation and ii) simultaneous equations model. I use the whole sample as well as its
suitable subsamples in all analyses performed in this chapter.
The results suggest that HFT improves liquidity, whereas higher fragmentation is
detrimental to liquidity. The interaction between HFT and fragmentation shows that some
of the possible benefits of HFT on market liquidity is offset by the extra cost of market
making in the fragmented market. Conversely, some extra cost of market fragmentation
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is also neutralized by the benefits derived from HFT. It appears that in the absence of HFT
a fragmented market would be more detrimental to liquidity.
Analyses expanded on large and small stocks show that both HFT and market
fragmentation have impacted the liquidity of large stocks more positively. In other words,
higher HFT is associated with more liquidity to large stocks whereas higher market
fragmentation in small stocks appears more detrimental to liquidity. The interaction
between HFT and market fragmentation across large and small stocks provides significant
insight. An increase in HFT in large stocks is associated with higher liquidity when
fragmentation is greater and an increase in fragmentation is associated with less harm to
liquidity when HFT is greater. On the contrary, for small cap stocks, an increase in HFT
activities is associated with lower liquidity if fragmentation is greater, and an increase in
fragmentation is more detrimental to liquidity when HFT is higher. The findings show
that fragmentation has affected the liquidity of small stocks more negatively than that of
large stocks.
In the quest for detecting the possible sources of changes in liquidity, I extend the
analysis by decomposition the effective spread into realized spreads and price impacts.
The results show that HFT has contributed in both better execution and less adverse
selection whereas fragmentation appears to be detrimental to both.
Time-varying analyses show that HFT and market fragmentation have time-varying
impacts; surprisingly (against a general belief), HFT appears to provide liquidity even
during a crisis period. Market fragmentation has increased over time, and increasingly
harmed liquidity over the period. Time-varying impacts in HFT and market fragmentation
provide evidence that increased fragmentation has offset, at least partially, the additional
liquidity which has been generated by higher HFT during the latter period of the sample.
The expanded analysis on alternative HFT proxies (based upon the quotes update at
different depths of the limit order book) show that HFT actively contributes beyond the
best imit price (BBO) in the order book but not much outside the best five limit prices.
The alternative estimation methods, IV-GMM and simultaneous equations model,
confirm that estimates obtained in OLS are robust. The use of simultaneous equations
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model extends understanding on the reverse causality between HFT, market fragmentation
and liquidity. It appears that simultaneity exists, the level of fragmentation and HFT
intensity both affect each other, and which in turn affect liquidity. However, the effect
of HFT seems stronger.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 associates this study with
the similar literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and relevant measures of liquidity,
HFT and market fragmentation, and reports descriptive results. Section 2.4 explains
the research strategies and main results for three alternative estimation methods: OLS,
IV-GMM and simultaneous equations model. Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Relevant literature
This section relates the chapter with the present body of literature reviewed in the section
1.2 (chapter 1). The study I present in this chapter is relevant to papers examining the
causality between HFT and market quality, or market fragmentation and market quality,
and concentrate on a single market HFT analysis. The literature like Hendershott et al.
(2011), Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), and Boehmer et al. (2015) provide evidence on the
causality between HFT and market quality, and O’Hara and Ye (2011), Gresse (2017),
Degryse et al. (2015) assess the impact of market fragmentation on market quality.
The originality of my study is that I address both HFT and market fragmentation and
investigate their relationwithmarket liquidity. Unlike these papers, my sample has a wider
coverage and higher granularity of data. The study bears a close resemblance to papers
examining interaction between HFT andmarket fragmentation like Brogaard, Hendershott
and Riordan (2014b) and Aitken, Harris and Harris (2015) and contributes to this research
area which is relatively unexplored in the literature and particularly in European markets.
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2.3 Data and measures
2.3.1 Data
It is widely believed and also demonstrated by previous studies that large-cap stocks
are highly liquid, attract more HFT, and also extremely fragmented. To study the high
frequency trading and market fragmentation phenomenon simultaneously, I primarily
choose large market capitalized common stocks in European equity markets. Generally,
papers studying HFT and fragmentation have a small data coverage, ranging from couple
of months to few years, due to huge management and computational burden. Managing
a small data set covering short time periods is relatively easy but has caveats—results
are more likely to be specific to the period specific factors. I attempt to get a wider
coverage of the data with two aims: i) it should provide enough variation in both HFT
and fragmentation measures, and ii) it should also cover pre and post-MiFID regulation
periods, i.e. both the period before and the period after November 2007.
I select the period January 2005–December 2016 which gives the most recent and
longest coverage of data in HFT research. The dataset has the footprint of all economic
shocks and recoveries of the last decade (see Figure A.1), and provides enough data
points extraordinarily to implement sound econometric tools. The post-MiFID period
is prominently characterized by the proliferation of low-latency based modern trading
venues, through which markets have been experiencing a large influx of HFT investment.
In constructing the sample, I take the STOXX 800 as the benchmark index which
constitutes the largest 800 market capitalized stocks in Europe. Table A.1 (Panel A) shows
the STOXX 800 composition at the end of year 2016. It reports that top 50% stocks of
the list are coming from only three primary trading venues, the London Stock Exchange,
Deutche Boerse (Xetra) and Euronext Paris, of which LSE listed stocks are more than
50%. Table A.1 (Panel B) shows the market share of both primary and alternative lit
trading venues in European equity markets. Among the trading venues, CHIX, BATS and
Turquoise facilitate most of the lit trading besides the primary platforms. Remarkably,
the present market share of CHIX exceeds that of any other trading venues. These three
17
alternative trading venues are selected to supplement the sample.
The primary source of my data is Thomson Reuters Tick History (TRTH) ,3 a product
of the Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA), which is compiled
from the Global Thomson Reuters exchange feeds. Two resilient London based recording
devices provide the millisecond time stamp to each recorded message. The primary
analysis of TRTH data structure reveals that time synchronization of trades and respective
quote messages is not uniform across trading venues. TRTH provides better quotes and
trades time synchronization for the trading venues which are physically closer to the IDN
Collection LAN in London (e.g. LSE, CHIX, Bats, Turquoise) than for those which are
not (e.g. Deutche Boerse (Xetra) , Euronext Paris ). This issue raises some real challenges
in determining trades and quotes based measure of transaction cost, which is particularly
true for the effective spread.
Considering the TRTH time synchronization issue, I narrow down the sample
choice only to the UK-based LSE listed stocks included in STOXX 800. To address
the fragmented environment of these stocks appropriately, I select CHIX, BATS, and
Turquoise as their alternative venue counterparts. These four trading venues facilitated
around 99% of lit trading during the period 2014–2016 for the stocks that are primarily
listed in LSE, and this pattern is quite regular over the sample period (see Table A.1, Panel
C). The trades and quotes data is available from TRTH since 1996 for most of the primary
trading venues, which for alternative trading venues in MiFID zone started to be available
frommid of 2008. Among the 220 primarily selected stocks from the LSE, TRTH provides
data support only for 204 stocks. Table A.2 shows the TRTH data availability for the
sample stocks across trading venues.
TRTH supplies quotes and trades records through two main files, the Time and Sales
(TS) and the Market Depth (MD). The time and sales file provides transaction records
and the best quote updates, and the market depth file comes with the queue of bid and
ask limit prices and respective quantities (displayed in the limit order book). The records
3I acknowledge gratefully the support of Prof. Riccardo Palumbo, Professor of Accounting at University
of Chieti-Pescara and CEO at European Capital Markets CRC for allowing me to use the TRTH database
during the period of my Ph.D. study.
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in market depth can be extracted to 25 best limit prices (based upon their availability)
of which I extract the best 10 levels. I download and process these two files for all
stocks primarily selected in the sample (Table A.2, Panel A). This requires me to dedicate
substantial computing resources and data processing time. I processed about 885 files of
market depth data of 70 million records each and 300 files of Time and Sales data of 110
million records each, on average, in several phases before harvesting the usable output.
The unzipped physical size of the data is around 20 TB.
At this point, a primary analysis shows that among those 204 securities, some are not
compatible for further analysis due to reasons like delisting, takeovers or mergers with
other firms or liquidation at some point or do not have enough data coverage for all four
trading venues for unknown reasons, and I set a final filter to ensure uniform data coverage
of the selected stocks and exclude them if they do not satisfy the following conditions: (i)
data availability in LSE at least from 2006; (ii) data availability in alternative trading
venues from 2008 or at least from the 1st quarter of 2009. Table A.2 (Panel B) shows the
reduced list of quarterly data used to construct the panel for the period 2005–2016. I also
rely on the Thomson Reuters’s Datastream for the relevant data, which are not supported
from TRTH but used in this study (e.g. daily market capitalization).
2.3.2 Measures
This section describes the liquidity measures, HFT proxies, and market fragmentation
proxies that are used in the analyses.
2.3.2.1 Liquidity
Foucault et al. (2013) define liquidity as the degree to which an order can be executed
within a short time frame at a price closer to the security’s consensus value. Conversely,
if a price deviates substantially from the consensus value, there is illiquidity. Liquidity
providers and seekers interact through the trading processes which are available in market
places and differ a lot across their structures and also contribute differently to liquidity.
The literature classifies liquidity into several dimensions, like transaction costs, quantity,
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time, and so on. Measurement of liquidity is of paramount importance to practitioners,
regulators and academics. Investors and intermediaries frame strategies with aim to
minimize the effect of liquidity shortage on their investment performance. Regulators
and researchers try to understand the relationship between market structure and liquidity
to work out and recommend the right policies.
In this study, I compute several standard measures of liquidity from the literature. I
use the relative quoted spread (spread_bpsit ) and the effective-half spread (espreadit )
which measure the transaction costs dimension of liquidity. The effective half-spread
is decomposed into price impacts (price_impactit ) and realized spreads (rspreadit ).
Price impact or adverse selection cost measures gross losses to liquidity demanders and
realized spreads measures revenue to liquidity providers. To reflect the price pressure
reasonably, an appropriate time gap (∆) between transaction and post transaction quote
adjustment is sought. In transparent and active markets adjustment is generally fast, so a
modest value of ∆ is appropriate (Foucault et al., 2013). In a low-latency environment,
HFT traders should have the capacity to close their position in a very short period of time.
A range of values are chosen—10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute and 5 minutes—for ∆
which likely fit both HFT and non-HFT trading environments.
To address the quantity dimension of liquidity, the quoted depth is measured at and
beyond best limit prices. The recent evidence (Financial Markets Regulator (France),
2017) suggests that HFTs’ liquidity supply surrounds several depth levels of the limit
order book. The quoted depth refers to the available buy and sell quantities at prices close
to the best bid and offer (BBO) price, practically at mid price. The measures, depth1it
and depth3it , refer the average quoted depth and cumulative depth at BBO and upto the
best three limit price respectively.
For the t th quote in stock j, quoted spread in basis points (bps) (spread_bpsit ) is defined
as
spread_bpsit = ((askit   bidit)/mpit)  10000;
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where askit is the best quoted ask price, bidit is the best quoted bid price, and mpit is
quote midpoint at BBO calculated as (askit + bidit)/2. For the t th trade in stock i , the
effective half-spread in bps, espreadit , is defined as
espreadit = (dit  (pit  mpit)/mpit)  10000;
where dit is an indicator variable that equals +1 if the kth trade is a liquidity demander’s
buy and  1 if the kth trade is a liquidity demander’s sell, pit is the trade price, and mpit
is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the kth trade.
Academics often find studying effective spreads challenging due to the trade signing
requirements. This becomes even more complicated in the low-latency environment due
to the involvement of enormous masses of quote updates, even within a millisecond.
Empirical studies usually use the readily avilable trade signing approaches from literature,
for example, Lee and Ready (1991). Signing a trade with these methods come with a high
price of inaccuracy due to the fact that exchange platforms and data providers do not
follow a uniform data synchronization system. In contrast to common practices, I develop
algorithms which are capable of signing trade precisely in TRTH European data structure
and give this study a unique advantage over others that rely on effective spreads in their
analysis. The algorithms match every trade price with the immediate prevailing quotes,
both bid and ask, and define kth trade as liquidity demander’s buy if it matches quoted ask
price and as liquidity demander’s sell if it matches quoted bid price.
The trade signing methodology adopted in this study goes as follows. In a first phase,
algorithms filter all trades not sourcing from the automatic session and then accumulate
trades executed on the same milliseconds with the same price. The problem arising from
accumulating all trades indiscriminately executed in the same millisecond is carefully
avoided. Generally, trade records delivered with the same time-stamp include both buy
and sell trades. So, it is important to distinguish them as buyer or seller initiated trades
before accumulating them. The second phase is bit more complex and time consuming
where algorithmsmatch trade price with the relevant quotes, both bid and ask , considering
several “if and then” conditions. The algorithms attempt to match a trade price with
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the immediately available prior quotes (either bid or sell), if they find a match with bid
then provide a seller initiated trade flag or a buyer initiated flag when find a match with
ask. If the algorithms do not find a match with the immediate quotes, then they look
for a match to the one before the immediate one and so on. In contrast, a traditional
trade signing approach compares changes in trade price with the changes in mid price to
ascertain whether an executed trade is buyer or seller initiated, and does not seem to fit
a dynamic low-latency environment where quote update speed is very high and the time
synchronization between trades and quotes updates is not quite orderly. The algorithms
used in this study can assign a trade sign as accurate as more than 99%.
For the kth trade in stock i , the percentage realized half-spread in bps, rspreadit is
defined as
rspreadit = (dit  (pit  mpi;t+∆)/mpit)  10000;
where dit is an indicator variable that equals +1 if the kth trade is a liquidity demander’s
buy and  1 if the kth trade is a liquidity demander’s sell, pit is the trade price, mpit
is the quote midpoint prevailing at the time of the kth trade, and mpi;t+∆ is the quote
midpoint after ∆. The gross losses to liquidity demanders, price_impactit , due to
adverse selection (using the same variable) is defined as
price_impactit = ((mpi;t+∆  mpit)/mpit)  10000:
A two-way decomposition of the effective spread, as an identity, can be defined as
espreadit = rspreadit + price_impactit :
The average quoted depth can be decomposed into offer depth (the specified quantity
that a liquidity supplier is willing to sell at ask price), and bid depth (the specified quantity
that a liquidity supplier is willing to buy at the bid price). The first of the two quantity
based liquidity measures, depthl , refers to the average offer and bid quantity available at
the best bid and offer prices (BBO), or at best depth level. At time t , for stock i , average
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market depth adepthit is defined as
depth1it = (Offer depth  offer price + bid depth  bid price)  0:5:
To measure the depth available beyond BBO , the average cumulative depth ( depth3it )
is defined, which measures cumulative depth up to three best limit prices using the similar
procedure defined for depth1it .
2.3.2.2 High frequency trading
In HFT research, identification of HFT is critical. The literature has limited choices and
depends on either one or both of the two approaches i) to use an exchange provided HFT
flag dataset and ii) to define a proxy which tracks the footprint of HFT. Some of the
possible disadvantages (Conrad, Wahal and Xiang, 2015) of using exchange-identified
HFT data are that exchange houses select samples according to their own criteria and
this may not be free from the possible conflict of interest, which prevails among the
users of HFT flagged data, HFT firms and trading platforms. Other than that, sample
firms appear to be large and specialized in HFT often operate in several exchanges across
countries. There are various reasons why there could be a non-random distribution of
trades across trading venues due to their heterogeneity in liquidity, fee structure etc.
Therefore, sometimes, drawing inferences from these datasets may not reflect the true
HFT behavior. In contrast, a proxy tracks the predominant market making nature of HFT
through posting and renewing quotes.
The literature has introduced several HFT proxies defined on: (i) daily net
position—intermediaries with high volume trades and low intraday and overnight position
considered as HFT (Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun, 2017); ii) ‘Strategic Runs’ of
linked messages (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013) where the proxy exploits the particular
order sending and cancelling pattern of low-latency traders ; iii) electronic message traffic
rate/normalized electronic message traffic rate (Hendershott et al., 2011), quote updates
(Conrad et al., 2015), message-to-trade ratios (Friederich and Payne, 2015; Frino et al.,
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2017). TRTH datasets do not support the measure in (i) and (ii), as no ‘order id’ field is
provided with the supplied data of European markets.
To exploit the benefit of the rich sample dataset, a set of HFT proxies are defined. This
study mainly relies on HFT proxy defined on the message traffic rate (per unit of time),
and it will be explained later why this measure is preferred over others. The principal
HFT proxy is defined on three different depth levels—from the narrowest to the widest
depth—of a limit order book. The first, hf t1, the second, hf t2 and the third, hf t3, HFT
proxies measure the per-minute message traffic in the best limit prices (BBO), the five best
limit prices and the ten best limit prices respectively. These alternative proxies defined on
different depth levels are motivated from the recent evidence reported in a HFT case study
(Financial Markets Regulator (France), 2017) which shows that HFTs actively participate
beyond the best limit prices. It also reports that the average market share of HFT in the
BBO, the two best limit prices and the three best limit prices are 70:8%, 77:3% and 79:3%
respectively.
In defining HFT proxies, I track every millisecond record to detect any change in all
ten best price limits due to: i) order execution, ii) arrival of new limit order, ii) quote
cancellation, and iv) quote modification; then aggregate them to daily sum divided by the
number of minutes allocated for each daily automated trading session (8.00 to 16.30).
I also develop proxies similar to Hendershott et al. (2011), which are hf t1h, hf t2h,
and hf t3h based on BBO, five best price limits and ten best price limits respectively,
and order to trade ratio (OTR). Boehmer et al. (2015) also use the measure similar to
Hendershott et al. (2011) calculated for the only best quotes as they did not have access
beyond the best limit prices in the dataset. Though OTR is used in many countries (
e.g. Italy, Germany , EU) as a benchmark to impose financial tax or other regulatory
measure on HFT activities, it has flaws. European Securities and Markets Authority
(2014) describes OTR as a useful metric to assess potential risks linked to trading system
overload rather a method to identify firms carrying out HFT activities.
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The electronic message rate (hf t1) is defined as
hf t1it = qupdate1it/T;
where qupdate1it is the aggregate quote update at 10 best limit prices for stock i on day
t and T is the length of trading sessions (in minutes). hf t2 and hf t3 are also defined in
the same way on the relevant depth of the order book. hf t1h is defined as
hf t1hit = valueit/(qupdate1it  100)  ( 1);
where valueit is the value of the trading volume of stock i on day t . Finally, ordtot rd1
is defined as
ordtot rd1it = qupdate1it/ntradesit ;
where ntradesit is the number of executed trade of stock i on day t .
One of the widely used measures of HFT proxy in the empirical literature is hf t1h,
based on Hendershott et al. (2011) which measures the number of electronic messages
per $100 of trading volume. The measure is normalized in the original literature to adjust
for an upward trend of trading volume which was particular to NYSE's and the employed
sample period (2001–2005). To put the measure in the same spirit of the message traffic
per unit of time (hf t1), they use the dollar volume per electronic message time ( 1) which
practically measures the negative of traded value per message. An increase in the ratio or
a smaller absolute value of the ratio stands for the increase in HFT intensity over time. A
problem with this measure is that this interpretation does not hold when this ratio is used
to compare two groups of stocks, or in other words, comparing this measure across stocks
does not provide the same interpretation.
Let us imagine, for stock X, the value of jhf t1hj is v1 and that for stock Y is v2 where
v1 < v2. It can’t be said that HFT traders are more intense in stocks X (lower v1) than
Y, practically, it is the reverse. Let us imagine again, for any stock, the value of jhf t1hj
at time t1 and t2 are v1t1 and v1t2 respectively . In this setup, v2t2 < v1t2 implies that
HFT intensity is more at t2 than t1 which is consistent with the definition. Figures A.3 and
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A.2 show that both the small-cap and large-cap quintiles have the same HFT time trends
which can be interpreted as the increase in HFT intensity over time. If the same measure
is compared across quintiles, one has to be careful in interpreting the values. The higher
value of HFT proxy in small cap quintile (Figure A.3b) does not necessarily mean that
HFTs/ATs are more intense in small-cap stocks; rather the opposite is the case. This is
also true in interpreting ordtot rd1.
Moreover, the period 2005–2016 which is used to construct the sample is not
associated with any increasing volume trend. Conversely, the LSE has lost market share
to the competing alternative trading venues during the same period (see Figure A.4).
Besides, both the normalized measures, hf t1h and ordtot rd1, do not incorporate the
technological aspects of HFT which is revealed through the speed of message trafficking.
If Figures A.4a and A.2 are compared, it can be seen that over the sample period hf t1
increased monotonically though the trading value declined. Proxies defined on the speed
aspect of HFT (hf t1) do not encounter the explained issues as observed in hf t1h.
To avoid these pitfalls, I only employ the HFT proxies developed on electronic
message rate (hf t1, hf t2 and hf t3) in the regression estimates, but use them all in
descriptive analyses. One should also be aware of the fact that use of message traffic
intensity per unit of time as a HFT proxy has its own limitation in tracking HFTs’ footprint.
It does not reflect the activity of a particular HFT, rather it should reveal a mixture of
strategies adopted by HFTs. The analyses should contemplate the impact of dominant
strategy because the mixture of strategies in actual markets may overwhelm the effect of
one strategy or the other (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).
2.3.2.3 Market fragmentation
I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI )—the most commonly used definition
of market concentration in literature—as the proxy of market fragmentation. Market
fragmentation refers to the extent to which order flow of a security is split across
exchanges. Fragmentation measures used in this study refer to the fragmentation of
order flows across lit trading venues (where HFTs only participate). Though market
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fragmentation commonly refers to the volume fragmentation, recently, some literature
came up with the idea of quote fragmentation. For instance, Madhavan (2012) argues
volume fragmentation does not incorporate the HFT aspect which is demonstrated through
huge quote update across exchanges. One of the limitations of traditional volume based
measure is that it shows the end results of the traders routing decision across trading venues
but fails to incorporate the huge quoting activities devoted by HFT behind every trade.
Looking at quote based measure, one can learn more cross markets footprint of HFT. I
define and use both volume and quote based fragmentation measures. Stock level volume
fragmentation,HHItrdit , is defined as
HHItrdit = 1/
nX
j
vij ;
where vij is the square of the trading volume share on venue j among n for security i
at day t . This is a normalized measure which ranges from 1 to n, where 1 stands for no
fragmentation or full concentration in the primary venue and n for evenly distributed order
flow across n exchanges. Since this study considers one primary venue (LSE) and three
alternative exchanges (n = 4) , the range is defined as, 1 <= HHItrdit <= 4. Some
literature (Degryse et al., 2015) also use the non-inverted form of the same measure that is
referred to asHHItrd2 here. A quote fragmentation proxy (HHIqulit ) can be defined
in a similar fashion by replacing trade volume with quote update. HHIqulit is defined
as
HHIqulit = 1/
nX
j
qlij ;
where qij is the square of the quote update share for the depth level l in the limit order
book at venue j (among n), for security i at day t .
2.3.3 Descriptive statistics
This section presents the descriptive evidence associating HFT, market fragmentation
and market liquidity using the full sample of 149 stocks for the period December
2005–December 2016 after winsorizing extreme 1% values on both tails. To facilitate
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cross sectional comparison, the full sample is divided into 5 equal quintiles based
on market capitalization. Descriptive analyses show that both aggregate and quintile
based measures (mean, median and standard deviations), monthly trends over the period
2005–2016, and pre and post-MiFID periods averages. All measures are calculated on
LSE data4.
High frequency trading
Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 present the descriptive summary of the three HFT proxies
measured at three depth levels. The first proxy (hf t ), for its three variants hf t1, hf t2
and hf t3, measures the per-minute electronic message update in the ten best price limits,
five best price limits and BBO respectively. The second proxy, hf th, for its two variants
hf t1h and hf t2h, measures the HFT intensity in the best 10 price limits and 5 price limits
respectively. The third, ordtot rd , is shown for only the ten best price limits. Figures A.2
and A.3 present the monthly time series evolution of the three HFT proxies during the
period 2005–2016.
These measures show that HFT intensity increased remarkably over the years. The
trend reflects the phenomenon which started to explode in European markets at the
beginning of 2008 and has grown monotonically over the periods except a small bump
in 2012, though ordtot rd shows almost no growth starting from 2011. As can be seen,
HFT intensity increased significantly across cross sections but in different magnitude.
Table A.5 shows that average message traffic rate (hf t1) in 2005 starts at 9 messages
per-minute and rises to 176 messages in 2016. It can also be seen that HFT activities are
more intensive in the large stocks. For example, the quintile of the highest capitalized
stocks (Large) starts from 22 messages in 2005 (whereas the smallest starts from below 5
messages) and rises to around 650 messages per-minute at the beginning of 2016 (whereas
the smallest-cap rises to 60 messages) before falling to around 340 messages at the end of
2016 (the smallest falls to 37 messages).
Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 also show that the general trend of rising HFT during this
4Table A.2 (Panel B) shows the periodical coverage of stocks in detail.
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long period has not been interrupted by any mid or long-term economic shocks through
which European markets have undergone during the last decade, rather, these shocks have
magnified the HFT intensity manifold, instead.
Market fragmentation
Figure A.5a shows the fragmentation index for the period 2005–2016. All measures reflect
the fragmentation of LSE listed stocks across LSE, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise. Table
A.1 (Panel C), shows that these four trading venues share around 100% market share of
lit turnover of the stocks which have primary listing in LSE and also fragmented in other
alternative trading venues. So, not including the other alternative trading venue’s except
these four should not make any difference in the fragmentation scenario as we see in Figure
A.5a.
Since the starting of the post-MiFID era in 2008, we see stocks, both large and small,
started to fragment sharply across alternative trading venues. Consistently, Figure A.4a
shows that LSE’s trading volume declined in the same period, which indicates that LSE
lost its substantial market share to the competing trading venues (see also Figure A.4b). As
can be seen (also from Figure A.5a), large stocks are relatively more fragmented. Over the
sample period, the fragmentation gap between large-cap and small-cap stocks decreased
but did not close completely. Until 2011, the split in venue market share grew steeply
and started to slow down afterwards. With few small bumps, stocks across the quintiles
reached the maximum fragmentation point at the end of 2015, before starting to fall at
the beginning of 2016. The fragmentation index never reached the theoretical maximum
(which is four(4)), that suggests, the gain from alternative floors has not come to substitute
for the heterogenous users’ needs that can be fulfilled by a primary trading floor as LSE.
Table A.6 and A.7 present the yearly and quintile based market fragmentation statistics
respectively. The evolution of market fragmentation is shown in Figures A.5a and A.5b,
where the former shows the traditional volume based measure and the latter a measure
of quote fragmentation. The two figures reveal a notable difference between quote
and volume fragmentation that quotes’ fragmentation (HHIqu5) was more symmetrical
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across markets and followed a steeper path to reach its peak. Table A.6 provides evidence
thatmarkets fragmentedmore and faster in quoting activities than trade execution. Quotes’
fragmentation is almost symmetrical across markets, though 75% of trades, on average,
are executed only in CHIX and LSE.
Market liquidity
Tables A.8 and A.9 report the yearly pre and post-MiFID liquidity descriptive summary
for the period 2005–2016. The liquidity measures presented in these tables are the
absolute quoted spread (spread_abs), the relative quoted spread (spread_bps), the
relative effective half-spread ( espread ), the 5-minute realized half-spread (rspread ),
the 5-minute price impact (price_impact ), the average best depth level at the best limit
prices (depth1), and the average cumulative depth for the three best prices (depth3).
Figures A.6, A.7 and A.8a present liquidity trends observed during the period 2005-2016.
All measures, except depth1 and depth3, reveal substantial improvement of
liquidity. For instance, overall spreads decreased by more than one-half to 30 bps at the
end of 2016 compared to 13.5 bps in 2005. Spreads decreased asymmetrically across
the quintiles. Quoted spreads in the largest-cap group decreased around 70% (from 17
bps in 2005 to 5.5 bps in 2016) and 90% (from 48 bps in 2005 to 10 bps in 2016) for the
smallest stock.
To make the percentage quoted spread comparable to other three liquidity
measures—effective half-spreads, realized-half spreads and price-impacts—the former is
to be scaled down by a factor of 2. This makes it equivalent to a half-round trip cost of
a hypothetical transaction. As can be seen, effective-half spreads also decreased across
quintiles. The average effective spread, for the whole sample, is 60% lower in 2016 than
in 2015. Tables A.8 and A.9 show that effective spreads are smaller than quoted spreads
(20 bps vs. 28 bps in the pre-MIFID period and 13 bps vs. 18 bps in the post-MIFID),
which is evidently reflecting the hidden liquidity and also indicative of within-quote
trading.
Tables A.10 and A.11 report the effective-half spread decomposition
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into realized-half spreads and price impacts. I develop four measures,
rspread1/prce_impact1, rspread2/price_impact2, rspread3/price_impact3
and rspread4/price_impact4 based on 10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1-minute and
5-minute post-trade quote adjustment periods (∆), respectively. The literature has mostly
used the 5-minute quote update gap in doing the same decomposition. The idea of
using the lower granularity of time in measuring realized spreads and price impacts
is consistent with the recent proliferation of low-latency trading environments across
European markets.
Between 2005–2016, both realized spreads and price impacts declined, which
explains the same trend observed in effective spreads. One of the possible reasons for
declining realized spreads is that, in the presence of HFT the market has achieved better
execution quality over the period. This evidence of decreased realized spread differs
from Hendershott et al. (2011), who report the opposite impact that was observed after
the introduction of auto quote in NYSE (which they also refer to as an unexpected
finding). Table A.10 shows that all the variants of realized half-spreads across quintiles
turn negative in the post-MIFID period, whereas only 5-minute realized half-spread for
mid-cap and large-cap stocks are seen to be negative in the pre-MIFID era. The higher
the time gap between trade execution and post-trade quote update, the less the realized
spreads are, and conversely for price impact measures. Generally, larger cap stocks
have smaller realized spreads and price impacts—a well evident stylized fact commonly
observed in liquidity analysis.
The study of the time-series evolution of liquidity, along with general equity market
trend (Figure A.1) reveals that liquidity as measured by quoted and effective spreads
is sensitive to economic and financial shocks. Events such as the financial crisis in
2008-2009, the euro-area sovereign debt crisis in 2011, the Chinese market crash in 2015,
Brexit, US presidential election in 2015-2016 explain the extreme illiquidity conditions
illustrated in the graph during the same periods.
Figure A.8a, shows that BBO level’s depth started to decrease steeply for large-cap
stocks since 2005, long before the implementation of MIFID. This might be attributable
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to the common driving forces of the similar trend that is also observed in average trade
sizes (Figure A.8b), and a monotonically rising message traffic rate (FigureA.2) during
the same period. The trend showing decreasing depth might be attributable to the
narrowed spreads as market makers have less incentive to offer a large depth as usually
done for wider spreads. The literature (Hendershott et al., 2011; Gresse, 2017; Aitken
et al., 2014) argues for the possible link between the rising HFT intensity and decreasing
trade sizes around the global financial marketplaces, especially in the last decade. HFTs
typically trade in small lots and prominently use slice-and-dice strategy in executing the
large order. Aitken et al. (2014) provide evidence that substantial changes in trade size is
linked to the rise of HFT.
Trends revealed in trade sizes and quoted depths are consistent with the argument that
recent changes in market microstructure, particularly HFT, have impacted trade sizes,
which in turn have affected the average depth level. For example, Table A.9 shows that
in the pre-MiFID period , 2005-2007, the average depth level in best price limit, depth1,
and three best price limits, depth3, for all stocks are GBP854 and GBP3047 respectively
and which decrease to GBP260 and GBP1331 respectively in the post MiFD period.
Both periods are also associated with higher depth in large-cap stocks. Figure A.8a also
reports that depth level offered for the best limit prices in large stocks appears to have
increased steadily since 2009.
Correlations analysis
Table A.13 shows the correlation coefficients between liquidity, HFT, and market
fragmentation measures respectively. Correlation between liquidty, HFT proxy (hf t2)
and market fragmentation proxy (HHItrd ) show that HFT intensity is negatively
correlated with quoted spreads (-0.78), effective spreads (-0.77), realized spreads (-0.15),
price impacts (-0.58), and positively correlated with fragmentation proxy (0.55), BBO
level depth (0.38), and cumulative depths (0.47). On the other hand, fragmentation proxy
(HHItrd) is negatively correlated with quoted spreads (-0.40), effective spreads (-0.45),
BBO level depth (-0.09), realized spreads (-0.04), price impacts (-0.58) and positively
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correlated with cumulative depths (0.08). These estimates show a positive association
between liquidity andHFT and also between liquidity andmarket fragmentation; however,
the correlation between HFT and liquidity is much stronger. In the existence of highly
positive correlation between HFT and fragmentation, the apparently visible correlation
among variables might be dubious and necessarily not indicate the causality. I examine
the associations among these variable in the next section more systematically.
2.4 Research strategies, results and discussions
The setup and identification of the regressions models, empirical findings and their
analysis are presented in this section. I present the basic setup and results using OLS
in the section 2.4.1. In sections 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, I control for the possible endogeneity
issues that could affect the OLS inferences through two alternative approaches, IV-GMM
(H2SLS) and simultaneous equations estimation (H3SLS).
2.4.1 Basic setup and identification
The relationships among HFT, market fragmentation and liquidity are examined in six
alternative linear specifications. The potential unobserved heterogeneity across firms is
addressed by introducing stock fixed effects and time effects, in all six specifications. The
basic specification starts with the HFT proxy, the main regressor of interest. The first
specification is:
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + 
0Xit + it ; (2.1)
where MQit represents one of the daily (t ) market quality measures (spread_bps,
espread , depth1, depth3, rspread or price_impact ) for stock i ,HF Tit represents
one of the HFT proxies (hf t1, hf t2 or hf t3), the vector Xit includes three control
variables, log normalized market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log normalized intraday
mid price volatility (Log(volt int ra)) and inverse of daily average prices (invprice),
which are commonly evident as liquidity determinant in empirical market microstructure
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literature, ˛1 is the firm fixed effects, and t is the time fixed effects.
The expanded second specification on (2.1) includes the daily market fragmentation
proxy,Mf ragit , with HF Tit , so that the impact of both HFT and market fragmentation
can be assessed in the same model. The second specification is :
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + ˇ2MFragit + 
0Xit + it ; (2.2)
whereMFragit is the market fragmentation proxy, measured byHHItrd .
The idea of the interaction effect between HFT and market fragmentation arises from
the fact that the level of fragmentation and HFT are likely to influence each other. For
example, if HFT firms wish to engage in market making across markets they must rely on
stocks which are fragmented. Consequently, the level of HFT participation across markets
is likely to impact the fragmentation level itself. It can be argued that if there exists an
impact of HFT and fragmentation on market quality, then the level of each on which the
other ride might also play a role in determining the extent of impact. It might be the case
that the effect of HFT on the market quality of a low fragmented stock is different from
that of a high fragmented stock, or that the level of HFT participation also determines the
extent to which market fragmentation impacts stock’s liquidity or both. At this point, I
expand the model (2.2) to include an additional interaction term between HFT and market
fragmentation proxies. The third specification is:
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + ˇ2MFragit + ˇ3HF Tit MFragit
+  0Xit + it :
(2.3)
Models defined so far are time-invariant. If the impact of HFT and market
fragmentation is not static then the above three models only provide an over the
period average estimates. To see the estimates’ dynamics, model (2.1)–(2.3) are
extended to include period dummies. The fourth, fifth and sixth specifications address
the time-varying impact of HFT, market fragmentation and their interaction. The
expanded fourth specification on (2.2) includes three additional time interaction dummies,
DY r(8; 9; 10), DY r(11; 12; 13) and DY r(14; 15; 16) which represent the respective
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period dummy, withHF Tit . The fourth specification is :
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + ˇ2MFragit + ˇ3HF Tit MFragit
+ ˇ4HF Tit DY r(8; 9; 10) + ˇ5HF Tit DY r(11; 12; 13)
+ ˇ6HF Tit DY r(14; 15; 16) +  0Xit + it :
(2.4)
The model (2.4) compares the HFT impact on liquidity in three equally divided
post-MiFID eras, (2008–2010), (2011–2013), (2014–2016) with that averagely observed
in the pre-MiFID period (2005–2007).
The expanded fifth specification on (2.2) includes two additional time interaction
dummies, DY r(11; 12; 13) and DY r(14; 15; 16), with market fragmentation proxy
(MFragit ), which represent two evenly divided terms of the period 2011-2016.
Essentially, the fifth specification is :
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + ˇ2MFragit + ˇ3HF Tit MFragit
+ ˇ4MFragit DY r(11; 12; 13) + ˇ5MFragit DY r(14; 15; 16)+
+  0Xit + it :
(2.5)
The model (2.5) compares the market fragmentation impact in (2011-2013), (2014-2016)
with that observed, on average, in the initial three years (2008-2010) of market
fragmentation.
Finally, the expanded sixth specification on specification (2.3) includes two more
HF Tit and MFragit interaction terms interacted with the two time dummies,
DY r(14; 15; 16) and DY r(11; 12; 13) respectively. The model is expected to assess the
time-varying impacts of market fragmentation and HFT interaction onmarket quality. The
sixth and final specification is :
MQit = ˛i + t + ˇ1HF Tit + ˇ2MFragit
+ ˇ3HF Tit MFragit + ˇ4HF Tit MFragit DY r(11; 12; 13)
+ ˇ4HF Tit MFragit DY r(14; 15; 16) +  0Xit + it :
(2.6)
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Results and discussions
To avoid the econometric pitfalls due to unbalanced panel estimation, a balanced panel
is constructed from the primarily selected sample with 132 stocks and 2624 trading days
(for the period December 2005–December 2016). For cross sectional comparison, the
sample is also classified into two equal quintiles of 66 stocks each, based on market
capitalization. To facilitate time-varying analyses, the sample is further divided into
four periods: (i) 2005–2007, represents the pre-MiFID era; and (ii) three equally divided
periods, 2008–2010, 2011-2013 and 2014-2016, represent the post-MiFID distinct phases.
Table A.12, calculated from the balanced panel for the full sample and subsamples, shows
the relevant descriptive statistics of regression variables which should be used as average
reference value for all regression estimates. All measures, other than realized-half spreads,
are natural log transformed. Realized-half spreads, on average, are negative and not
transformable. The message traffic rate developed for the five best limit prices (hf t2)
is used as the HFT proxy in all analyses otherwise it is not stated since a comparison
across three HFT measures (hf t1, hf t2 and hf t3) shows that the impact of hf t2 is the
strongest, which is also presented in a later section (2.4.1.6).
Models (2.1)–(2.3) are estimated employing both full sample and subsamples of
large and small stocks for different liquidity measures. Models (2.4)–(2.6) are estimated
employing the four periodical subsamples. The coefficient estimates in all models are
OLS, and the standard errors are computed using the Newey-West HAC estimator, a
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator (lags for
autocorrelation are optimally determined). All estimates include both time (daily) and
stock fixed effects.
The remainder of this section is organized as follows. The estimates for Models
(2.1)–(2.3) for different liquidity measures employing the full sample are presented in
the subsections 2.4.1.1 and 2.4.1.2. Subsection 2.4.1.3 presents the estimates for the same
models employing large and small stocks’s subsamples. Subsection 2.4.1.4 presents an
analysis on the estimates for realized half-spreads and price-impacts (a decompositions of
effective half-spreads). Subsection 2.4.1.5 presents the estimates for Models (2.4)–(2.6)
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employing four periodical subsamples for three groups of stocks—All, large and small
stocks. Subsection 2.4.1.6 presents the analysis comparing alternative HFT proxies
employing the full sample.
2.4.1.1 HFT and market fragmentation
The regression results for the liquidity measures employing the whole sample are
reported in Table A.14. Upper panel (Panel A) reports the result for the first three
liquiditymeasures—spread_bpsit , espreadit and depthit—and the lower Panel (Panel
B) reports the rest—depth3i t , rspread_5minit , and price_impact_5minit . Sub
columns (1), (2), (3) report the results for the models (1), (2) and (3) respectively. The
coefficients of Log(hf t2) and HHItrd measure the association of HFT intensity and
market fragmentation with the market quality measures respectively. We observe from
the coefficient of hf t2it that higher HFT intensity is associated with lower quoted and
effective spreads, lower depth (in the both depth1 and depth3), lower realized spreads
and price impacts. On the contrary, the coefficients of MFragit show that higher
fragmentation is associated with higher quoted and effective spreads, lower BBO depth,
higher depth in the deep of the order book (not significant), lower realized spreads and
higher price impacts.
We must be careful in the interpretation of the estimated coefficient since the
variables used in the estimation have different measurement scales. For example, to
interpret the coefficient of hf t2 , we would recall that hf t2 measures the per-minute
electronic message trafficking rate and the liquidity measures—other than the depth1 and
depth3—are measured in basis point and depth1 and depth3 are measured in GBP100.
Since both hf t2 and market quality measures are log normalized, the interpretation
becomes easier and does not depend any more on the unit of measurement. Thus, the
estimate of  0:288 of Log(hf t2) (Panel A, column I) means that, ceteris paribus, 1%
increase in the HFT is associated with 0:288% decrease in quoted spread. For instance, a
one standard deviation increase in HFT from its sample mean of 95 messages/per-minute
to 220 (Log(220/95)  88% ) would narrow quoted spreads by 25% (88*0.288) i.e.
37
the sample mean of quoted spreads would go down from 18:37 bps to 13:77 bps (for
descriptive statistics, see Table A.12). The coefficient ofHHItrd is not log transformed,
so the estimate of 0:052 (Panel A, column II) against the log transformed quoted spreads
means that, ceteris paribus, a unit increase in HHItrd , for example, from the sample
mean of 2:17 to 3:17 is associated with 5:2% increase in quoted spreads.
The coefficients of hf t2 and HHItrd on rspread_5min have different
interpretations due to the use of a different measurement scale. The estimate of  1:871 of
hf t2 (Panel B, columnV)means that a one percent increase (decrease) in the averagehf t2
would decrease (increase) the average realized half-spreads by 0:0187 bps. Since both
the HHItrd and rspread_5min are employed in the regression in their original unit
of measurement, the estimate of  0:245 (Panel B, column V) means that a unit increase
(decrease) inHHItrd is associated with a decrease (increase) of 0:245 bps in the average
realized half-spreads.
The impact of hf t2 and HHItrd on the average quoted depth is negative, which
implies that both the HFT and fragmentation are associatedwith less average quoted depth.
The positive sign of the coefficient HHItrd in column II (Panel B) implies that more
fragmentation is associated with more quoted depth in the deeper level of an limit order
book, however the coefficient is not significant. One might argue that the depleted market
liquidity through the quoted depth is likely to outweigh the benefit of the liquidity added
through the narrower quoted and effective spreads. Hendershott et al. (2011) perform a
calibration exercise to overcome the doubt and concluded that the depth reduction is small
relative to the narrowing of the spread.
The coefficients of the control variables have the expected signs and are significant
at the 1% level. The large market capitalized stocks are associated with lower quoted
and effective spreads, lower price impacts, greater depth and higher realized spreads. The
inverse price coefficient implies that a stock with higher price is associated with lower
quoted and effective spreads, higher depth and lower realized spreads and price impacts.
The positive estimate of the volatility coefficient implies that a higher intraday volatility
increases quoted and effective spreads, provides greater depth in the best price, and is
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associated with higher price impact and lower realized spread.
2.4.1.2 Interaction between HFT and market fragmentation
I now turn to the most interesting specification (2.3) and the corresponding estimates for
ˇ3 (column III, VI, IX of Panel A and B) presented in the Table A.14. The coefficient ˇ3
measures the interaction effect between HFT and market fragmentation. The coefficients
associated to both main effects, hf t2 and HHItrd , are all significant at the 1% level
other than in column III (Panel A), which is only significant at the 10% level, and in
column III (Panel B), which is not significant at all. All the interactions signs are negative
except that for the realized-half spread. A negative sign (column III and VI) for the
interaction estimate implies that an increase in HFT is associated with higher liquidity
when fragmentation is greater, and an increase in fragmentation is associated with less
harm to liquidity when HFT is higher.
Since in the presence of interaction term (Log(hf t2) HHItrd ) the interpretation
of the coefficient estimates of the variables hf t2 andHHItrd become tricky, it is useful
here to explain the interpretation of the parameters in model (2.3). In the given setting,
the partial effect of hf t2 on liquidity depends on the average level ofHHItrd , and vice
versa. Let us define a general expression for the partial effect. Partial effects of hf t2 and
HHItrd (on liquidity) can be defined as ∆MQit/∆(HF Tit) = ˇ1 + ˇ3 MFragit
and∆MQit/∆(MFragit) = ˇ2 + ˇ3 HF Tit respectively. To interpret partial effects,
these expressions should be evaluated at some interesting values. I evaluate them at sample
mean, which is a well-practised norm among academics.
For instance, the estimated coefficient on the interaction term between HFT and
market fragmentation against the response variable effective-half spread is  0:02 ( Table
A.14, Panel A, Column VI), and the respective estimates for the partial effects of HFT
(∆espread/∆(Log(hf t2)) and market fragmentation (∆espread/∆(HHItrd ) are
( 0:282 0:022:17 ) 0:32 and (0:144 0:02Log(96) ) 0:053 respectively5. These
estimates are close to the estimated coefficients on the same variables where the interaction
5The general expressions for the partial effect are evaluated at the sample means of HFT (96) and market
fragmentation (2:17) as reported in Table A.12.
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effects are not introduced (column V of Panel A). I do not report joint significance tests
for partial effects, which are trivial as both interaction and main effects are significant.
The model (3) greatly expands the understanding of the relationship of HF Tit and
MFragit . The results indicate that models without interaction effects could lead to
a misspecification as the effect is statistically significant, and one could argue that the
model (2.1) and model (2.2) are poorly specified as no interaction terms are included. The
marginal effect of hf t2 andHHItrd in model (2.3) are generally smaller than observed
in (2.2) and (2.1), which may imply that some of the possible benefits of HFT intensity
on market liquidity is offset by the extra cost of market making in a fragmented market.
Conversely, some extra cost of market fragmentation is also offset by the benefits derived
from HFT . It seems that a fragmented market would be more detrimental to liquidity if
there was no HFT.
2.4.1.3 Large and small stocks
Table A.15 reports the estimates of the model (2.1)–(2.3) for large and small stocks. For
brevity, I do not report the estimates for control variables which are significant, at the
1% level, and have the same signs as they appear in the estimated coefficients for the full
sample in Table A.14. Panel A1 and B1 report the estimates for large stocks and Panel A2
and B2 do the same for small stocks.
The estimated coefficients for Log(hf t2) and HHItrd are significant (at the 1%
level) and larger than the respective estimates for small stocks, which implies that both
HFT and market fragmentation impacted the liquidity of large stocks more (column I, II,
IV, V of both Panel A1 and A2). This difference in estimates between large and small
stocks also may imply that HFT is associated with more liquidity for large stocks whereas
market fragmentation is more liquidity detrimental for small ones.
Table A.15 shows that the estimated interaction coefficients on HFT and fragmentation
for large stocks are significant, at the 1% level (column III, VI and IX in both Panel A1
and B1), and that for small stocks show a few exceptions (column III, VI and IX in both
Panel A2 and B2). The results of the Wald test, a test for joint hypothesis, are reported
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where marginal effect of market fragmentation (HHItrd ), or interaction between market
fragmentation and HFT (HF T Mf rag), or both are not significant.
As can be seen from Table A.15, the estimated interaction coefficients on HFT and
fragmentation against quoted and effective spreads for large stocks are negative, but those
for small stocks are positive. This contradiction in the direction of interaction effect
between large and small stocks hint to two different implications. An increase in HFT
for a higher fragmentation or an increase in fragmentation for a higher HFT activity is
associated with a higher liquidity for large stocks whereas the same appears detrimental
to liquidity for small stocks, which suggests that fragmentation is more liquidity harming
for small stocks.
Table A.15 also reports an interesting finding regarding the effect of HFT and
market fragmentation on the quoted depth. The estimated coefficients on fragmentation
(HHItrd ) and HFT (hf t2) variables against the average quoted depth at best price
(depth1) appear to have the same sign in all three group of samples—Full, large-cap
and small-cap. The estimated coefficient on fragmentation (HHItrd ) is positive
and significant at the 1% level (Panel B1 , column III), which implies that market
fragmentation contributed more liquidity to the deeper of the order book in contrast to the
HFT which decreased quoted depth at both best price(depth1) and beyond that (depth3).
2.4.1.4 Sources of liquidity supply
The results reported in Table A.14 and A.15 for the effective-half spread decomposition
into realized-half spreads and price impacts are discussed in this section. As reported
earlier in the previous section, column (IV)–(VI) in Panel A of Table A.14 and the same
columns in Panel A1 and A2 of Table A.14 show that an increase in HFT is associated
with lower effective spreads whereas an increase in market fragmentation results in greater
effective spreads. The column (IV)–(IX) in Panel B of Table A.14 and the same column
in Panel B1 and B2 of Table A.15 reports the coefficients associated with realized-half
spreads and price impacts.
A narrower (greater) effective spread implies either less (more) revenue per trade for
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liquidity providers, or smaller (larger) gross loss due to informed liquidity demanders,
or both (Hendershott et al., 2011). Respective columns in both tables show that both
HFT and market fragmentation positively impacted the realized-half spread and the
price impacts measured at 5-minute intervals and the results are robust across all stocks
group. Apparently, HFT has improved the execution quality, and it can be seen in the
descriptive statistics (Table 2.23) that the realized spread has turned to almost negative in
the post-MiFID era. The negative effects on realized-half spreads indicate that liquidity
providers are earning less revenue per trade than before. On the other hand, liquidity
providers are also losing less to liquidity demanders (less adverse selection). But the
significant interaction effect betweenHHItrd and hf t2 implies that higher HFT in more
fragmented market, or more fragmented market with higher HFT is detrimental to both
realized-half spreads and price impacts. The reported effects of HFT on the realized spread
and price impacts are quite expected in HFT environments. It seems that, the low-latency
environment increases HFTs’ market making capability in every side of the order book
which in turn reduces both realized spreads and price impacts. If we consider HFT as a
market making agent, one would rationally expect that HFTs try to design algorithm such
as to minimize the adverse selection cost and HFT as a liquidity demander would try to
do the same to get better execution. I excerpt few relevant lines from a recent trading
magazine’s article by Rick Baert (http://www.pionline.com).
“Money managers and internally managed pension funds are expected to follow the
lead of T. Rowe Price Group Inc. in sending direct equity order flow to high-frequency
trading firms, which could chip away at the established use of brokers to direct institutional
trades, sources said...Added Valerie Bogard, equity analyst at TABB Group LLC, New
York: ‘The buy side has gotten more comfortable with high-frequency trading firms, and
they weren’t before. A lot of their strategies used to make the buy side uncomfortable. But
now the buy side understands much better how those firms work and they’re ramping up
their transaction cost analysis, and HFT firms are providing the liquidity they need.’...T.
Rowe Price executives said in the past two years the real success of the program has been
in finding liquidity—a growing problem for institutions as fewer stocks trade on public
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markets and more institutional investors move toward passive investing...‘ The execution
quality has been solid,’ said Mehmet Kinak, vice president and head of global equity
market structure and electronic trading at T. Rowe Price, Baltimore...”
2.4.1.5 Time-varying impact
This section presents the regression results for the specification (2.4)–(2.6). Model (2.4)
examines the incremental impact of HFT for the last three three-year consecutive periods.
Model (2.4) essentially examines the incremental HFT impact on the last 9 years sample
period, in three equally divided blocks, with the beginning three years. Model (2.5)
examines the incremental impact of market fragmentation for the last two three-year
consecutive periods. Model (2.6) examines the incremental interaction effect of HFT and
market fragmentation in the last 6 years of the sample, divided into two equally divided
three-year blocks, with that of the first three years since 2008. Table A.16 reports the
results for the full sample and Table A.17 and A.18 report the same for both large and
small stocks groups. For brevity, Table A.17 and A.18 do not report coefficient estimates
of control variable which are significant and have the same expected sign as in Table A.16.
All coefficients in Table A.16 are significant at the 1% level, except one (panel
A, column I) and show that incremental effects of HFT (hf t2), market fragmentation
(HHItrd ) and interaction of market fragmentation and HFT (hf t2  HHItrd ) are
highly significant. This implies that HFT and market fragmentation impacted market
liquidity differently in different periods. The average impact of HFT and market
fragmentation (as reported previously in Table A.14) remained the same. For example, the
coefficient of Log(hf t2) DY r8; 9; 10 (Panel A, column I) is  0:03 which implies that
compared to the period 2005–2007, a 1% increase in HFT during 2008-2010 is associated
with 0.03% extra narrower spreads. We also observe a similar effect during this period in
effective spread, realized-half spreads and price impacts. This result is very significant in
the sense that the period 2008-2010 is a period of high illiquidity and high volatility due
to global financial crisis (as can be seen in Figures A.6a or A.6b). The evidence provided
in Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) also confirm the similar effect.
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There might be different reasons why HFT could create positive externality in the
market at the time that the market needs it the most. Higher volatility might create more
profitable opportunity for HFT traders. In a high illiquid period, HFT even might find
small stocks—which are generally less liquid—profitable (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).
Table A.14 also shows that in the subsequent periods, since 2008 compared to 2005–2007,
higher HFT in small cap stocks is associated with less narrower quoted and effective
spreads. But among them, the incremental impact was the lowest during 2008–2010. As
long as quoted depth is concerned, HFT has impacted the depth mostly during 2008–2010.
One of the possible explanations might be that after the enactment of MiFID, the influx
of HFT impacted the trade sizes and quoted depths significantly. The coefficients of
HHItrd  DY r11; 12; 13 and HHItrd  DY r14; 15; 16 (panel A, column II,IV) are
positive which confirm the implication of the result provided in Table A.14. This means
that increased market fragmentation has depleted more liquidity during this period as
measured by quoted and effective spreads.
The previous results on HFT and market fragmentation show that HFT has improved
more liquidity in the latter periods (2011-2016) whereas in the same period market
fragmentation has been seen to be more detrimental to liquidity. The columns (III) and
(VI) of Panel A (Table A.16) show how the coefficient of HFT and market fragmentation
interaction changed over the periods. As can be seen, the sign of the interaction effect
has turned to be less intense during 2011–2013 and 2014–2016 compared to the period
2008–2010 , though the interaction effect is still negative and significant. It seems that
the increased fragmentation has offset, at least partially, the additional liquidity which
has been generated by the higher HFT during the latter periods. Column (II) of Panel B
again confirms that higher fragmentation is associated with higher quoted depth in the
deeper of the order book whereas at best price both HFT and fragmentation decreased the
quoted depth. Column (VI-IX) of Panel B shows that both HFT and market fragmentation
improved price impacts positively over the period.
It is noteworthy to recall that all period-dummy interactions show the incremental
effect which should be compared with the beginning base period. For example, in
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Table A.17, the coefficient of Log(hf t2)  DY r11; 12; 13 (Column I, Panel A) is
-0.112 (incremental effect) that has to be compared with  0:279 (the base coefficient
of Log(hf t2)). The base coefficient of Log(hf t2) during 2011–2013 can be found by
adding the incremental coefficient with the base coefficient which is 0.391 ( 0:279  
0:112). Thus, the incremental coefficient  0:112 implies that an increase in 1% HFT
during 2011-2013 is associated with 0.112% more narrower spread compared to the base
period 2005-2007.
I now examine the period-dummy effects in different stock groups. Table A.17
shows that since 2008, higher HFT in both small and large stocks are associated with
narrower quoted and effective spreads, on the contrary, higher fragmentation is more
liquidity detrimental to small stocks. The incremental interaction effect of HFT andmarket
fragmentation in large stocks (column III, VI in Panel A) has become stronger (more
negative). For large stocks, it seems that in the latter periods, a greater fragmentation
when HFT is higher, or a higher HFT when fragmentation is greater is associated with
more liquidity, whereas that for small stocks is more detrimental to liquidity (column III,
VI in Panel B). Table A.17 and A.18 also show that since 2008, an increase in HFT and
fragmentation, both are associated with far less quoted depth in large stocks whereas more
fragmentation has improved the quoted depth of smaller stocks but not the HFT. Turning
to the impact on realized spreads and price impacts, it appears that the impact of HFT on
realized spread has decreased, in both small and large stocks, over the period, while the
effect on price impacts has increased. Among all the models, realized half-spread shows
the worst fit. The effect of fragmentation on price impacts, in both small and large stocks,
has increased over the period, but that on realized spreads is the reverse. The interaction
effect on realized spreads, in both large and small stocks, is positive, but stronger in small
stocks. The same effect on price impacts is negative for both groups of stocks.
2.4.1.6 A comparison of alternative HFT proxies
In this section, I estimate Models (2.1)–(2.3) by employing three alternative HFT proxies
tracking the HFT footprint for three different depth levels of the limit order book. So
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far, hf t2, a measure based on quotes updates for five best limit prices, is used for all
estimates. As mentioned in section 2.3.2, the remaining two proxies, hf t1 and hf t3
measure the message traffic rate for the best 10 depth levels and the first best level (BBO)
respectively. Usually, the literature uses themaximum depth levels provided in the dataset,
however, it is not a common practice 6. The exercise I perform here, is likely to expand
the understanding on the HFTs liquidity supply in the deeper level of a limit order book.
Table A.19 reports the regression estimates of hf t1, hf t2, and hf t3 for different
liquidity measures. We see that all the estimates across the three HFT proxies are
significant and hf t2 is showing more reliable estimates. For example, column (III) of
Panel A reports the estimates  0:275,  0:289 and  0:265 for hf t1, hf t2 and hf t3
respectively. In the same column, it can also be seen that HFT and fragmentation
interaction coefficients are not significant except for hf t2 (subpanel A2). These results
are robust across all liquidity measures.
These results provide some insight on the soundness of HFT proxies used in this
study. Apparently, the average level of hf t1 is greater than hf t2, and hf t1 is likely
to provide the most reliable estimates. But, the analysis of HFT on alternative depth
levels does not confirm this outward observation. It appears that neither hf t1 nor hf t3
provides as much variations in regressions as supplied by hf t2, which is indicative of
HFTs participation beyond the first best limit price, but not too far from the five best limit
prices, and consitent with the evidence in Financial Markets Regulator (France) (2017).
These results also support the literature evidence that HFTs provide both tight (marketable)
and wider (non-marketable) quotes.
2.4.2 A two-stage optimal IV-GMM regression (H2SLS) approach
Endogeneity issues are commonly admitted in the HFT and fragmentation literature (e.g.
Hendershott et al. (2011); Hasbrouck and Saar (2013); Degryse et al. (2015); Gresse
(2017)). In the presence of endogeneity, establishing a causal link between HFT and
6Boehmer et al. (2015) use only the BBO level depth (as datasets do not provided access beyond the
first best limit price), a few studies employ 10 best limit prices, and Financial Markets Regulator (France)
(2017) considers the three best limit prices.
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market quality or fragmentation and market quality is challenging. It might be the case
that HFT and market quality, or market fragmentation and market quality, or both are
simultaneously determined in equilibrium, so that there may be bi-directional causality.
For example, as Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) explain “an exogenous drop in spreads might
establish a more attractive environment for, and lead to increase in, low-latency activity.”
This mechanism would induce correlation between HFT proxy and the error terms, which
makes OLS estimates inconsistent. It might also be the case that a highly liquid stock is
more fragmented than an illiquid one. There is also the possibility that fragmentation is
driven by the HFT, or a highly fragmented market attracts more HFT, and eventually both
impact market quality. If this is the case then it challenges all the previous specifications.
A simultaneous structural equations estimates is more appropriate, and indeed this is how
the endogeneity problem is addressed in the next section.
To tackle the possible biases arising from endogeneity, one solution could be adopting
an IV approach where one needs to find at least one or more distinct instruments, at least
one for each of the two endogenous variables HF Tit and MFragit , which should be
correlated with HF Tit / MFragit but not with the error terms (it ). There should be
instruments which meet the above criteria and consistently show the same association
over the whole sample period (December 2005–December 2016).
Hendershott et al. (2011) use the event of NYSE’s quote automation in 2003 that
increases AT as an exogenous instrument where they cover a relatively short post event
period, 2003-2005. Boehmer et al. (2015) use the starting date of colocation hosting by
the exchanges across countries as an instrument in their sample. Neither of the approaches
is well suited in my case. The reason is LSE underwent several market structural changes
throughout the period 2005–2016 to enhance its low-latency environment. For example,
LSE launched accelerated hosting service (in its limited form ) in September 2008 which
full service form was again launched in September 2009. In one of their latest attempts,
LSEmigrated its UK cashmarkets to a new ultra low-latency trading platform,Millennium
Exchange, in February 2011. Further, LSE introduced sponsoring access to non-member
clients from June 2011. LSE also signed contracts with third parties which also provide
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low-latency access. If we analyse these market structure changes, we would see that no
particular event explains the HFT intensity observed in the LSE (see Fig.A.2).
One of the potential problems of identifying HFT/AT through this approach
(colocation instrumenting) is that it does not go with the idea that presence of HFT
in market leads to the introduction of colocation service not the opposite. Exchanges
choose to offer colocation services in reponse to the low-latency demand of HFT (Aitken
et al., 2014). Menkveld (2016) argues that there is a bi-directional loop between a
modern trading platform and HFT requirements. Aitken et al. (2014) also shows that
HFT activities have been documented quite earlier on average than the date of first
colocation hosting event by an exchange. Historically, trading firms seeking speed located
themselves next to or across the street from the exchangewell before the colocation hosting
within the exchange.
I choose a similar approach to Hasbrouck and Saar (2013), Degryse et al. (2015) and
Gresse (2017) where they developed instruments from the existing available measures of
HF Tit andMFragit . Let us consider, any of the specifications in (2.1)–(2.6) on which
OLS coefficents are estimated in the last section. A sound instrument, for HFT intensity,
should be (i)correlated with HF Tit ; (ii) and not correlated with the it . Hasbrouck and
Saar (2013) argue that if low-latency activity has a significant market wide component
then a market wide average of HF Tit is likely to satisfy the first requirement. They
explain that funding constraints or inventory risk management might be the causes for
which HFT participate across stocks, which means that HF Tit is related with HF T it ,
and determined by the market wide HFT factors.
This exercise is performed for the fist five specifications to show that my previous
OLS estimates are robust even in IV setting due to employing large samples and
implemented control. The basic three specifications (2.1)–(2.3) used in the previous
section are redefined in the following instrumental variable modelling setup. The
redefined specifications are:
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HF Tit = a1;i +
WX
t=1
!1;t + b
0
1Zit + c
0
1Wit + "1;it ; (2.7)
MFragit = a2;i +
WX
t=1
!2;t + b
0
2Zit + c
0
2Wit + "2;it ; (2.8)
HF T MFragit = a3;i +
WX
t=1
!3;t + b
0
3Zit + c
0
3Wit + "3;it ; (2.9)
MQit = ˛i +
WX
t=1
t + 12HF Tit + 0Wit + 1;it ; (2.10)
MQit = ˛i +
WX
t=1
t + 12HF Tit + 23MFragit + 0Wit + 2;it ; (2.11)
MQit = ˛i +
WX
t=1
t + 12HF Tit + 23MFragit + 3bHF T MFragit + 0Wit + 3;it ;
(2.12)
where the vector Zit represents the instrumental variables which are excluded from
the second-stage regressions (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12), the vector Xit includes control
variables,2HF Tit ,3MFragit andbHF T MFragit representing the predicted values
of HF Tit , MFragit and HF T  MFragit , respectively, generated from the
three first-stage regression equations (2.7) (2.8) and (2.9) and used in the respective
second-stage regression equations (2.10) (2.11) and (2.12),
PW
t=1 !t , and
PW
t=1 t are the
time fixed- effect, ai and ˛i are the firm-fixed effect in the first-stage and second-stage
regression respectively. To ease the computational burden, I use weekly time dummies
for each of the 591 weeks instead of using daily. The following section describes the
vector for instrumental variables and control variables.
Xit includes log market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log intraday mid price
range volatility (Log(volt int ra)), price inverse (invprice) and the average degree of
liquidity of stocks in the same size group excluding stock i (MQ it ), calculated from
the four equally divided firm size group based on market capitalization. I follow Degryse
et al. (2015) to include, MQ it , in the vector of control variables in addition to the
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control variables used for OLS estimation. Anyway, using this control variable also in
OLS estimation does not change any of the existing estimates.
In the specification (2.7) (2.8) (2.9), HF Tit and MFragit and HF T  MFragit
are the potential endogenous variables. The first set of instruments I consider for these
three variables are the daily average of each variables over all stocks in the same size
group excluding stock i . Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) adopted this approach which was
latter also applied in Degryse et al. (2015) and Buti, Rindi and Werner (2011).
One of the short comings of using only this instrument is that by construction it
decreases both between and within variations of HFT intensity which are observed in
the original dataset. Consequently, dataset losses the original panel’s inherent power of
distinguishing a high HFT intensed stock from its low counterpart. This problem is more
visible in a panel where apparent heterogeneity across stock is substantial. This problem
also persists in my dataset.
At this point, I proceed to look for relevant instruments with a motivation from Gresse
(2017). I add three more instruments, log trading volumes (Log(value)), average trade
sizes (Log(size)), and relative tick sizes (rt ick) in the first stage regression to increase
the predictive power of2HF Tit ,3MFragit andbHF T MFragit in my instrument set.
I explain here the rationale of choosing these variables as instruments. Evidence shows
that recent influx of HFT across financial market places is associated with the changes of
some particular market microstructures. For example, O’Hara, Saar and Zhong (2014)
and Hagströmer and Nordén (2013) report how variations in relative tick sizes affects the
HFT activities. In a large relative tick size environment, HFTs leave orders in the book
longer, trade more aggressively, and have higher profit margins than a small one.
Trading volume is also directly related to both HFT intensity and market
fragmentation. Gresse (2017) explains that the portion of AT corresponding to HFT
market making is expected to be more profitable and thus more developed for heavily
traded stocks. The evidence in Hendershott et al. (2011) and Brogaard, Hendershott and
Riordan (2014a) also show that large stocks attract more HFTs.
HFTs typically trade in small lots and prominently use slice-and-dice strategy in
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executing the large order. Hendershott and Riordan (2013) show that by splitting large
orders into smaller slices, algorithmic traders reduce their own market impact but also the
volatility of liquidity in general. The literature supports the link between the rising HFT
intensity and decreasing trade size in the recent years and attribute the causality from
HFT to trade sizes (Hendershott et al., 2011; Aitken et al., 2014).
Results and discussion
To estimate the Models (2.8)–(2.12), I use the same panel dataset employed in OLS
estimation, with 132 stocks and 2624 days for the period December 2005–December 2016.
I use two-stage optimal IV-GMM (H2SLS) estimator. The inference is based on standard
errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation ( Newey-West HAC, based
on 5 lags). Similarly, I also estimate the models (2.4) and (2.5) in the IV-GMM setting
for which I do not mention the IV specifications explicitly. I also repeat the estimations
for large and small stock groups. All specifications include stock and time (weekly) fixed
effects.
Table A.20 reports the estimates for IV-GMM models (2.10)–(2.12) (equivalent to
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.3) respectively in OLS) and similar IV estimation for OLS model (2.4)
and (2.5) employing full sample, and TableA.21 shows the same for large and small stocks.
For conserving space, estimates for control variables are not reported. To keep consistency
with the previous table, sub columns(1)–(5) represent the equivalent IV-GMM estimation
of OLS models (2.1)–(2.5). For a comparison between OLS and IV-GMM estimates, sub
columns (1)–(3) of table A.20 should be matched with the respective sub columns of Table
A.14, and sub columns (4)–(5) with the same sub columns of Table A.16. For small and
large stocks, sub columns of Table A.21 should be compared with the same sub columns
in Table A.15 and Table A.17. To avoid repetition, I do not discuss the results which are
mostly similar to OLS.
The results in Table A.20 suggest that higher HFT intensity is associated with lower
quoted and effective spreads, while higher fragmentation is associated with higher quoted
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and effective spreads. In fact, the estimates appear to be stronger for IV-GMM. Hasbrouck
and Saar (2013) also find similar magnification when they switched from OLS to IV
which they attributed to market wide role of HFT. I find only non-matching exception
with OLS in sub column (3), but the partial effect generates the same sign as is observed in
OLS. For example, coefficient ofHHItrd (column IX) shows a non-significant negative
sign ( 0:019), and if the partial effect is evaluated at average log normalize value of
HFT (Log(95:91) = 4:56), then the estimate becomes 0:045, and is consistent with the
previous OLS results. The control variables appear with same signs as in OLS and the
sign in the additional control variable, average market liquidity, is positive as expected
and significant.
It seems that instruments do not provide the estimationwith enough variations to assess
the interaction effect or complex specifications like (2.4)–(2.6). The incremental effects
of both HFT and Market fragmentation are significant in the latter year of the sample
periods but coefficients ofHHItrd Dyr11; 12; 13 andHHItrd Dyr14; 15; 16 are
not consistent with OLS estimates.
Table A.21 reports the same estimates for large and small stocks samples. It can be
seen that models (1)-(5) for both small and large stocks confirm the same signs of OLS
estimates more consistently than full sample. The only contradiction I find is that HFT
and market fragmentation appear to have much stronger effect on small-cap stocks where
OLS estimates reported the same for large-cap stocks. This apparent contradiction might
be attributed to the weakness of the instrument, a classical problem in implementing IV.
In conclusion, the IV-GMM estimates confirm most of the results documented in the
previous section, though there are some limitations to the identification strategy. To
overcome these limitations, the next section turns to a simultaneous equations model
approach to address the endogeneity problem.
2.4.3 A simultaneous equations model approach
I turn to a simultaneous equations model estimation approach to tackle the possible
endogeneity among the market quality, HFT and market fragmentation. As explained in
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the previous section (2.4.2), there exist at least two possible mechanisms through which
market liquidity and HFT affect each other: (i) the long trend of declining spread based
transaction measures in the financial market places might be attributable to the lowmarket
making cost of HFTs; and (ii) the rising competition among HFT firms through huge
investment in high speed trading technology. There is also evidence that both the level
of liquidity or volatility affect the level of HFTs participation in market. On the other
hand, if we consider HFT from the demand perspective, then the proliferation of modern
low-latency-based trading venues should be attributed to response by the supply side
(exchanges).
Market liquidity seems to play a role, being one of the determinants of order flow
fragmentation where we see that more liquid stocks are more fragmented. It is more
likely that liquidity affects the fragmentation decision than the other way round, though it
is commonly accepted in the literature that market fragmentation also impacts liquidity.
Over the last few years, the most active channel which affected the quoting and trading
activities across markets is HFT. In this connection, the recent responses of the supply side
on the rising HFT demand have rapidly increased the number of electronic exchanges with
low-latency technology across the European equity market. It is apparent that there are
simultaneity among HFT, market fragmentation and liquidity.
To tackle the simultaneity among HFT, market fragmentation and market quality, I
consider simultaneous equations model which is relatively a new approach in market
microstructure research. Buti et al. (2011) and Aitken et al. (2014) use similar arguments
that market quality, fragmentation and HFT are jointly determined in equilibrium and they
used simultaneous equations model in their setting. Hasbrouck and Saar (2013) also use
the same approach in a more simple setting where an attempt has been made to determine
the impact of low-latency on market quality.
I consider market quality (MQit ), HFT (HF Tit ) and market fragmentation
(MFragit ) are determined in equilibrium, and three equations are defined accordingly,
one for each of the variables. I include the variables on the right hand side of MQit ,
HF Tit andMFragit which are found to be determinants of each of the variables by the
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literature, and also explained in the IV-GMM section (2.4.2). This setup should overcome
the limitations of IV-GMM specifications. The three-equation simultaneous model is:
MQit = ˛i(mq) +
MX
m=1
(mq)m + ˇ1(mq)HF Tit + ˇ2(mq)MFragit + ˇ3(mq)MQ it
+ ˇ4(mq)Log(mktcap)it + ˇ5(mq)Log(volt int ra)it + ˇ6(mq)inv(price)it + it(mq);
(2.13)
HF Tit = ˛i(hf t) +
MX
m=1
(hf t)m + ˇ1(hf t)MQit + ˇ2(hf t)MFragit + ˇ3(hf t)HF T it
+ ˇ4(hf t)Log(size)it + ˇ5(hf t)Log(value)it + ˇ6(hf t)rtkit + ˇ7(hf t)Log(mktcap)it
+ ˇ8(hf t)Log(volt int ra)it + it(hf t);
(2.14)
MFragit = ˛i(frg) +
MX
m=1
(f rg)m + ˇ1(frg)HF Tit + ˇ2(frg)MQit + ˇ3(hf t)MFrag it
+ ˇ4(frg)Log(value)it + ˇ5(frg)Log(mktcap)it + ˇ6(frg)Log(volt int ra)it + it(frg);
(2.15)
where indices i and t represent stocks and day respectively, MQit represents one
of the two log normalized market liquidity measures (spread_bps, espread ), HF Tit
represents the HFT proxy (hf t2) , MFragit represents the market fragmentation proxy
(HHItrd ),MQ it represents average market liquidity level over all stocks in the same
size group excluding stock i , MFrag it represents the average market fragmentation
level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i , HF T  it represents
the average HFT intensity over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i ,
Log(mktcap) is the log normalized market capitalization, Log(volt int ra) is the log
normalized intraday mid price range volatility, invprice is the inverse of daily average
price, Log(size) is the log normalized trade sizes, Log(value) is the log normalized
trading volumes, rtkit is the relative tick size, ˛i is the firm fixed effects,
PM
m=1 m is
the time (month) fixed effects, index (mq), (hf t), (f rg) refer the respective coefficient of
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the equationsMQit ,HF Tit andMFragit respectively.
I employ a balanced panel of 132 stocks (that are also used in OLS and IV-GMM
estimations) for the period 2008–2016 (2240 days). The selected period essentially
represents the fragmented era of European equity market. I also estimate them both for
large and small stocks separately and also for three equally divided periods (2008-2010),
(2011-2013) and (2014-2016).
I use GMM approach (H3SLS) to estimate the simultaneous equations model, an
approach that is robust to unknown heteroskedastic error structure. This a three-stage
estimation and asymptotically the same as 3SLS if the disturbance are homoscedastic
(Greene, 2003). This derives estimation efficiency over two-stage (Zellner and Theil,
1962) and which is relevant to my study in at least two ways. The first, the European
equity market structure which rationalises the use of simultaneous equations model also
gives rise to the probability that existing simultaneity amongMQit ,HFit andMFragit
might produce non-zero contemporaneous covariance in the structural disturbances. And
the second, the use of disproportionate instruments for HF Tit , MFragit and MQit
produces both identified and over-identified equations in the system. In both cases, 3SLS
has full information characteristics. The coefficient estimated through three-stage least
squares are also reported to compare the robustness of the estimates. All estimations
include monthly time-fixed effect for each of the 108 months for the period January
2008– December 2016, and stock level fixed effects.
Results and discussion
Table A.22, A.23 and A.24 report the estimates for the whole sample, large and small
stocks, three sub-sample periods respectively where only quoted spreads and effective
half-spreads are used as dependent variables. Table A.22 presents two set of estimates
using GMM and 3SLS for each liquidity measure and the others only report GMM
estimates. The discussions on estimates for the model (2.13), (2.14) and (2.15) are
presented one after another.
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Market liquidity (MQit )
Table A.22 shows that all the coefficients estimated through GMM and 3SLS for each
model are highly significant, and as expected, 3SLS’s estimates are much stronger than
those obtained by using GMM. However, only one exception is seen where the coefficient
of MQit in column (III) is not significant but the corresponding 3SLS estimates are
highly significant. The model in which we are most interested is (2.13), Columns I, IV
and VII, X report the estimated coefficient for quoted spreads and effective half-spreads
respectively. We see that higher HFT is associated with narrower quoted and effective
spreads whereas higher fragmentation is associated with wider quoted and effective
spreads. Other estimates show that average liquidity level in the same group of other
stocks, firm sizes measured by market capitalization, volatility and price level are also
the determinants of liquidity, where higher market liquidity in the same size group and
higher volatilities are associated with wider spreads, conversely, larger firm sizes (market
capitalization), and higher price levels are associated with narrower spreads. The results
confirm the evidence documented in OLS with stronger estimates ( see section 2.4.1).
The estimates in A.23 (column I, IV, VII, X) confirm the same sign of the estimates,
as observed in full sample, across large and small stock groups with different magnitude
which implies that both HFT and fragmentation in smaller cap stocks seems to have more
striking effect. The coefficients in Table A.24 (column I, IV, VII) show that both the
impact of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity has narrowed and even turn out
to non significant during 2014-2016 for market fragmentation. This might be due the
fact that fragmentation has reached its saturation stage for the employed stocks where
variations in fragmentation does not create enough space to explain the changes in liquidity
econometrically.
High frequency trading (HF Tit )
The coefficient estimates of the Model (2.14) are reported in Table A.22 (column II,
V, VIII, XI). The coefficient estimates of the Model HF Tit necessarily explain the
factors influencing the HFT intensity, and extend the understanding about the bi-direction
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causality between HFT, market fragmentation and liquidity. Now, it can be seen that there
are some indirect impacts which channelise to liquidity through HFT. The coefficient of
MQit is positive which implies that there is one or more mechanisms which associate
wider quoted and effective spreads with higher HFT. This is likely to indicate the
phenomenon where HFTs post non-marketable limit order as a part of their regular market
making activities. Aitken et al. (2015) has found similar results and argued accordingly.
Evidence suggests HFT participation is not only limited to BBO (Financial Markets
Regulator (France), 2017). HFTs also post quotes around the BBO and even in the deeper
levels of the order book depending on the market conditions, consistent with the evidence
provided in section 2.4.1.6.
The estimate ofMFragit implies that a higher fragmentation level is also associated
with a higher HFT intensity as expected. As can be seen, market wide factors (HF T  it )
play a good role in determining HFT which supports the argument and methodology of
HFT instruments development onmarket level HFT activities (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013).
Among others, larger firm size and larger trading volume are associated with higher HFT.
On the contrary, higher volatility, higher relative tick sizes and higher trade sizes indicative
of lower HFT . All the findings support the hypothesis and evidences on which HFT
instruments are developed in the previous IV-GMM section (2.4.2).
Table A.23 provides more insight on the determinants of HFT activities across stocks.
A higher estimate of the coefficient MQit for small stocks may indicate that spreads in
non-marketable limit orders become wider when HFTs post them for relatively illiquid
stocks. Other results also show that larger stocks are associated with more intense market
wide factors, relative tick sizes and trade sizes. Volatility in small and large stocks appears
to have different impact on HFT, though estimates seem not significant in GMM. Higher
volatility in large stocks tends to reduce the HFT intensity, which is consistent with the
explanation of Hasbrouck and Saar (2013). It is argued that during the period of high
illiquidity HFT creates externalities by participating more in illiquid stocks. A similar
evidence is also observed in OLS results (section 2.4.1) that HFT provided more liquidity
during 2008-2009 while it was scarce. But the same estimates for effective spreads are
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negative to imply that mere HFT participation by providing non-marketable quotes may
not benefit to reduce the actual trading cost.
Table A.24 (column III, VI, IX) shows the similar effect observed in Table A.22
over the periods other than few exceptions. HFT appears to provide more intense
non-marketable quotes during 2014-2016which is consistent with less intense HFT impact
on liquidity (column VII) in the same period.
Market fragmentation (MFragit )
The estimates for Model (2.14) are likely to explain the factors those determine the market
fragmentation which in turn affect HFT and liquidity indirectly. The coefficient estimates
of Model (2.14) are reported in Table A.22 (column III, VI, IX, XII).
The result shows that HFT, market wide factor of fragmentation, firm sizes, trade
volumes and volatility have statistically significant impact on liquidity. Stocks with a
higher HFT participation, larger market capitalization andwider spreads seem to be related
to a higher fragmentation. A positive association between liquidity and fragmentationmay
indicate that a higher fragmented stock is exposed to a higher market making cost across
markets.
2.5 Conclusion
The debate regarding the social benefit of HFT is far from closed, and the evaluation of
HFT effects is becoming more complex due to its multifaceted exposure in the financial
marketplace. I investigate the impact of HFT on European equity market environments
by adopting a relatively new approach and unique dataset.
The results suggest that the decreasing trend of spread based liquidity measures in the
European equity market is attributable to the rising HFT intensity over the period, but
the tendency of higher order flow fragmentation appears to harm liquidity. My analyses
show that a higher fragmentation in order flows imposes extra cost on the ability of HFT
market making, and offset some potential liquidity benefits otherwise that could have been
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derived from this newmarket maker. It seems that some extra cost imposed through higher
market fragmentation is also neutralized by the benefits derived from intense HFT .
The results support the general view documented in the HFT literature (Hendershott
et al., 2011; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2015; Aitken et al., 2015) that
HFT improves liquidity, however, unlike the existing literature, evidence provided in this
chapter helps to explain the mechanism through which the surplus is generated or offset.
The evidence provided in this paper has strong policy implications due to the rising
concern of curving HFT. MiFID II has recently come out with strict HFT monitoring rules
without implementing any direct measures which seems to provide European market with
a good device to trade-off between the benefit and concern of HFT.
In the next chapter, I expand the analyses to amulti-venue setting which should address
the limitations of studying HFT within a market.
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Chapter 3
High Frequency Trading, Market
Fragmentation and Liquidity: A
Cross-Market Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The current marketplace is highly fragmented, and market participants can employ smart
order routing (SOR) techniques to find liquidity across multiple trading venues. The
potential counterparties for HFT market-makers have a large selection of trading venues
on which they can trade. To interact with this order flow, HFTs must be present on
all these trading venues (The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, 2016).
O’Hara (2015) argues HFT is strategic because it maximizes against market design, other
HFTs, and other traders, and HFTs need to optimize in a market that contains other
HFT players. The cross-market HFT presence makes limit order books linked across
markets, and so, too, order flows and price behaviour. I address this added cross-market
complexity to HFT research in this chapter in analysing the impact of HFT and market
fragmentation on market liquidity. In doing so, I extend the simultaneous equations model
in chapter 2 to incorporate alternative exchanges (MTFs) and introduce a novel approach
to creating a macro view of cross-market HFT analysis. To the best of my knowledge, no
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literature to date attempts a similar analysis capable of taking account of the HFT activities
simultaneously across markets.
I primarily examine how HFT and fragmentation affect market liquidity in a
cross-market setting. The research setup I use to examine the primary research question
also allows me to investigate some other related issues like the drivers of HFT within
and across markets, nature of exchange competitions etc. To answer these questions,
I use millisecond time-stamped TRTH data on the LSE and three alternative electronic
exchanges. The dataset covers the whole post-MiFID period until 2016. I develop
daily measures for liquidity, HFT and fragmentation across four markets included in the
sample. I also develop some consolidated measures to reflect the level and evolution of
exchange competition over the time. I estimate the simultaneous equations model using
the three-stage least squares method for the full sample as well as its suitable subsamples
classified on both cross sections and time-series dimensions.
The results suggest that HFT improves liquidity across markets and exchange level
latency has significant impact on liquidity. Among the exchanges, CHIX is highly
competitive and attracts more HFT. Furthermore, market fragmentation harms liquidity
in the primary exchange while it improves that in alternative exchanges.
The analyses on HFT drivers provide evidence that HFTs’ market making activities
are linked across markets and HFTs provide liquidity when spreads are wider. A
wider/narrower spread in CHIX and the LSE appear to affect the HFT activities across
markets. Among others, fragmentation, order sizes, relative tick sizes and volatilities have
significant impact on HFT activities. Besides, HFTs concentrate in the primary exchange
during the period of a higher volatility.
The analyses extended on large and small stocks provide evidence that HFT remains
active in highly liquid stocks even when spreads are narrow. The time-varying analysis
shows that the direction of the association between HFT and liquidity and market
fragmentation and liquidity appear almost stable across markets over the sample period
with time-varying impact.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 links this chapter with
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the existing body of literature. Section 3.3 describes data and measures, and presents
descriptive evidence. Section 3.4 explains the research strategies, and discusses the main
results. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Relevant literature
This chapter covers three related aspects : i) HFT, its drivers and speed competition across
exchanges; ii) market fragmentation and iii) their impact on market liquidity. A detailed
literature review was provided in the section 1.2 (chapter 1). I briefly mention here some
of them which are more relevant to this chapter.
The evidence provided in several studies (Hendershott et al., 2011; Hasbrouck and
Saar, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2015) on the relation between AT/HFT and market quality
show that AT/HFT improves liquidity. The papers studying the impact of market
fragmenation on market quality (O’Hara and Ye, 2011; Gresse, 2017; Degryse et al., 2015)
mostly support the liquidity improving view of market fragmentation. The novelty of this
chapter is that I study both HFT and market fragmentation across markets using a panel
dataset for a relatively long period compared to those mostly used in the literature.
The spirit of this chapter is close to the papers which study the HFT and market
fragmentation across markets like Upson and Van Ness (2017), Brogaard, Hendershott
and Riordan (2014b) but the approach and measures I use are different from those that
they used in their research. This chapter also joins the strands of HFT literature: i)
examining the HFT liquidity supply and demand within and across markets (Hendershott
and Riordan, 2013; Carrion, 2013; Menkveld, 2013); ii) studying HFT on LSE listed
stocks (Brogaard, Hendershott, Hunt and Ysusi, 2014; Jarnecic and Snape, 2014), and
iii) studying exchange competition (He et al., 2015; Riordan et al., 2011). The motivation
of papers (Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2012; Frino et al., 2014; Murray et al., 2016; Frino
et al., 2017; Brogaard et al., 2015) examining the impact of speed on market environments
supports the analysis conducted in this chapter.
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3.3 Data, measures and descriptive statistics
3.3.1 Data
The dataset includes 149 large capitalized stocks, primarily listed on the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) and also traded across three alternative exchanges (MTFs)—CHIX,
BATS and Turquoise. Almost 100% of LSE listed stocks’ lit trading volumes are
concentrated in these four trading venues (see Table A.1). One of the challenges of HFT
and fragmentation research across markets is to identify the same security across trading
venues. TRTH provides unique identification symbology known as Reuters Instrument
Code (RIC). RIC structure is pretty complex where several parameters—defined on a
stock’s primary listing venue, trading venues, currency denominations etc.—are arranged
in a particular order to form a RIC. International Securities Identification Number (ISIN)
provides the unique identification of a stock across exchanges. I use ISIN and RIC
to identify sample stocks across exchanges1. Since the analysis is extended across
exchanges in this chapter, the sample period covers only the post-MiFID period (October
2008–December 2016) for three and starts from the earliest month from which the widest
coverage of data support is available from TRTH across three alternative trading venues
(see Table A.2). The section 2.3.1 (chapter 2) presented the data preparation in details.
3.3.2 Measures and descriptive statistics
I use the same measures defined on market liquidity (spreadit , espreadit , rspreadit ,
espreadit and depth1it ), HFT (hf t1, hf t2, ordtot rd and hf t1h) and market
fragmentation (HHItrd ) in chapter 2 ( see section 2.3.2) and expand these measures for
all three alternative trading venues included in the sample. All measures are developed
using intraday millisecond trades and quotes records for the automated trading sessions
(8.00–16.30/London time) of the respective exchanges. Besides, I develop some
consolidated measures across trading venues, which are explained below.
EBBO. European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO) is a hypothetical aggregate measure of
1I refer Table B.1 for a better explanation, which illustrates how a stock with unique ISIN but different
RICs is identified across exchanges.
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the best bid and offer prices for LSE listed stocks across trading venues, which can be
seen to be equivalent to the NBBO (National Best Bid and Offer), the US counterpart.
I take snapshots of the transparent limit order books of all four trading venues at each
500 millisecond interval for the trading hours between 8.10–16.25. The first 10 minutes
and the last 5 minutes of the automated trading sessions are excluded to avoid the undue
price pressure from opening and closing sessions. At each snapshot, the best bid (the
highest among the four local bid prices) and the best offer (the lowest among the four
local offer prices) are defined, and both do not necessarily have to come from the same
trading venue.
%EBBO. The %EBBO measures the frequency by which a trading venue uniquely
or jointly contributes in the EBBO. A trading venue’s contribution for both the lowest ask
price and the highest bid price is included in the %EBBO. The joint/simultaneous trading
venue participation rate (single/double/triple/quadruple) refers the number of trading
venues contributing in the EBBO each time. For a unique contribution, the unique venue
participation rate measures which exchange contributes in the EBBO. In the presence of
HFTs, these measures are expected to reveal the order flows competition across trading
venues.
Unlike RegNMS, MiFID does not impose a consolidated tape and trade through
rules for European markets, rather it allows some aspects to be decided in the market.
For example, MiFID directives details the ‘obligation to execute orders on terms most
favourable to the client’. This provision requires that firms take relevant steps to ensure
the best possible execution for clients and consider ‘price, costs, speed, likelihood of
execution and settlement, size, nature or any other consideration relevant to the execution
of the order’. The % EBBO shows the extent to which limit order books are linked across
European markets in providing competitive quotes.
Quotes update speed. The average quotes update speed shows the average time
between two quotes updates, and is measured by dividing the number of quotes updates
by the length of the automated trading sessions (measured in seconds). The measure is
expected to reflect the speed aspect of exchange competition.
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Descriptive statistics
This section presents the descriptive evidence regarding HFT and market liquidity across
four markets for the full sample of 149 stocks2 for the period December 2005– December
2016 after winsorizing extreme 1% values on both tails. To facilitate cross sectional
comparison, the full sample is divided into 5 equal quintiles based onmarket capitalization.
Descriptive analyses show both aggregate and quintile based measures ( mean, median an
standard) and monthly trends over the sample period. The descriptive evidence provided
on the EBBO, %EBBO and quotes update speed are based on a subsample of 45 stocks
which became fragmented across main four trading venues in initial post-MiFID period,
and on which the maximum data support from TRTH is available for the period thereafter.
Tables B.2 and B.3 report the quarterly summary of the %EBBO for the unique and
joint venue participation rate in the EBBO and Figures B.1a and B.1b show the quarterly
trends of the same measures respectively. Initiating from a rate of 100% in the 1st quarter
of 2008, the unique trading venue participation rate started to decline afterwards and the
level of joint participation in the %EBBO increased over the period. During the period
2008–2010, the average single, double, triple and quadruple venue participation rate were
54%, 23%, 13% and 10% respectively and remained perfectly symmetrical in both sides
of the order book throughout the years. It is quite apparent that the joint participation rate
in the %EBBO increased over the period but never exceeded 50%. The trends of venue
participation rate indicate that order flows competition in European markets got intense
over the years.
The rivalry between the LSE and CHIX can be imagined clearly from Table B.3 which
reports how the LSE lost its market share to the alternative exchanges over the sample
period. Since the competition for order flows in European equity markets started at the
end of 2007, CHIX dominated the position of providing the best bid and ask prices. To
remain competitive for HFTs, the LSE made huge investment in low-latency technology
2The details of stocks coverage across four trading venues over the sample period can be seen in Panel
B of Table A.2
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and upgraded the trading system in several phases during the period 2006–2011. As can be
seen in Table B.3, the LSE started to regain some of its lost market share starting from the
year 2013. Among the competing venues, CHIX dominated the position in contributing
the EBBO. Turquoise was the next after the LSE and CHIX to contribute to the EBBO.
The EBBO participation rate of the exchanges was apparently symmetrical in both sides
of the order book.
Figure B.1c depicts the trends of quotes update speed across four markets. The trends
of both quotes update speed and %EBBO moved together consistently throughout the
sample period—the higher the quotes update speed the more the exchanges share were in
the %EBBO—which outwardly indicates that exchanges providing a better low-latency
technology attract more traders/market-makers relying on the speed. Since the enactment
of MiFID, the quotes update speed in CHIX was the highest until the year 2012, and
the LSE started to take the lead back thereafter. Turquoise also seems to become more
competitive over the years in contrast to BATS which lost its competitiveness in the same
period.
The summary statistics of HFT proxies across four markets are presented in Tables
B.4 and B.5, and Figures B.3b and B.3a show the trends of the respective measures over
the period. Among the exchanges, the average HFT intensity measured by all proxies are
the highest in CHIX. The average per-minute message rate (hf t2) for the LSE, CHIX,
BATS and Turquoise are 84, 116, 69 and 67 respectively. The evidence also shows, HFTs
predominantly relied on large stocks, a common feature to observe across exchanges.
The rising trends of HFT was consistent across exchanges throughout the sample period.
CHIX was found to be more competitive than the LSE in the initial post-MiFID period
(2008–2011), and in the latter period, the LSE appeared to regain the position. This
phenomenon is also consistent to the %EBBO pattern which is mentioned already.
The descriptive statistics of liquidity measures are presented in Tables B.6 and B.7, and
Figures B.4 and B.5 show the trends of the samemeasures across four markets. Among the
exchanges, the LSE provided the most tightest quotes, particularly for small stocks over
the period. Moreover, both quoted and effective spreads in large stocks found a low in the
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LSE in the initial period of the market fragmentation which eventually disappeared in the
latter period due to fierce exchange competition. Large stocks are the highest fragmented
stocks and it seems that the competition in order flows impacted them the most. As can be
seen, effective half-spreads for the large stocks found a low in almost all trading venues
other than BATS, especially in the latter period of the sample, 2013-2016. Figure B.9 also
shows that trends in quotes update speed and quoted spreads across trading venues moved
together consistently, particularly in large stocks—the higher the quotes update speed the
lower the spreads were.
Figures B.7 and B.8 show the trends in average quoted depth and trade size across four
markets. For the LSE, both the quoted depth and trade sizes started to decrease sharply in
the pre-MiFID period (2005–2008) particularly in large stocks and the trend continued
throughout the post-MiIFD period. For alternative trading venues, both quoted depth
and trade sizes were consistently smaller than those of the LSE, and declined throughout
the period. Figure B.8 depicts the evolution of trade size in large stocks and show that
over the years trade size has been declining monotonically across trading venues which
essentially indicates the increasing HFT intensity over the years and also consistent to the
observations mentioned in the previous chapter (section 2.4.2).
Tables B.8, B.9, B.10 , and B.11 show the decomposition of effective spreads into
realized spreads and price impacts across four trading venues and Figure B.6 depicts the
trend of these measures. The decomposition is based on four hypothetical post-trade
quotes adjustment intervals (10 seconds, 30 seconds, 1 minute and 5 minute). As can
be seen, the price impacts and realized spreads decreased across trading venues over the
period and realized spreads were negative in all markets for all measures other than in
BATS. The evidence suggests that trade execution quality improved across exchanges
over the years. I mentioned the same only for the LSE in chapter 2 (see section 2.4.1.4).
The overall descriptive evidence shows that over the years, quoted and effective
spreads narrowed and HFT intensity increased across exchanges. It appears that HFT
played a substantial role to integrate the fragmented European market using the available
low-latency structure. As a result, both quoted and effective spreads converges to low
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across trading venues over the post-MiFID period. The subsequent sections address the
issue more systematically.
3.4 Research strategies, results and discussions
3.4.1 Methodology
I use a cross-market simultaneous equations model approach to examine the relation
between HFT, market fragmentation and liquidity. A multi-market setup should overcome
the endogeneity arising from simultaneity within and across markets. The endogeneity
within a market is well-acknowledged in the HFT literature (Hendershott et al., 2011;
Hasbrouck and Saar, 2013; Boehmer et al., 2015). The idea of endogeneity within a
market is that an exogenous shock in liquidity might establish a more (less) attractive
environment for, and lead to an increase (decrease) in HFT activities. However, the same
argument can be made for the endogeneity across markets, and seems more intuitive,
as far as the existing equity market structure is concerned, specifically in Europe. My
research design agrees with the recommendations and evidence of recent HFT literature
(O’Hara, 2015; The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets, 2016)3.
I expand and redefine the simultaneous equations model estimated in chapter
2 (section 2.4.3) to incorporate all trading venues (LSE, CHIX, BATS and TURQ)
included in the extended sample. The original model was comprised of three equations
(2.13–2.15) each representing one of the three endogenous variables—liquidity (MQit ),
HFT (HF Tit ) and market fragmentation (MFragit ). The cross-market approach
which I adopt here integrates the fragmented markets for LSE listed stocks altogether
by defining models on each venue. So, I drop the fragmentation equation (2.15) and
redefine the system across trading venues. The redefined models for four trading venues
include eight equations, two for each market to represent the equations for endogenous
variables—market liquidity and HFT. The same rationale I followed in chapter 2 (sections
2.4.2 and 2.4.3) justifying the determinants of HFT and market liquidity also motivate
3Figure B.2 presents some of the evidence provided in The Netherlands Authority for the Financial
Markets (2016) regarding the cross-market HFT activity in European markets
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the specifications in this chapter. The cross-market simultaneous equations model is :
MQ1it = ˛i(mq)1 +
MX
m=1
(mq)1m + ˇ1(mq)1HF T1it + ˇ2(mq)1HHItrdit + ˇ3(mq)1MQ 1it
+ ˇ4(mq)1ln(mktcap)it + ˇ5(mq)1ln(volt int ra)1it + ˇ6(mq)1inv(price)it + it(mq)1;
(3.1)
MQ2it = ˛i(mq)2 +
MX
m=1
(mq)2m + ˇ1(mq)2HF T2it + ˇ2(mq)2HHItrdit + ˇ3(mq)2MQ 2it
+ ˇ4(mq)2ln(mktcap)it + ˇ5(mq)2ln(volt int ra)2it + ˇ6(mq)2inv(price)it + it(mq)2;
(3.2)
MQ3it = ˛i(mq)3 +
MX
m=1
(mq)3m + ˇ1(mq)3HF T3it + ˇ2(mq)3HHItrdit + ˇ3(mq)3MQ 3it
+ ˇ4(mq)3ln(mktcap)it + ˇ5(mq)3ln(volt int ra)3it + ˇ6(mq)3inv(price)it + it(mq)3;
(3.3)
MQ4it = ˛i(mq)4 +
MX
m=1
(mq)4m + ˇ1(mq)4HF T4it + ˇ2(mq)4HHItrdit + ˇ3(mq)4MQ 4it
+ ˇ4(mq)4ln(mktcap)it + ˇ5(mq)4ln(volt int ra)3it + ˇ6(mq)4inv(price)it + it(mq)4;
(3.4)
HF T1it = ˛i(hf t)1 +
MX
m=1
(hf t)1m +
4X
v=1
ˇv(hf t)vMQvit + ˇ5(hf t)1HF T 1it + ˇ6(hf t)1HHItrd1it
+ ˇ7(hf t)1ln(size)1it + ˇ8(hf t)ln(volume)1it + ˇ9(hf t)1rtk1it + ˇ10(hf t)1ln(mktcap)it
+ ˇ11(hf t)1ln(volt int ra)1it + it(hf t)1;
(3.5)
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HF T2it = ˛i(hf t)2 +
MX
m=1
(hf t)2m +
4X
v=1
ˇv(hf t)vMQvit + ˇ5(hf t)2HF T 2it + ˇ6(hf t)2HHItrd2it
+ ˇ7(hf t)2ln(size)2it + ˇ8(hf t)2ln(volume)2it + ˇ9(hf t)2rtk2it + ˇ10(hf t)2ln(mktcap)it
+ ˇ11(hf t)2ln(volt int ra)2it + it(hf t)2;
(3.6)
HF T3it = ˛i(hf t)3 +
MX
m=1
(hf t)3m +
4X
v=1
ˇv(hf t)vMQvit + ˇ5(hf t)3HF T 3it + ˇ6(hf t)3HHItrd3it
+ ˇ7(hf t)3ln(size)3it + ˇ8(hf t)3ln(volume)3it + ˇ9(hf t)3rtk3it + ˇ10(hf t)3ln(mktcap)it
+ ˇ11(hf t)3ln(volt int ra)3it + it(hf t)3;
(3.7)
HF T4it = ˛i(hf t)4 +
MX
m=1
(hf t)4m +
4X
v=1
ˇv(hf t)vMQvit + ˇ5(hf t)4HF T 4it + ˇ6(hf t)4HHItrd4it
+ ˇ7(hf t)4ln(size)4it + ˇ8(hf t)4ln(volume)4it + ˇ9(hf t)4rtk4it + ˇ10(hf t)4ln(mktcap)it
+ ˇ11(hf t)4ln(volt int ra)4it + it(hf t)4;
(3.8)
where indices i , t , v represent stocks, time (days) and trading venues respectively, v
takes the value 1; 2; 3; 4 for the LSE, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise respectively, MQvit
represents one of the two log normalized liquiditymeasures (quoted spreads/spread_bps,
effective half-spreads/espread ), HF Tvit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2), HHItrdit
represents the market fragmentation proxy, MQ vit represents the average market
liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i at venue v,
HF T  vit represents the average HFT intensity over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i at venue v, ln(mktcap) is the log normalized market capitalization,
ln(volt int ra)vit is the log normalized intraday mid price range volatility, invprice
is the inverse of daily average prices, ln(size)vit is the log normalized trade size,
ln(value)vit is the log normalized trading volume, rt ickvit is the relative tick size, ˛i
is the firm fixed effect,
PM
m=1 m is the time (month) fixed effect, (mq) and (hf t)v index
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the coefficient of the equationsMQvit , HF Tvit respectively. Market wide measures on
liquidity ( MQ vit ) and HFT ( HF T  vit ) for each venue are based on four equal size
stocks groups, classified on market capitalization.
Model identification and the order condition. To meet the order condition, the
number of exogenous variables that appear elsewhere in the equation system must
be at least as large as the number of endogenous variables in the equation. The
number of endogenous variables in equations (3.1)–(3.4) and (3.5)–(3.8) are two and five
respectively. The control variables which are specified in the model (3.1)–(3.8) should be
considered exogenous. Model (3.1)–(3.4) and (3.5)–(3.8) use the same control variables
as specified in the section 2.4.3 for Models (2.13) and (2.14) respectively. All models
share three common exogenous variables, ln(mktcap) and inv(prce) , HHItrdit and
the rest—MQ vit ,HF T vit , ln(size), ln(volt int ra), ln(volume), rt ick—are based
on the respective market and different from each other. The system has, in aggregate,
more excluded exogenous variables than required by the order conditions and meet the
order condition. The rank condition ensures that there is a unique solution to this set of
equations. In practical terms, the rank condition is difficult to establish in large equation
systems. Practitioners typically take it as given (Greene, 2003).
To estimate the models in equations (3.1)–(3.8) as a system, I use a panel dataset with
4 markets/trading venues (LSE, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise), 149 stocks and 2060 days,
from October 2008–December 2016. I also use its suitable subsamples classified on both
cross-section and time-series dimensions. I use the three-stage least squares method, an
approach which derives estimation efficiency over two-stage (Zellner and Theil, 1962)
and also has full information characteristics when the use of disproportionate instruments
produces both identified and over-identified equations in the system.
3.4.2 Results and discussions
The impact of HFT and market fragmentation on market quality
The results of the simultaneous equations model estimation for the full sample are
presented in Table B.12. Panel A reports the results for market quality equations
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(3.1–3.4). Columns I–IV and V–VIII of Panel A report the results estimated for quoted
spreads and effective half-spreads respectively.
The main variables of interest are HFT (HF Tit ) and market fragmentation
(HHItrdit ). All of the estimates for HFT are highly statistically significant across
equations and have the same sign—which is negative—for both liquidity measures.
Among the trading venues, CHIX appears to have the strongest estimates for HFT. The
estimates for the market fragmentation variable are also highly statistically significant
across equations and produce different signs across trading venues. All of the signs in
alternative venue equations—MQ(chix)it , MQ(bats)it , MQ(turq)it—are negative while
the same for the primary venue equation (MQ(lse)it ) are positive. The estimates reported
in the previous chapter (see Table A.14) regarding HFT and market fragmentation for
both quoted and effective spreads have similar signs with slightly weaker estimates for
HFT and almost similar estimates for market fragmentation.
These results suggest that HFT improves liquidity across trading venues and
low latency sophistication at exchange level appears to have significant impact on
liquidity—the lower the latency the narrower the quoted and effective spread. Among
the exchanges, CHIX was highly competitive in attracting HFT due to its better low
latency technology sophistication since it started operations. The evidence I provide here
regarding HFT is consistent with the findings of Hendershott et al. (2011), Hasbrouck and
Saar (2013), Boehmer et al. (2015) who examine the causality between HFT and market
quality. The findings also support the evidence provided in many papers which assess
how external HFT shocks affect market liquidity4. The results also suggest that market
fragmentation harms primary exchange’s liquidity while it improves that of alternative
trading exchanges. For the primary venue LSE, it appears that scale economics and
network externality arguments given in favor of a concentrated market dominates the
alternative view of exchange competition favouring the fragmented markets and the
reverse holds for alternative exchanges. The evidence regarding the fragmentation
effect on alternative trading venues implies that trader preferences over technology
4Frino et al. (2014);Murray et al. (2016); Frino et al. (2017); Riordan and Storkenmaier (2012); Brogaard
et al. (2015).
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differentiation are sufficiently important in modern marketplaces. From a multi-venue
perspective, the evidence regarding market fragmentation I provide here is striking. To
the best of my knowledge, no research to date provides similar evidence that reconciles
the trade-off between the two opposite effects of exchange co-existence. The evidence
does not support the liquidity improving view of market fragmentation, particularly in
primary exchanges, provided in O’Hara and Ye (2011) and Gresse (2017). However, the
set up that I use in my approach is different from those that they adopt in their research.
All of the estimates regarding control variables are highly statistically significant and
have the expected signs. The average exchange level liquidity appears to have varying
positive impacts on stock level liquidity across exchanges—the less the exchange level
liquidity the stronger the effect is. Among the others, a lower inverse price level and
intraday volatility and a higher market capitalization seem to improve liquidity. The
estimates are consistent in signs with the estimates reported in chapter 2 for the same
control variables.
Drivers of HFT
Columns I-IV and V-VIII of Panel B (Table B.12) report the results for HFT equations
(3.5)—(3.8) estimated for quoted spreads and effective half-spreads respectively. All
estimates for market quality (MQvit ), average market wide HFT (HF T  vit ), market
fragmentation (HHItrd ), trade sizes (ln(size)vit ) , relative tick sizes (rt ickvit ), trade
volume (ln(volume)vit ), market capitalization (ln(mktcap)vit ) and intraday mid price
range volatility (ln(volt int ra)vit ) are highly statistically significant across equations
other than two reported in column V. The main variables of interest are market liquidity
(MQvit ) and market fragmentation (HHItrd ). These variables explain the links among
HFT, market quality and fragmentation that arguably exist across markets. The reported
estimates for market liquidity as measured by quoted and effective spreads for the LSE
(MQ(lse)it ) and CHIX (MQ(chix)it ) have positive signs in equations specified for the
respective markets and negative signs in equations for the others. On the contrary, all
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reported estimates for market liquidity in the other equations, BATS (MQ(bats)it ) and
Turquoise (MQ(turq)it ), are positive across exchanges. Among the rest, the reported
estimates for average market wide HFT, market fragmentation and trade volume are
positive and that for market capitalization, trade sizes and relative tick sizes are negative
across equations.
These results regarding cross-market liquidity and HFT activities suggest that both the
liquidity level in the LSE and CHIX determine the HFT activity across trading venues.
For the LSE and CHIX, HFTs supply liquidity in the LSE when quoted and effective
spreads are wider in the LSE and narrower in CHIX, and conversely for CHIX. The
wider spreads in BATS and Turquoise also appear to increase HFT activities in both
the LSE and CHIX as well. For BATS and Turquoise, HFTs supply liquidity in both
markets when quoted and effective spreads are narrower in the LSE and CHIX and wider
in the respective markets. The results have at least two implications: firstly, HFTs’
market making activities are linked across markets; secondly, HFTs provide liquidity
when spreads are wider. The evidence I provide here is consistence to the finding of
Hendershott and Riordan (2013) and Carrion (2013) who also provide evidence that HFT
supply liquidity when its scarce and demand liquidity when its cheap. They explain that
when spreads are narrow HFTS/ATs are less likely to submit new orders, less likely to
cancel their orders, and more likely to initiate trades. HFTs/ATs react more quickly to
events and even more so when spreads are wide. The findings also confirm the cross
market HFT strategies portrayed in The Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets
(2016) and Menkveld (2013).
The results in B.12 also suggest that a statistically significant market wide HFT
component exists and affects HFT activities positively across markets. Among others
determinants, fragmentation affects HFT positively—the higher the fragmentation the
more the HFT activity. The order size is negatively associated with HFT—the smaller
the order size the higher the HFT activity is. The evidence agrees with the arguments
provided in Hendershott et al. (2011) and Aitken et al. (2014) regarding the association
between HFT and smaller order size. The relative tick size seems to affect HFT activities
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significantly—the lower the relative tick size the higher the HFT activity is. The findings
in O’Hara (2015) support the indicated association I find between HFT and relative tick
sizes. They show that HFTs leave orders in the book longer when relative tick size is
larger and trade more aggressively. Higher volatilities in alternative exchanges seem to
lower the HFT activity there but that of primary exchange increases the HFT activity. It
seems that during high volatile periods HFTs find a primary exchange more favourable to
execute their strategies. This evidence support the findings in He et al. (2015) who show
that trading tends to concentrate on primary exchanges during market stress. These results
also support the evidence provided in the section 2.4.3 (chapter 2) about the association
between HFT, relative tick sizes, order sizes, order volume and market capitalization.
Large and small stocks
Since descriptive analyses demonstrate significant differences in liquidity and HFT across
quintiles, I divide here the full sample (149 stocks) into two equal subsamples—small-cap
group (which comprises 75 stocks below the median market capitalization) and large-cap
group (which comprises 74 stocks above the median market capitalization)—to examine
how different firm sizes affect the results obtained for the full sample. I estimate the
system of equations (3.1)—(3.8) for both groups of stocks as performed on the full
sample using quoted and effective half-spreads as dependent variables in the previous
section. The results are reported in Table B.13 and Table B.14 for large and small stocks
respectively. Panel A and Panel B, in both tables, report the results for market quality
equations (3.1)–(3.4) and HFT equations (3.5)–(3.8) respectively where columns I–IV
show the estimates for quoted spreads and V–VIII show that for effective half-spreads.
To avoid repetition, I only discuss the results which do not agree with those presented in
the case of full sample.
All of the estimates are highly statistically significant for both groups of stocks
with almost similar estimated coefficients, particularly in signs, as obtained for the full
sample. The estimates for market quality equations, both for large and small stocks, do
not show any notable differences regarding the main variables of interest— HFT and
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market fragmentation—from those of the full sample. The estimates for large stocks
against quoted spreads in Panel B (Table B.13) for the LSE and CHIX are different from
those of the full sample (column I and II), which have the same sign i.e. negative across
equations. The estimates against the other liquidity measure, effective half-spreads, are
still consistent with those of the full sample.
The results could suggest that HFT remains active in highly liquid stocks even when
spreads are narrow. The descriptive evidence shows that the average quoted spreads in
large stocks is around 60% smaller than that in small stocks. To remain competitive, HFTs
must update quotes in liquid stocks, which could require them to supply liquidity on large
stocks even when it is less profitable. The results also suggest stronger HFT and market
fragmentation effects on liquidity for small stocks, and consistent to the findings in the
previous chapter.
It is useful to recall that stocks included in my samples are the highest market
capitalized stocks in the LSE which are mostly included in FTSE 100 and FTSE 250
indices. Small stocks, as are classified in subsamples, do not necessarily hold the
characteristics of a typical small stock that we see in the literature. This might be the
reason to produce similar estimates across stock groups.
Time-varying effects
I extend the analyses to see whether the effects of high frequency trading and market
fragmentation on liquidity and factors determining the liquidity supply of HFT vary over
time. I divide the original sample into three subsamples (2008–2010, 2011–2013, and
2014–2016), each with three years and 149 stocks. I estimate the system of equations
(3.1)–(3.8) for each subsample using the same liquidity measures used for the estimates
in previous sections. These subsamples necessarily do not reflect any motivation other
than a uniform classification of the sample period. The results are reported in Table B.15.
Panel A and Panel B report the estimates for market quality equations (3.1)–(3.4) and
HFT equations (3.5)–(3.8) respectively, in which columns I–IV and V–VIII present the
estimates on quoted spreads and effective half-spreads respectively. To conserve space, I
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report the estimates only for the variables of main interest and the rests that I do not report
are also significant at the 1% level and produce the expected signs.
The coefficient estimates on equations (3.1)–(3.4) in Panel A for three subperiods are
all statistically significant at the 1% level and have the same signs as reported in Table
B.12 for the full sample other than in column II, VI. Estimates showing the exceptions
are estimated for the period 2008–2010 (the initial period of alternative trading venues’
operations) where one is only significant at the 5% level (for CHIX). This exception should
not affect the general findings revealed in all others estimates. For HFT, the estimates
appear stronger in the latter period of sample (2014–2016) whereas that for fragmentation
appear weaker in the same period across markets.
These results suggest that the general direction of the association between HFT and
liquidity and market fragmentation and liquidity that are reported for the full sample
appears almost stable across markets over the sample period with time-varying impact.
Panel B reports the coefficient estimates for HFT equations across markets and a few
estimates appear time-varying: for the LSE, the estimates for MQ(lse)it for the period
2014–2016 (column I) ; for CHIX, the estimates forMQ(lse)it (column II) andMQ(chix)it
(column II, VI) for the period 2008–2010 and the estimates for MQ(chix)it (column II)
for the period 2011–2013; for BATS, the estimates for MQ(lse)it (column III, VII) for
the period 2008-2010 and the same estimates (column VII) for the period 2011-2013
and 2014–2016; and for Turquoise, the estimates for MQ(chix)it (column VIII) for the
period 2011—2013. These estimates are mostly associated with the LSE and CHIX which
suggest that varying spreads level in main two competitive exchanges have time-varying
impact on HFTs’ liquidity supply across markets.
The estimates for the period 2008–2010 seem to reflect some historical facts about the
fierce market competition in European equity markets immediately after the adoption of
MiFID. Between 2008–2010, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise emerged as alternative trading
venues and started to compete with the incumbent exchange LSE. Among the MTFs,
CHIX was the most advanced in providing low latency trading platforms. Descriptive
evidence shows that spreads in CHIXwas the narrowest during that period for large stocks
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and remained at that level until the end of 2013 after which the LSE took the lead. Between
2007–2011, the LSE undertook several initiatives (that I also mentioned in explaining
the descriptive evidence) to upgrade its trading system with the aim to regain the market
share which it started to lose at the beginning of 2008. Accordingly, the results suggest
that between 2008–2010, HFT liquidity supply was positively associated with narrower
spreads in CHIX across markets. On the contrary, during the same period the liquidity in
the LSE , as measured by quoted spreads, does not seem to have a similar effect on HFT
liquidity supply across markets. On the other hand, between 2011–2013, the narrower
spreads in the LSE affected the HFT liquidity supply positively across alternative trading
venues, and the effect of CHIX’s quoted spreads started to become less strong across other
trading venues. These results further suggest, between 2014–2016, the narrower spreads
in both LSE and CHIX were associated with a higher HFT liquidity supply across trading
venues.
3.5 Conclusion
HFT strategies are generally implemented across markets. To obtain an encompassing
view of HFT, it is necessary to incorporates all markets in the analysis whose order books
are believed to be linked due to HFT activity. This chapter uses a unique approach of
cross-market simultaneous equations model to tackle the possible endogeneity between
HFT, market fragmentation and market quality across markets and estimates the specified
model employing a rich panel dataset. I provide evidence that HFT improves liquidity
across markets and fragmentation harms the primary exchange’s liquidity while improves
that of alternative exchanges. The direction of association between HFT , market
fragmentation and liquidity are almost stable across markets with time-varying impact.
I also show that HFT activities are linked across markets and HFT activities is higher
when spread is wider, however, HFT remain active in highly liquid stocks even when
spread is narrow.
HFTs are diverse in their use of trading strategies (Biais and Foucault, 2014;
Hagströmer and Nordén, 2013). The HFT proxy used in this thesis does not necessarily
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reflect the activity of a particular HFT, It’s rather reveal a mixture of strategies. The
evidence I provided in this chapter could indicate the relative dominance of a subset of
HFT who pursue certain strategies that strengthen market environments. The findings are
more indicative of market making HFTs than other HFT types whose activity improves
liquidity across markets.
The results of this chapter have important implications for both regulators and
trading platforms providers, particularly in Europe. Any regulation aimed at hindering
HFT activities indiscriminately may have serious negative consequences for market
environments and thus market participants. Encouraging exchanges to provide better
HFT-friendly platforms and their high-speed connecting channels may help to increase
market competitions and decrease trading costs. Providing a better low-latency technology
may help exchanges to gain market share.
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Appendix A
Appendix - Chapter 2
80
Table A.1 The universe of sample stocks
This table shows the decomposition of large-cap stocks across European countries (Panel A) as presented in the STOXX 800 index at
the end of year 2016, and relative position of the European lit trading venues based upon total European equity trading volumes (Panel
B) and trading volumes of LSE listed stocks (Panel C).
Panel A: STOXX 800's composition
Country (Primary listing venue) No. of Instruments (%)
The United Kingdom (LSE) 220 27.5
France (Euronext (Paris)) 95 11.88
Germany (Xetra) 84 10.5
Switzerland (Six Swiss) 61 7.63
Sweden 60 7.5
Italy 47 5.88
Spain 37 4.63
The Netherlands 28 3.5
Denmark 25 3.13
Panel B: Market share of European lit trading venues (European equities)
Panel C: Market share of European lit trading venues (LSE listed stocks)
source: Fidessa
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Table A.2: TRTH’s data support over the sample period
This table shows the data availability (from TRTH) for the LSE listed stocks primarily selected for the sample (across major trading
venues). Panel A reports the data availability for the LSE and other three alternative trading venues, BATS, CHIX, Turquoise (TURQ),
since 2008. Panel B reports the data availability for the stocks finally selected for the sample.
PANEL A
Post MiFID TRTH DATA availability for LSE stocks included in STOXX 800
Year BATS CHIX LSE TURQ
Jan05–Dec07 0 0 180* 0
Jan-08 n.a.** n.a. 182 n.a.
Jan-09 159 159 184 156
Jan-10 160 160 185 162
Jan-11 165 166 190 167
Jan-12 183 183 192 171
Jan-13 189 189 194 174
Jan-14 197 197 198 197
Jan-15 204 203 204 203
Jan-16 205 204 205 204
* availability varies over the period
** not available
PANEL B
Unbalanced panel constructed by taking eligible stocks from PANEL A
year Qtr LSE CHIX BATS TURQ
2005 1 118 n.a n.a n.a
2005 2 122 n.a n.a n.a
2005 3 131 n.a n.a n.a
2005 4 136 n.a n.a n.a
2006 1 138 n.a n.a n.a
2006 2 139 n.a n.a n.a
2006 3 140 n.a n.a n.a
2006 4 142 n.a n.a n.a
2007 1 143 n.a n.a n.a
2007 2 146 n.a n.a n.a
2007 3 149 n.a n.a n.a
2007 4 149 n.a n.a n.a
2008 1 149 n.a n.a n.a
2008 2 149 138 n.a n.a
2008 3 149 143 n.a 70
2008 4 149 149 136 75
2009 1 149 149 148 85
2009 2 149 149 149 147
2009 3 149 149 149 148
2009 4 149 149 149 148
2010 all 149 149 149 149
2011 all 149 149 149 149
2012 all 149 149 149 149
2013 all 149 149 149 149
2014 all 149 149 149 149
2015 all 149 149 149 149
2016 1 149 149 149 149
2016 2 149 149 149 149
2016 3 147 147 147 147
2016 4 146 146 146 146
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Table A.14: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.1)–(2.3) where various liquidity measures are regressed on HFT (hf t2),
market fragmentation (HHItrd ) proxy. hf t2 represents the per minute quote update for the best 5 depth levels in the limit order
book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of market fragmentation. The liquidity measures are
time weighted quoted spread (spread_bps), volume weighted effective-half spread (espread ), average quoted depth at best limit
price (depth1), accumulated average quoted depth up to best three limit price (depth3 ), volume weighted 5-minute realized-half
spread ( rspread_5min), and volume weighted 5-minute price impacts (price_impact_5min). All dependent variables are log
transformed except rspread_5min, all spreads based measures are in basis point and depth in 100GBP. Panel A shows the result for
spread_bps, espread anddepth1 and Panel B shows the rest. Control variables are logmarket capitalization (Log(mktcap)),
log normalized intraday mid-price volatility (Log(voltintra)) and inverse of average daily price level (invprice). The regression
is based on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2624 days ( December2005–December2016) and have both time (daily) and stock fixed
effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS , t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient, calculated using Newey-West (HAC)
standard errors (lags are optimally determined). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.288*** -0.289*** -0.283*** -0.322*** -0.324*** -0.282*** -0.25*** -0.247*** -0.155***
(-92.96) (-93.21) (-54.74) (-99.98) (-100.38) (-51.56) (-40.36) (-40.14) (-14.76)
HHItrd 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.144*** -0.105*** 0.068***
-17.72 -9.09 -20.72 -18.81 (-19.51) -4.5
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.003* -0.02*** -0.044***
(-1.96) (-11.24) (-11.27)
Log(mktcap) -0.198*** -0.201*** -0.202*** -0.127*** -0.131*** -0.139*** 0.811*** 0.818*** 0.801***
(-49.14) (-49.93) (-49.97) (-29.43) (-30.41) (-32.17) -85.82 -86.18 -86.22
Log(voltintra) 0.167*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.21*** 0.213*** 0.209*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.018***
-58.38 -59.99 -59.69 -63.96 -65.83 -64.35 -7.69 -6.42 -4.59
Inv(price) 17.159*** 17.205*** 17.335*** 19.847*** 19.904*** 20.694*** 1.584 1.492 3.227*
-22.65 -22.68 -22.7 -21.99 -22.04 -22.83 -0.82 -0.77 -1.69
stock fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
time fixed effect YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.82
PANEL B
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min Log(price_impact_5min)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.264*** -1.871*** -1.866*** -4.251*** -0.239*** -0.242*** -0.08***
(-39.84) (-39.78) (-22.66) (-16.17) (-16.18) (-19.34) (-65.29) (-66) (-13.69)
HHItrd 0.003 0.01 -0.245*** -4.711*** 0.133*** 0.433***
-0.52 -0.62 (-3.86) (-20.12) (33.12) (50.34)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.002 1.125*** -0.076***
(-0.43) (20) (-38.8)
Log(mktcap) 0.863*** 0.863*** 0.862*** 0.472*** 0.488*** 0.929*** -0.112*** -0.121*** -0.15***
-82.97 -82.75 -83.75 (8.3) (8.3) (15.55) (-24.13) (-26.01) (-33.11)
Log(voltintra) -0.007* -0.007* -0.007* -1.44*** -1.451*** -1.272*** 0.399*** 0.405*** 0.393***
(-1.71) (-1.68) (-1.75) (-33.23) (-34.24) (-29.22) (69.93) (72.22) (69.25)
Inv(price) 0.173 0.176 0.249 212.544*** 212.328*** 167.51*** 10.844*** 10.963*** 13.937***
-0.09 -0.09 -0.13 (13.19) (13.2) (11.77) (13.7) (13.84) (18.23)
stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368
R-Square 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.64 0.64 0.64
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Table A.15: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity: large and
small stocks
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.1)–(2.3) for large and small stocks in the panels A1, B1 and A2,
B2 respectively, where various liquidity measures are regressed on HFT (hf t2), market fragmentation (HHItrd ) proxy. hf t2
represents the per minute quote update for the best 5 depth levels in the limit order book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index
(HHI), shows the degree of market fragmentation. The liquidity measures are time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps), volume
weighted effective-half spreads (espread ), average quoted depths at best limit price (depth1), accumulated average quoted depths
up to best three limit price (depth3 ), volume weighted 5-minute realized-half spreads ( rspread_5min), and volume weighted
5-minute price impacts (price_impact_5min). All dependent variables are log transformed except rspread_5min, all spreads
basedmeasures are in basis point and depth in GBP100. Panel (A1, A2 )show the result for spread_bps, espread anddepth1 and
Panel (B1, B2) show the rests. Control variables are log market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log normalized intraday mid-price
volatility (Log(voltintra)) and inverse of average daily price level (invprice) are significant with expected sign but not shown.
The regression is based on a balanced panel of 66 stocks and 2624 days ( December2005–December2016) for each group and have
both time (daily) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS, t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient,
calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (lags are optimally determined). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and
10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A1 Large-cap stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.392*** -0.391*** -0.283*** -0.455*** -0.454*** -0.248*** -0.649*** -0.65*** -0.099***
(-84.62) (-84.42) (-30.17) (-87.43) (-87.11) (-25.48) (-49.23) (-49.49) (-3.28)
HHItrd 0.035*** 0.241*** 0.033*** 0.427*** -0.044*** 1.01***
(8.29) (15.52) (6.89) (25.6) (-4.78) (21.74)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.043*** -0.083*** -0.222***
(-13.64) (-24.78) (-22.81)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.75 0.75 0.76
PANEL A2 Small-cap stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.237*** -0.239*** -0.282*** -0.251*** -0.254*** -0.294*** -0.087*** -0.084*** -0.03**
(-57.62) (-58.09) (-36.79) (-59.59) (-60.2) (-36.41) (-15.96) (-15.46) (-2.49)
HHItrd 0.076*** -0.004 0.086*** 0.011 -0.093*** 0.009
(20.02) (-0.34) (21.6) (1) (-16.83) (0.53)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd 0.023*** 0.022*** -0.03***
(7.87) (7.01) (-5.93)
Wald test (ˇ2 + ˇ3 = 0) 5.85** 15.09*** 2.87*
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.80 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.72 0.73 0.73
PANEL B1 Large-cap stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min Log(price_impact_5min)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.664*** -0.662*** -0.09*** -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.178** -0.431*** -0.428*** -0.172***
(-47.96) (-47.88) (-2.88) (-2.7) (-2.93) (-2.45) (-74.74) (-73.99) (-15.37)
HHItrd 0.061*** 1.156*** -0.217*** -0.404*** 0.101*** 0.59***
(5.93) (23.69) (-9.66) (-3.79) (15.96) (31.41)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.231*** 0.039* -0.103***
(-22.68) (1.87) (-27.15)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.61 0.61 0.62
PANEL B2 Small-cap stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min Log(price_impact_5min)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Log(hft2) -0.117*** -0.117*** -0.135*** -2.488*** -2.475*** -6.718*** -0.146*** -0.152*** -0.039***
(-18.58) (-18.59) (-10.1) (-16.3) (-16.31) (-20.97) (-33.17) (-34.26) (-4.43)
HHItrd 0.01 -0.023 -0.436*** -8.366*** 0.178*** 0.387***
(1.56) (-1.17) (-5.23) (-21.8) (35.03) (28.56)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd 0.01* 2.318*** -0.061***
(1.69) (21.57) (-17.14)
Wald test (ˇ2 + ˇ3 = 0) 0.85
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.69 0.69 0.69 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.53 0.54 0.54
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Table A.16: The time-varying effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.4)–(2.6) where various liquidity measures are regressed on HFT (hf t2),
market fragmentation (HHItrd ) proxy. hf t2 represents the per minute quote update for the best 5 depth levels in the limit order
book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI) , shows the degree of market fragmentation. The liquidity measures are time
weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps), volume weighted effective-half spreads (espread ), average quoted depths at best limit
price (depth1), accumulated average quoted depths up to best three limit price (depth3 ), volume weighted 5-minute realized-half
spreads ( rspread_5min), and volume weighted 5-minute price impacts (price_impact_5min). All dependent variables are
log transformed except rspread_5min, all spreads based measures are in basis point and depth in GBP100. Panel A shows the result
for spread_bps, espread and depth1 and Panel B shows the rest. DYr8; 9; 10,DYr11; 12; 13,DYr14; 15; 16 represent the
period dummies for the three three-year blocks 2008–2010 , 201–2013 and 2014–2016, respectively. Control variables are log market
capitalization (Log(mktcap) ), log normalized intraday mid-price volatility (Log(voltintra)) and inverse of average daily price
level (invprice). Models (4), (5), (6) examine the time-varying effect of HFT, market fragmentation and their interaction in the latter
three three-year block periods of the sample, respectively. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2624 days (
December 2005–December 2016) and have both time (daily) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS, t-statistics shown
in the parentheses below the coefficient, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (lags are optimally determined). ***,
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Log(hft2) -0.278*** -0.288*** -0.252*** -0.294*** -0.323*** -0.268*** -0.004 -0.245*** -0.081***
(-56.67) (-94.17) (-46.5) (-54.92) (-101.01) (-46.63) (-0.44) (-39.83) (-7.25)
HHItrd 0.056*** -0.024*** 0.122*** 0.067*** 0.021*** 0.166*** -0.034*** -0.195*** 0.208***
-19.63 (-3.8) -15.65 -21.74 -3.06 -20.17 (-6.83) (-18.8) -12.66
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.03*** -0.034*** -0.353***
(-6.92) (-7.26) (-39.26)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 0.005 -0.012*** -0.232***
-1.17 (-2.74) (-25.83)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.013*** -0.052*** -0.246***
(-3.09) (-11.1) (-25.81)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.106*** 0.072*** 0.136***
-13.46 -8.85 -11.5
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.112*** 0.054*** 0.119***
-14.57 -6.68 -9.08
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.029*** -0.032*** -0.105***
(-12.52) (-13.21) (-21.07)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.039***
-17.17 -12.35 -23.37
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.015*** 0.003*** 0.038***
-13.15 -2.98 -18.84
Log(mktcap) -0.201*** -0.2*** -0.198*** -0.143*** -0.13*** -0.14*** 0.791*** 0.819*** 0.813***
(-48.23) (-49.51) (-48.19) (-32.24) (-30.2) (-31.83) -84.74 -86.04 -85.69
Log(voltintra) 0.17*** 0.169*** 0.168*** 0.212*** 0.213*** 0.21*** 0.02*** 0.024*** 0.017***
-61.17 -59.04 -59.15 -65.73 -65.23 -64.05 -5.76 -6.34 -4.46
Inv(price) 16.421*** 16.784*** 17.052*** 19.32*** 19.611*** 20.132*** -0.699 0.941 2.878
-21.55 -21.81 -22.09 -21.24 -21.53 -21.9 (-0.39) -0.48 -1.51
stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.82 0.82
PANEL B
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min price_impact_5min
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Log(hft2) -0.058*** -0.264*** -0.169*** -3.953*** -1.844*** -4.345*** -0.107*** -0.242*** -0.072***
(-5.65) (-39.33) (-13.49) (-18.84) (-16.24) (-19.46) (-18.43) (-66.16) (-11.58)
HHItrd 0.074*** -0.18*** 0.191*** -0.599*** -1.217*** -4.888*** 0.153*** 0.163*** 0.447***
-12.59 (-14.6) -10.47 (-12.6) (-6.75) (-20.21) -37.84 -21.8 -46.72
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.361*** 1.931*** -0.126***
(-37.5) -10.88 (-25.42)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 -0.165*** 2.415*** -0.144***
(-17.2) -15.69 (-28.66)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.195*** 2.691*** -0.179***
(-19) -17.49 (-36.22)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.258*** 1.417*** -0.038***
-18.33 -7.5 (-3.95)
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.26*** 1.341*** -0.044***
-16.92 -7.48 (-4.61)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.082*** 1.204*** -0.083***
(-14.76) -17.91 (-30.86)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.055*** -0.053*** 0.007***
-26.87 (-2.72) -6.05
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.047*** -0.047** 0.002*
-19.7 (-2.25) -1.84
Log(mktcap) 0.856*** 0.866*** 0.876*** 1.122*** 0.505*** 0.915*** -0.163*** -0.121*** -0.151***
-83.24 -82.91 -83.74 -17.76 -8.46 -14.56 (-34.74) (-26.14) (-32.64)
Log(voltintra) -0.005 -0.007* -0.007* -1.313*** -1.453*** -1.272*** 0.397*** 0.405*** 0.393***
(-1.34) (-1.74) (-1.81) (-31.5) (-34.82) (-29.16) -71.75 -72.56 -69.08
Inv(price) -3.629** -0.856 -0.493 201.111*** 206.635*** 168.227*** 11.336*** 11.111*** 13.636***
(-2.01) (-0.44) (-0.26) -12.89 -13.14 -11.81 -14.52 -14.05 -17.66
stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368
R-Square 0.82 0.81 0.81 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.64 0.64 0.64
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Table A.17: The time-varying effects of HFT andmarket fragmentation on liquidity:
Large and small stocks (part-1/2)
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.4)–(2.6) for large and small stocks where various liquidity measures
are regressed on HFT (hf t2), market fragmentation (HHItrd ) proxy. hf t2 represents the per minute quote update for the
best 5 depth levels in the limit order book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of market
fragmentation. The liquidity measures are time weighted quoted spread s(spread_bps), volume weighted effective-half spreads
(espread ), average quoted depths at best limit price (depth1). All dependent variables are log transformed, all spreads based
measures are in basis point and depth in GBP100. Panel A and Panel B show the result for large and small stocks respectively.
DYr8; 9; 10,DYr11; 12; 13,DYr14; 15; 16 represent the period dummies for the three three-year blocks 2008–2010 , 201–2013
and 2014–2016, respectively. Control variables are log market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log normalized intraday mid-price
volatility (Log(voltintra)) and inverse of average daily price level (invprice). Models (4), (5), (6) examine the time-varying
effect of HFT, market fragmentation and their interaction in the latter three three-year block periods of the sample, respectively. The
regression is based on a balanced panel of 66 stocks and 2624 days (December 2005–December 2016) for each group and have both time
(daily) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS, t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient , calculated
using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (lags are optimally determined). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels,
respectively.
PANEL A: Large stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Log(hft2) -0.279*** -0.392*** -0.305*** -0.29*** -0.455*** -0.275*** -0.171*** -0.652*** -0.108***
(-31.93) (-84.55) (-30.83) (-33.36) (-87.47) (-26.96) (-5.71) (-49.82) (-3.33)
HHItrd 0.033*** 0.045*** 0.194*** 0.029*** 0.08*** 0.368*** -0.052*** 0.135*** 0.984***
-7.8 -5.3 -11.45 -5.94 -8.28 -20.53 (-5.77) -8.23 -19.44
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.083*** -0.121*** -0.455***
(-9.66) (-13.62) (-16.64)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 -0.112*** -0.156*** -0.457***
(-13.8) (-18.96) (-17.24)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.145*** -0.219*** -0.583***
(-17.08) (-24.93) (-21.55)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.01 -0.035*** -0.216***
-0.98 (-2.9) (-10.12)
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -0.035*** -0.096*** -0.296***
(-3.19) (-7.56) (-13.11)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.026*** -0.062*** -0.215***
(-6.24) (-14.01) (-17.85)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 -0.005*** -0.003* 0.013***
(-3.07) (-1.76) -3.74
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.02***
(-8.32) (-10.58) (-4.88)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.76 0.75 0.76
PANEL B : Small stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6)
Log(hft2) -0.292*** -0.238*** -0.251*** -0.303*** -0.253*** -0.271*** 0.107*** -0.083*** 0.057***
(-45.63) (-58.57) (-30.11) (-46.16) (-60.7) (-30.81) -10.07 (-15.2) -4.37
HHItrd 0.067*** 0.019* 0.042*** 0.077*** 0.024** 0.045*** -0.062*** -0.146*** 0.133***
-18 -1.93 -3.52 -19.84 -2.37 -3.71 (-11.81) (-12.73) -7.3
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 0.05*** 0.049*** -0.291***
-6.93 -6.6 (-26.07)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 0.074*** 0.07*** -0.27***
-11.13 -10.22 (-24.08)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 0.082*** 0.073*** -0.116***
-11.61 -9.94 (-9.19)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.058*** 0.071*** 0.018
-5.05 -5.98 -1.34
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.091*** 0.089*** 0.118***
-8.19 -7.84 -8.24
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.003 0.001 -0.098***
(-0.74) -0.32 (-14.21)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.017***
-6.62 -5.36 -5.71
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.018*** 0.013*** 0.061***
-7.61 -5.44 -18.25
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.74 0.73 0.73
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Table A.18: The time-varying effects of HFT andmarket fragmentation on liquidity:
Large and small stocks (part-2/2)
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.4)–(2.6) for large and small stocks where various liquidity measures
are regressed on HFT (hf t2), market fragmentation (HHItrd ) proxy. hf t2 represents the per minute quote update for the best 5
depth levels in the limit order book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of market fragmentation.
The liquidity measures are accumulated average quoted depths up to best three limit price (depth3 ), volume weighted 5-minute
realized-half spreads (rspread_5min), and volume weighted 5-minute price impacts (price_impact_5min). All dependent
variables are log transformed except rspread_5min, all spreads based measures are in basis point and depth in GBP100. Panel A
and Panel B show the result for large and small stocks respectively. DYr8; 9; 10, DYr11; 12; 13, DYr14; 15; 16 represent the
period dummies for the three three-year blocks 2008–2010 , 201–2013 and 2014–2016, respectively. Control variables are log market
capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log normalized intraday mid-price volatility (Log(voltintra)) and inverse of average daily price
level (invprice). Models (4), (5), (6) examine the incremental effect of HFT, market fragmentation and their interaction in the latter
three three-year block periods of the sample, respectively. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 66 stocks and 2624 days (
December 2005–December 2016) for each group and have both time (daily) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS,
t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (lags are optimally
determined). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A: Large stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min Log(price_impact_5min)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5)
Log(hft2) -0.154*** -0.664*** -0.08** -0.466*** -0.079*** -0.407*** -0.209*** -0.429*** -0.185***
(-5.12) (-48.23) (-2.41) (-8.27) (-2.88) (-5.65) (-22.01) (-74.51) (-15.53)
HHItrd 0.05*** 0.274*** 1.167*** -0.211*** -0.294*** -0.874*** 0.1*** 0.179*** 0.56***
-4.87 -14.36 -22.04 (-9.49) (-5.26) (-8.18) -15.64 -14.98 -27.07
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.515*** 0.74*** -0.197***
(-18.34) -13.38 (-22.2)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 -0.467*** 0.301*** -0.223***
(-17.15) -6.39 (-24.6)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.614*** 0.316*** -0.261***
(-22.11) -6.75 (-28.51)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 -0.261*** 0.055 -0.067***
(-10.51) -0.85 (-4.08)
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -0.348*** 0.158** -0.15***
(-13.59) -2.57 (-9.44)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.239*** 0.223*** -0.092***
(-18.73) -9.15 (-17.94)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.026*** -0.118*** 0
-6.03 (-12.61) -0.14
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -0.013*** -0.115*** -0.013***
(-2.74) (-12.29) (-5.23)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.21 0.2 0.21 0.62 0.61 0.62
PANEL B: Small stocks
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min Log(price_impact_5min)
(4) (5) (6) (4) (5) (6) (4) (5)
Log(hft2) 0.054*** -0.112*** 0.027* -5.339*** -2.433*** -6.39*** -0.086*** -0.152*** -0.047***
-4.72 (-17.98) -1.82 (-18.21) (-16.42) (-19.42) (-10.71) (-34.34) (-4.78)
HHItrd 0.037*** -0.18*** 0.21*** -0.945*** -2.722*** -7.876*** 0.189*** 0.216*** 0.376***
-5.85 (-13.41) -10.11 (-13.22) (-9.26) (-19.71) -37.37 -20.25 -25.51
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.312*** 2.267*** -0.048***
(-26.23) -6.79 (-5.77)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 -0.249*** 4.215*** -0.084***
(-20.1) -15.77 (-9.87)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.005 4.892*** -0.131***
(-0.34) -18.25 (-14.97)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.136*** 3.097*** -0.05***
-8.4 -10.03 (-3.82)
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.359*** 2.847*** -0.049***
-21.31 -9.77 (-3.83)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.12*** 2.018*** -0.055***
(-14.89) -14.34 (-10.95)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.041*** 0.218*** 0
-10.81 -3.98 (-0.1)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.11*** 0.169*** -0.006**
-27.47 -3 (-2.31)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
R-Square 0.71 0.7 0.7 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.54 0.54 0.54
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TableA.19: The effects ofHFT andmarket fragmentation on liquidity: a comparison
of alternative HFT proxies
This table presents the panel regression results of Models (2.1)–(2.3) for the three alternative HFT proxies (hf t1, hf t2, hf t3)
where various liquidity measures are regressed on each HFT proxy and market fragmentation proxy (HHItrd ). hf t1, hf t2, hf t3
represent the per minute quote update for the best 10 depth levels in the limit order book, 5 depth levels in the limit order book, and
at BBO respectively. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of market fragmentation. The liquidity
measures are time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps), volume weighted effective-half spreads (espread ), average quoted
depths at best limit price (depth1), accumulated average quoted depths up to best three limit price (depth3 ), volume weighted
5-minute realized-half spreads ( rspread_5min), and volume weighted 5-minute price impacts (price_impact_5min). All
dependent variables are log transformed except rspread_5min, all spreads based measures are in basis point and depth in GBP100.
Panel A1, A2, A3 present the proxies hf t1, hf t2, hf t3 respectively and show the result for spread_bps, espread and depth1
and Panel B1, B2, B3 present the proxies hf t1, hf t2, hf t3 respectively and show the result for the rest of the liquidity measures.
Control variables are log market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log normalized intraday mid-price volatility (Log(voltintra))
and inverse of average daily price level (invprice) are not shown, all are significant with expected sign. The regression is based
on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2624 days ( December 2005–December 2016) and have both time (daily) and stock fixed
effects. Coefficient estimates are OLS , t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient, calculated using Newey-West
(HAC) standard errors (lags are optimally determined). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
PANEL A
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread) Log(depth1)
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
A1: hft1 (best 10 depth levels)
Log(hft1) -0.278*** -0.279*** -0.275*** -0.32*** -0.321*** -0.279*** -0.284*** -0.282*** -0.183***
(-89.68) (-90.04) (-50.21) (-98.95) (-99.46) (-48.42) (-45.35) (-45.25) (-16.13)
HHItrd 0.049*** 0.057*** 0.061*** 0.139*** -0.107*** 0.078***
(15.9) (7.21) (18.99) (16.6) (-19.94) (4.76)
Log(hft1)*HHItrd -0.002 -0.019*** -0.045***
(-1.15) (-10.19) (-10.99)
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83
A2: hft2 (best 5 depth levels)
Log(hft2) -0.288*** -0.289*** -0.283*** -0.322*** -0.324*** -0.282*** -0.25*** -0.247*** -0.155***
(-92.96) (-93.21) (-54.74) (-99.98) (-100.38) (-51.56) (-40.36) (-40.14) (-14.76)
HHItrd 0.052*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.144*** -0.105*** 0.068***
-17.72 -9.09 -20.72 -18.81 (-19.51) -4.5
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.003* -0.02*** -0.044***
(-1.96) (-11.24) (-11.27)
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.82
A3: hft3 (best price limit/BBO)
Log(hft3) -0.269*** -0.269*** -0.265*** -0.291*** -0.292*** -0.254*** -0.148*** -0.146*** -0.07***
(-81.77) (-81.87) (-48.72) (-84.2) (-84.41) (-42.99) (-24.55) (-24.45) (-6.76)
HHItrd 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.059*** 0.118*** -0.112*** 0.007
-15.35 -8.35 -17.78 -17.05 (-20.37) -0.52
Log(hft3)*HHItrd -0.002 -0.018*** -0.037***
(-1.08) (-9.68) (-9.4)
R-Square 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.82 0.82
PANEL B
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(depth3) rspread_5min price_impact_5min
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
B1: hft1 (best 10 depth levels)
Log(hft1) -0.295*** -0.295*** -0.285*** -1.662*** -1.657*** -4.25*** -1.601*** -1.61*** -3.217***
(-43.27) (-43.22) (-22.7) (-16.45) (-16.43) (-19.5) (-28.06) (-28.28) (-27.31)
HHItrd 0.001 0.019 -0.273*** -5.116*** 0.507*** -2.496***
(0.21) (1.05) (-4.14) (-20.25) (9.08) (-15.18)
Log(hft1)*HHItrd -0.004 1.17*** 0.725***
(-0.98) (19.86) (20.9)
R-Square 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.54 0.54 0.54
B2: hft2 (best 5 depth levels)
Log(hft2) -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.264*** -1.871*** -1.866*** -4.251*** -1.988*** -2*** -3.615***
(-39.84) (-39.78) (-22.66) (-16.17) (-16.18) (-19.34) (-30.64) (-30.9) (-29.57)
HHItrd 0.003 0.01 -0.245*** -4.711*** 0.543*** -2.48***
-0.52 -0.62 (-3.86) (-20.12) (10.11) (-15.79)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.002 1.125*** 0.762***
(-0.43) (20) (22.07)
R-Square 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.54 0.54 0.55
B3: hft3 (best price limit/BBO)
Log(hft3) -0.184*** -0.184*** -0.188*** -2.184*** -2.18*** -4.901*** -1.779*** -1.788*** -3.053***
(-27.66) (-27.63) (-16.19) (-17.55) (-17.57) (-22.06) (-26.39) (-26.53) (-24.68)
HHItrd -0.004 -0.01 -0.253*** -4.505*** 0.508*** -1.469***
(-0.57) (-0.74) (-4.15) (-23.38) -9.94 (-11.33)
Log(hft3)*HHItrd 0.002 1.312*** 0.61***
-0.5 -23.87 -18.2
R-Square 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.56 0.56 0.57
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Table A.20: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity: a two-stage
IV-GMM estimation
This table presents the second stage result of the two-stage optimal IV-GMM estimation of the Models (2.10)–(2.13) for time
weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps) and volume weighted effective half-spreads (espread ). Sub columns (1)–(5) represent the
equivalent IV-GMM estimation of Models (2.1)–(2.5) in OLS. The three suspected endogenous variablesHF Tit , MF ragit , and
HF T MF ragit are predicted by the three first-stage Models (2.7), (2.8), and (2.9) respectively. hf t2 represents the per minute
quote update for the best 5 depth levels in the limit order book. HHItrd is the Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of
market fragmentation. The liquidity measures are time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps), and volume weighted effective-half
spreads (espread ). All dependent variables are log transformed and liquidity measures are in basis point. Control variables are log
market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log intraday mid price range volatility (Log(voltintra)), price inverse (invprice) and
the average degree of liquidity of stocks in the same size group excluding stock i (MQ it ), calculated from four equally divided
firm size group based on market capitalization. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2624 days ( December
2005–December 2016), have both time (weekly time dummy for each of 591 weeks) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are
IV-GMM, t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient, calculated using Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on
5 day lags). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
I II III IV VI VII VIII IX X XI
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(hft2) -0.442*** -0.413*** -0.456*** -0.402*** -0.407*** -0.425*** -0.418*** -0.457*** -0.409*** -0.415***
(-127.12) (-116.04) (-78.56) (-64.16) (-112.43) (-115.36) (-111.42) (-79.64) (-66.25) (-105.87)
HHItrd 0.254*** 0.147*** 0.27*** 0.161*** 0.085*** -0.019 0.077*** 0.056***
(25.78) (10.86) -8.82 (8.24) (-1.42) -6.67 -2.86
Log(hft2)*HHItrd 0.016*** 0.015***
(7.72) (7.7)
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -23.86 -0.017***
-0.037*** (-3)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 (-6.42) 0.018***
0.003 -3.46
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.47 -0.031***
-0.012** (-5.99)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 (-2.31) 0.07** 0.01
-2.57 -0.34
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 0.269*** 0.101***
-8.14 -2.78
Log(MQ it ) 0.367*** 0.391*** 0.38*** 0.365*** 0.338*** 0.249*** 0.252*** 0.25*** 0.262*** 0.235***
(42.53) (45.56) (49.48) -39.46 -30.4 (24.85) (25.16) (28.81) -25.1 -18.38
Log(mktcap) -0.117*** -0.152*** -0.137*** -0.148*** -0.152*** -0.09*** -0.101*** -0.087*** -0.107*** -0.101***
(-29.98) (-37.23) (-37.71) (-33.94) (-36.72) (-21.66) (-23.06) (-22.09) (-23.05) (-22.88)
Log(voltintra) 0.225*** 0.232*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.237*** 0.266*** 0.27*** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.271***
(78.56) (82.4) (91.63) -84.82 -82.24 (82.51) (82.01) (88.38) -83.03 -82.62
Inv(price) 9.968*** 10.507*** 9.655*** 9.973*** 10.212*** 9.588*** 9.705*** 8.772*** 8.587*** 9.633***
(14.26) (15.01) (16.71) -14.05 -14.36 (11.72) (11.85) (12.41) -10.48 -11.69
stock fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
time fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Observations 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368 346368
adj_Rsqr 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.81 0.82 0.81 0.82 0.82
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Table A.21: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity: a two-stage
IV-GMM estimation for large and small stocks
This table presents the second stage result of the two-stage optimal IV-GMM estimation of the Models (2.10)–(2.13) employing large
(Panel A) and small (Panel B) stocks for time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps) and volume weighted effective half-spreads
(espread ). Sub columns (1)–(5) represent the equivalent IV-GMM estimation of Models (2.1)–(2.5) in OLS. The three suspected
endogenous variablesHF Tit ,MF ragit , andHF T MF ragit are predicted by the three first-stage equations (2.7), (2.8), and
(2.9) respectively. hf t2 represents the per minute quote update for the best 5 depth levels in the limit order book. HHItrd is the
Herfindhal-Hirchman index (HHI), shows the degree of market fragmentation. The liquidity measures are time weighted quoted spread
(spread_bps), and volume weighted effective-half spread (espread ). All dependent variables are log transformed and liquidity
measures are in basis point. Control variables are log market capitalization (Log(mktcap)), log intraday mid price range volatility
(Log(voltintra)), price inverse (invprice) and the average degree of liquidity of stocks in the same size group excluding stock i
(MQ it ), calculated from four equally divided firm size group based on market capitalization. Estimates on the coefficient of control
variables are not shown, all are significant, and have the expected sign. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 66 stocks and
2624 days ( December 2005–December 2016) for each group of stock, have both time (weekly time dummy for each of 591 weeks) and
stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are IV-GMM, t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient , calculated using
Newey-West (HAC) standard errors (based on 5 day lags). ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A : Large stocks
I II III IV VI VII VIII IX X XI
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(hft2) -0.408*** -0.398*** -0.293*** -0.312*** -0.409*** -0.376*** -0.406*** -0.201*** -0.282*** -0.437***
(-85.82) (-80.29) (-25.19) (-29.39) (-69.08) (-71.27) (-70.1) (-16.18) (-23.9) (-55.45)
HHItrd 0.086*** 0.31*** 0.108*** 0.231*** -0.155*** 0.289*** -0.121*** 0.242***
(6.14) (12.66) -7.62 -8.37 (-9.07) (10.43) (-7.31) -7.21
Log(hft2)*HHItrd -0.039*** -0.08***
(-8.93) (-16.68)
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.082*** -0.096***
(-7.28) (-7.59)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 -0.061*** -0.082***
(-5.87) (-7.13)
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 -0.126*** -0.203***
(-11.68) (-16.95)
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 0.021 -0.129**
-0.41 (-2.02)
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -0.612*** -1.502***
(-9.66) (-17.29)
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
adj_Rsqr 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.79 0.77 0.77 0.78 0.78 0.65
Panel B : Small stocks
I II III IV VI VII VIII IX X XI
Log(spread_bps) Log(espread)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log(hft2) -0.507*** -0.448*** -0.508*** -0.464*** -0.459*** -0.49*** -0.475*** -0.591*** -0.469*** -0.464***
(-105.95) (-86.75) (-42.39) (-35.72) (-88.45) (-98.78) (-90.09) (-52.8) (-39.92) (-77.82)
HHItrd 0.378*** 0.226*** 0.321*** -0.423*** 0.086*** -0.172*** 0.047*** -1.109***
(25.33) (8.86) -21.13 (-6.98) (5.76) (-7.04) -3.08 (-14.58)
Log(hft2)*HHItrd 0.025*** 0.059***
(4.68) (11.52)
Log(hft2)*DYr8,9,10 -0.042*** -0.086***
(-2.77) (-6.21)
Log(hft2)*DYr11,12,13 0.041*** 0.034***
-2.88 -2.67
Log(hft2)*DYr14,15,16 0.014 0.029**
-1 1.002*** -2.19 1.626***
HHItrd*DYr11,12,13 -11.84 -15.49
1.082*** 1.498***
HHItrd*DYr14,15,16 -14.29 -16.65
Observations 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184 173184
adj_Rsqr 0.74 0.73 0.74 0.74 0.67 0.71 0.72 0.71 0.71 0.57
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Table A.22: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity: a
simultaneous equations model estimation
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation of the equations (2.13)–(2.14) using both GMM (H3SLS) and 3SLS
estimations for time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps) and volume weighted effective half-spreads (espread ). Indices i
and t represent stocks and day respectively, MQit represents one of the two log normalized market quality (liquidity) measures
(spread_bps, espread ), HF Tit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2), MF ragit represents the market fragmentation proxy
(HHItrd ), MQ it represents the average market liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i ,
MF rag it represents the average market fragmentation level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i ,HF T it
represents the average HFT intensity over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i , Log(mktcap) is the log normalized
value of market capitalization,Log(voltintra) is the log normalized value of intraday mid price range volatility, invprice is the
inverse of daily average price,Log(size) is the log normalized average value of trade size ,Log(value) is the log normalized value
of trading volume, indices ((mq)), ((hf t)), ((frg)) refer the respective coefficient of the equationsMQit /(2.13),HF Tit /(2.14) and
MF ragit /(2.15) respectively. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2240 days ( January 2008–December
2016), have both time (monthly time dummy for each of the 108 months) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are GMM
(H3SLS) and 3SLS, t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient . ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%
levels, respectively.
spread_bps espread
H3SLS (GMM) 3SLS H3SLS (GMM) 3SLS
Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Log(HF T )it -0.317*** -0.376*** -0.311*** -0.384***
(-87.92) (-249.1) (-80.6) (-242.44)
MFragit 0.189*** 0.231*** 0.073*** 0.063***
-22.9 -56.24 -8.35 -14.54
log(MQ) it 0.45*** 0.372*** 0.311*** 0.239***
-54.94 -100.48 -31.2 -51.98
Log(mktcap)it -0.187*** -0.182*** -0.143*** -0.118***
(-44.18) (-104.03) (-30.2) (-63.84)
Log(volint ra)it 0.183*** 0.185*** 0.219*** 0.208***
-64.82 -170.98 -65.67 -182.68
inv(price)it 14.086*** 14.979*** 16.373*** 18.568***
-17.36 -67.92 -17.13 -80.84
Log(MQ)it 0.726*** 0.685*** 1.253*** 1.378***
-21.87 -47.3 -15.69 -39.02
MFragit 0.149*** 0.106*** 0.138*** 0.113***
-8.14 -10.61 -6.13 -9.45
Log(HF T ) it 0.429*** 0.463*** 0.371*** 0.51***
-48.19 -113.05 -26.12 -82.05
Log(mktcap)it 0.296*** 0.317*** 0.405*** 0.458***
-26.43 -69.65 -20.03 -53.06
rtkit -462.761*** -386.573*** -712.829*** -582.874***
(-29.26) (-115.61) (-23.14) (-55.95)
Log(size)it -0.762*** -0.774*** -0.949*** -0.954***
(-44.64) (-120.39) (-27.92) (-67.74)
Log(volume)it 0.702*** 0.691*** 0.769*** 0.797***
-58.18 -136.6 -37.48 -90.91
Log(volint ra)it -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.142*** -0.172***
(-6.85) (-14.19) (-9.01) (-26.01)
Log(MQ)it 0.01 0.248*** 0.11*** 0.241***
-1.04 -51.29 -12.03 -53.1
Log(HF T )it 0.209*** 0.26*** 0.246*** 0.284***
-41.53 -85.6 -46.27 -85.4
MFrag it 0.629*** 0.613*** 0.627*** 0.624***
-71.1 -124.25 -70.69 -123.35
Log(mktcap)it 0.216*** 0.262*** 0.238*** 0.261***
-50.01 -126.24 -55.27 -126.12
Log(volume)it -0.242*** -0.218*** -0.249*** -0.242***
(-81.98) (-146.77) (-86.01) (-156.93)
Log(volint ra)it -0.005* -0.049*** -0.024*** -0.051***
(-1.83) (-31.54) (-8.65) (-32.45)
observations 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680 295680
adjrsq 0.87 0.86 0.83 0.83
adjrsq 0.91 0.91 0.85 0.83
adjrsq 0.78 0.77 0.78 0.78
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Table A.23: The effects of HFT and market fragmentation on liquidity (large and
small stocks): a simultaneous equations model estimation
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation of the equations (2.13)–(2.14) for large and small stocks
using GMM(H3SLS)estimation for log normalized time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps) and volume weighted effective
half-spreads (espread ). Indices i and t represent stocks and day respectively, MQit represents one of the two market quality
(liquidity)measures (spread_bps, espread ),HF Tit represents HFT proxy (hf t2),MF ragit representsmarket fragmentation
proxy (HHItrd ), MQ it represents average market liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i ,
MF rag it represents average market fragmentation level over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i , HF T it
represents average HFT intensity over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i , Log(mktcap) is the log normalized
value of market capitalization,Log(voltintra) is the log normalized value of intraday mid price range volatility, invprice is the
inverse of daily average price, Log(size) is the log normalized average value of trade size , Log(value) is the log normalized
value of trading volume , indices (mq), ((hf t)), (frg) refer the respective estimates of the equationsMQit /(2.13),HF Tit /(2.14)
andMF ragit /(2.15) respectively. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 6 stocks and 2240 days ( January 2008–December
2016) for each group of stock, have both time (monthly time dummy for each of 108 months) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient
estimates are GMM (H3SLS), t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient . ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%,
and 10% levels, respectively.
spread_bps espread
LARGE SMALL LARGE SMALL
Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X XI XII
Log(HF T )it -0.277*** -0.379*** -0.266*** -0.382***
(-60.69) (-71.68) (-51.04) (-68.43)
MFragit 0.081*** 0.268*** -0.074*** 0.101***
-7.31 -22.35 (-5.92) -8.19
Log(MQ) it 0.585*** 0.365*** 0.333*** 0.316***
-41.71 -31.72 -16.35 -25.97
Log(mktcap)it -0.189*** -0.176*** -0.141*** -0.119***
(-35.43) (-27.3) (-23.25) (-16.9)
Log(volint ra)it 0.13*** 0.239*** 0.161*** 0.284***
-35.56 -73.69 -35.27 -79.64
inv(price)it 13.963*** 10.738*** 12.239*** 20.848***
-13.42 -10.32 -10.98 -15.82
Log(MQ)it 0.355*** 0.535*** 0.563*** 0.689***
-12.33 -10.64 -8.27 -9.17
MFragit 0.094*** 0.325*** 0.097*** 0.36***
-5.29 -9.08 -4.78 -10.41
Log(HF T ) it 0.532*** 0.325*** 0.523*** 0.281***
-64.65 -22.82 -48.58 -14.94
Log(mktcap)it 0.335*** 0.202*** 0.406*** 0.219***
-28.89 -12.52 -17.8 -12.4
rtkit -292.35*** -484.626*** -409.578*** -597.873***
(-13.84) (-32.05) (-10.88) (-25.72)
Log(size)it -0.89*** -0.525*** -1.009*** -0.541***
(-44.52) (-26.5) (-25.1) (-23.59)
Log(volume)it 0.577*** 0.661*** 0.585*** 0.666***
-56.94 -38.08 -40.42 -33.15
Log(volint ra)it -0.01 0.018 -0.029*** -0.022
(-1.54) -1.64 (-2.81) (-1.28)
Log(MQ)it 0.113*** 0.063*** 0.141*** 0.158***
-12.3 -3.78 -15.77 -10.75
Log(HF T )it 0.186*** 0.272*** 0.214*** 0.306***
-33.78 -32.31 -36.38 -35.43
MFrag it 0.661*** 0.373*** 0.653*** 0.372***
-57.33 -29.69 -56.71 -29.33
Log(mktcap)it 0.219*** 0.194*** 0.23*** 0.216***
-43.02 -30.62 -44.74 -33.55
Log(volume)it -0.228*** -0.255*** -0.249*** -0.259***
(-62.03) (-60.57) (-65.82) (-66.41)
Log(volint ra)it -0.016*** -0.025*** -0.015*** -0.051***
(-4.49) (-5.06) (-4.37) (-10.74)
observations 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840 147840
adjrsq 0.82 0.77 0.78 0.74
adjrsq 0.9 0.82 0.88 0.8
adjrsq 0.81 0.76 0.81 0.76
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Table A.24: The time-varying effects of HFT andmarket fragmentation on liquidity:
a simultaneous equations model estimation
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation of the equations (2.13)–(2.14) using GMM (H3SLS) estimation
for the sub periods (2008-2010), (2011-2013) and (2014-2016) for log normalized time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps)
and volume weighted effective half-spreads (espread ). Indices i and t represent stocks and days respectively, MQit represents
one of the two market quality (liquidity) measures (spread_bps, espread ),HF Tit represents HFT proxy (hf t2) ,MF ragit
represents market fragmentation proxy (HHItrd ),MQ it represents average market liquidity level over all stocks in the same size
group excluding stock i ,MF rag it represents average market fragmentation level over all stocks in the same size group excluding
stock i ,HF T it represents average HFT intensity over all stocks in the same size group excluding stock i , Log(mktcap) is the
log normalized value of market capitalization, Log(voltintra) is the log normalized value of intraday mid price range volatility,
invprice is the inverse of daily average price, Log(size) is the log normalized average value of trade size , Log(value) is the
log normalized value of trading volume , indices (mq), (hf t ), (frg) refer the respective estimates of the equations MQit /(2.13),
HF Tit /(2.14) andMF ragit /(2.15) respectively. The regression is based on a balanced panel of 132 stocks and 2240 days (January
2008–December 2016), have both time (monthly time dummy for each of the 36 months in each sub period) and stock fixed effects.
Coefficient estimates are GMM (H3SLS), t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient . ***, **, * denote significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
effective half   spread
2008-2010 2011-2013 2014-2016
Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit Log(MQ)it Log(HF T )it Mf ragit
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Log(HF T )it -0.251*** -0.253*** -0.221***
(-47.54) (-45.09) (-31.81)
MFragit 0.239*** 0.095*** 0.01
-18.62 -9.94 -0.95
Log(MQ) it 0.391*** 0.477*** 0.486***
-30.13 -31.7 -28.47
Log(mktcap)it -0.222*** -0.25*** -0.231***
(-25.81) (-28.15) (-22.63)
Log(volint ra)it 0.204*** 0.175*** 0.151***
-41.98 -56.27 -44.7
inv(price)it 19.067*** 6.573*** 46.527***
-16.63 -9 -16.81
Log(MQ)it 0.297*** 0.297*** 0.39***
-6.36 -6.46 -10.47
MFragit 0.206*** 0.304*** 0.249***
-9.85 -10.57 -11.34
Log(HF T ) it 0.514*** 0.587*** 0.457***
-46.12 -55.7 -52.42
Log(mktcap)it 0.237*** 0.175*** 0.18***
-14.22 -10.42 -10.48
rtkit -221.216*** -1006.162*** -875.426***
(-17.64) (-30.09) (-24.12)
Log(size)it -0.618*** -0.314*** -0.517***
(-33.04) (-24.33) (-37.47)
Log(volume)it 0.527*** 0.452*** 0.552***
-42.38 -45.08 -66.02
Log(volint ra)it 0.053*** 0.041*** 0.001
-5.87 -5.09 -0.15
Log(MQ)it 0.199*** 0.105*** 0.17***
-15.88 -6.89 -13.73
Log(HF T )it 0.212*** 0.273*** 0.382***
-29.38 -35.21 -40.26
MFrag it 0.685*** 0.544*** 0.557***
-59.75 -36.63 -36.51
Log(mktcap)it 0.2*** 0.219*** 0.357***
-23.71 -19.94 -33.92
Log(volume)it -0.185*** -0.3*** -0.376***
(-47.39) (-75.46) (-74.72)
Log(volint ra)it -0.054*** 0.01** -0.011***
(-12.48) -2.53 (-3.28)
observations 97284 97284 97284 99528 99528 99528 98868 98868 98868
adjrsq 0.85 0.84 0.83
adjrsq 0.92 0.93 0.95
adjrsq 0.83 0.44 0.46
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Fig. A.1: Market trends: 2005–2016
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(a) HFT proxy: hf t1 (10 depth levels)
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(b) HFT proxy: hf t2 (5 depth levels)
Fig. A.2: HFT proxies: electronic message rate
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hft1h (GBP volume (100) per message ( best 10 depth levels ) * (-1)), venue : LSE Small Q2 Q3 Q4 Large
(a) HFT proxies: hf t1h (Hendershott et al., 2011)
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(b) HFT proxies: hf t1h (zoomed in)
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(c) HFT proxies: ordtot rd
Fig. A.3: HFT proxies: Hendershott et al. (2011)’s measure and order to trade ratio
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(a) Trends in trading volumes across quintiles
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Yearly volume venue market share 
LSE CHIX BATS Turquoise
(b) Trading volumes’ market share across exchanges
Fig. A.4: LSE listed stocks: Trends in trading volumes and venue market share
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(a) The volume fragmentation proxy (HHItrd )
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(b) The quote fragmentation proxy (HHIqu5)
Fig. A.5: Trends in market fragmentation proxies
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(a) Time weighted quoted spreads (spread_bps)
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Q2 Q3 Q4 Large Small
(b) Volume weighted effective spreads (espread )
Fig. A.6: Trends in average quoted spreads and effective half-spreads
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(a) 5-minute realized half-spreads (rspread )
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(b) 5-minute price impacts (price_impact )
Fig. A.7: Trends in realized half-spreads and price impacts
111
0500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
5000
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
01
Ja
n2
00
5
01
M
ay
20
05
01
Se
p2
00
5
01
Ja
n2
00
6
01
M
ay
20
06
01
Se
p2
00
6
01
Ja
n2
00
7
01
M
ay
20
07
01
Se
p2
00
7
01
Ja
n2
00
8
01
M
ay
20
08
01
Se
p2
00
8
01
Ja
n2
00
9
01
M
ay
20
09
01
Se
p2
00
9
01
Ja
n2
01
0
01
M
ay
20
10
01
Se
p2
01
0
01
Ja
n2
01
1
01
M
ay
20
11
01
Se
p2
01
1
01
Ja
n2
01
2
01
M
ay
20
12
01
Se
p2
01
2
01
Ja
n2
01
3
01
M
ay
20
13
01
Se
p2
01
3
01
Ja
n2
01
4
01
M
ay
20
14
01
Se
p2
01
4
01
Ja
n2
01
5
01
M
ay
20
15
01
Se
p2
01
5
01
Ja
n2
01
6
01
M
ay
20
16
01
Se
p2
01
6
depth1 (average BBO level depth /GBP 100) venue: LSE Small Q2 Q3 Q4 Large
(a) Average quoted depths at best price (depth1)
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Fig. A.8: Trends in average quoted depths and trade sizes
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Table B.1: Reuters Instrument Code (RIC) structure
This table explains how a stock is identified across exchanges in the TRTH data request environment. This illustration is based on
an excerpted TRTH data request snapshot of HSBC HOLDINGS, an LSE listed UK based company. Under uniform symbology, RIC
structure of a stock comprises two parts: the unique root part which is ’HSBA’ in this example and the listing/trading venue extension
(upper case ‘L’,‘BS’, ‘TQ’ and ‘CHI’ for LSE, BATS, Turquoise and CHIX respectively ) that comes after a period ‘.’. If a stock is
traded in the primary exchange, the first part of the RIC only includes the ticker root while an additional lower case letter referring an
unique primary venue (lower case ’l’ for LSE) is added with the root if it is traded on any other exchanges. Accordingly, ‘HSBA.L’,
refers the RIC of the primary exchange LSE, and ‘HSBAl.CHI’, ‘HSBAl.BS’ and ‘HSBAl.TQ’ refer that for alternative exchange
CHIX, BATS and Turquoise respectively. The ISIN is unique for a stock and can be used to link all RICs defined against a stock. The
lower section of this table shows a real TRTH data request environment.
RIC ISIN Exchange Name First Date Last Date Underlying RIC
HSBAl.BS GB0005405286 BTE HSBC HOLDINGS 23/10/2008 26/10/2017 HSBA.L
HSBAl.TQ GB0005405286 TRQ HSBC HOLDINGS 1/8/2008 26/10/2017 HSBA.L
HSBAl.CHI GB0005405286 CHI HSBC HOLDINGS 5/4/2008 26/10/2017 HSBA.L
HSBA.L GB0005405286 LSE HSBC HOLDINGS 1/1/1996 26/10/2017 HSBA.L
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Table B.2: The simultaneous trading venue participation rate (quarterly) in the
EBBO
This table shows the joint venue participation rate (%) in the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO), a hypothetical aggregate measure
of limit order books across LSE, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise, builded on 500 milliseconds snapshots. The single, double, triple and
quadruple refer the number of venue(s) which each time contributes in the EBBO. The EBBO is measured on a subsample of 45 stocks
which were fragmented across four main exchanges immediately after the event of MiFID, and on which TRTH provides the maximum
data support for the period 2008–2016.
% EBBO (The highest bid price) % EBBO (The lowest ask price)
year qtr single Double triple quadruple total single Double triple quadruple total
2008 1 100.00 - - - 100 100.00 - - - 100
2008 2 83.83 16.17 - - 100 83.48 16.52 - - 100
2008 3 73.56 25.78 0.66 - 100 73.34 25.88 0.78 - 100
2008 4 69.58 24.27 5.49 0.67 100 68.13 24.75 6.29 0.83 100
2009 1 59.43 25.11 12.53 2.93 100 57.37 25.47 13.63 3.53 100
2009 2 50.22 27.49 16.50 5.79 100 49.30 26.97 17.34 6.40 100
2009 3 56.77 23.18 13.36 6.70 100 56.39 23.18 13.58 6.85 100
2009 4 55.96 23.53 13.44 7.07 100 55.79 23.53 13.48 7.19 100
2010 1 50.19 26.46 16.12 7.24 100 50.02 26.41 16.14 7.44 100
2010 2 47.54 26.07 16.92 9.47 100 47.24 26.10 16.96 9.70 100
2010 3 48.13 24.26 15.95 11.66 100 48.13 24.25 15.93 11.69 100
2010 4 50.80 23.26 15.32 10.62 100 50.65 23.22 15.35 10.78 100
2011 1 51.63 22.83 14.69 10.86 100 51.52 22.84 14.68 10.96 100
2011 2 56.56 22.10 11.79 9.56 100 56.66 22.08 11.71 9.56 100
2011 3 58.02 22.22 10.61 9.16 100 58.01 22.21 10.59 9.19 100
2011 4 51.71 24.71 13.59 9.99 100 51.83 24.66 13.53 9.99 100
2012 1 42.60 26.72 18.90 11.79 100 42.45 26.71 18.94 11.90 100
2012 2 48.61 23.65 14.09 13.65 100 48.71 23.65 14.07 13.56 100
2012 3 49.92 22.90 15.14 12.04 100 49.89 22.84 15.12 12.15 100
2012 4 49.15 23.48 14.47 12.90 100 49.33 23.45 14.41 12.82 100
2013 1 53.95 22.74 12.44 10.87 100 54.00 22.78 12.37 10.85 100
2013 2 52.58 23.08 12.92 11.42 100 52.81 23.13 12.80 11.26 100
2013 3 54.21 22.26 12.76 10.76 100 54.38 22.27 12.73 10.61 100
2013 4 52.25 22.93 13.86 10.96 100 52.29 22.97 13.88 10.85 100
2014 1 54.65 22.15 12.89 10.30 100 54.85 22.20 12.82 10.13 100
2014 2 53.54 22.29 13.85 10.31 100 53.47 22.31 13.89 10.33 100
2014 3 54.45 23.47 13.82 8.26 100 54.43 23.44 13.80 8.33 100
2014 4 51.73 24.21 15.06 9.00 100 51.70 24.21 15.04 9.06 100
2015 1 48.22 22.80 15.24 13.74 100 48.31 22.79 15.21 13.69 100
2015 2 47.91 23.19 15.06 13.84 100 47.97 23.16 15.03 13.84 100
2015 3 46.82 23.66 15.47 14.05 100 46.68 23.71 15.52 14.09 100
2015 4 45.05 23.65 15.38 15.92 100 44.91 23.66 15.45 15.98 100
2016 1 46.00 24.26 15.70 14.04 100 45.85 24.18 15.75 14.22 100
2016 2 46.25 23.80 15.69 14.26 100 46.34 23.80 15.66 14.20 100
2016 3 48.78 22.33 15.00 13.88 100 48.64 22.31 15.06 14.00 100
2016 4 48.23 22.24 14.55 14.99 100 48.11 22.23 14.53 15.14 100
mean 54 23 13 10 54 23 13 10
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Table B.3: The unique trading venue participation rate (quarterly) in the EBBO
This table shows the unique venue participation rate (%) in the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO), a hypothetical aggregate measure
of limit order books across LSE, CHIX, BATS and Turquoise, builded on 500 milliseconds snapshots. LSE, CHIX, BATS and TURQ
refer the percentage of time each venue uniquely contributing in the consolidated best bid/offer (EBBO). The EBBO is measured on
a subsample of 45 stocks which were fragmented across four main exchanges immediately after the event of MiFID, and on which
TRTH provides the maximum data support for the period 2008–2016.
% EBBO (The highest bid price) % EBBO (The lowest ask price)
year qtr LSE CHIX BATS TURQ total LSE CHIX BATS TURQ total
2008 1 100.00 - - - 100 100 - - - 100
2008 2 68.88 31.12 - - 100 67.94 32.06 - - 100
2008 3 42.41 55.76 - 1.83 100 41.68 56.33 - 1.99 100
2008 4 34.66 53.39 1.85 10.10 100 34.08 53.58 1.92 10.42 100
2009 1 38.69 36.85 3.85 20.60 100 38.21 36.43 4.05 21.31 100
2009 2 48.15 36.79 11.05 4.01 100 47.05 37.18 11.54 4.23 100
2009 3 41.83 30.49 10.77 16.91 100 41.79 30.37 10.93 16.91 100
2009 4 32.44 37.33 9.86 20.37 100 32.39 37.32 9.87 20.43 100
2010 1 38.45 37.08 11.78 12.69 100 38.38 37.01 11.80 12.81 100
2010 2 36.98 41.19 10.65 11.18 100 36.59 41.33 10.72 11.35 100
2010 3 37.93 40.36 10.42 11.29 100 37.82 40.51 10.38 11.30 100
2010 4 34.27 39.79 16.72 9.22 100 34.27 39.95 16.60 9.17 100
2011 1 35.53 40.15 14.43 9.89 100 35.48 40.40 14.30 9.83 100
2011 2 15.00 71.67 7.14 6.18 100 14.98 71.73 7.12 6.17 100
2011 3 8.98 81.00 4.84 5.17 100 8.84 81.23 4.74 5.19 100
2011 4 13.71 61.93 13.54 10.82 100 13.54 62.12 13.54 10.79 100
2012 1 18.73 47.61 15.76 17.91 100 18.69 47.71 15.75 17.84 100
2012 2 32.88 40.89 11.57 14.67 100 32.87 40.91 11.54 14.69 100
2012 3 32.19 41.11 11.69 15.01 100 32.12 41.14 11.70 15.04 100
2012 4 37.11 32.85 13.19 16.85 100 37.25 32.79 13.15 16.81 100
2013 1 41.16 29.84 9.29 19.71 100 41.22 29.80 9.35 19.63 100
2013 2 47.44 27.07 8.15 17.35 100 47.47 27.13 8.18 17.21 100
2013 3 45.35 28.90 7.88 17.87 100 45.22 29.05 7.89 17.84 100
2013 4 43.85 27.65 9.08 19.41 100 43.83 27.72 9.05 19.39 100
2014 1 54.98 19.63 8.38 17.01 100 55.35 19.47 8.34 16.84 100
2014 2 57.89 18.15 9.12 14.84 100 58.13 17.98 9.12 14.77 100
2014 3 47.13 29.11 9.15 14.60 100 47.23 29.07 9.15 14.55 100
2014 4 48.22 25.80 8.60 17.39 100 48.25 25.72 8.60 17.43 100
2015 1 47.77 24.89 10.60 16.73 100 47.90 24.69 10.59 16.82 100
2015 2 50.70 22.98 10.78 15.54 100 51.06 22.74 10.77 15.44 100
2015 3 48.63 25.64 9.82 15.91 100 48.96 25.40 9.79 15.84 100
2015 4 47.14 28.25 7.93 16.69 100 46.98 28.36 7.99 16.67 100
2016 1 38.94 27.20 12.77 21.09 100 38.62 27.13 12.90 21.35 100
2016 2 41.42 23.34 13.91 21.33 100 41.45 23.30 13.93 21.33 100
2016 3 53.50 20.69 8.49 17.33 100 53.35 20.62 8.50 17.53 100
2016 4 57.91 17.93 7.49 16.66 100 57.92 17.89 7.51 16.69 100
mean 42 35 10 13 42 35 10 13
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Table B.12: The cross-market impact of high frequency trading and market
fragmentation on liquidity: a simultaneous equations model estimation
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation for the system of equations (3.1)–(3.8) using the three-stage least
squares methods for two liquidity measures: log normalized time weighted quoted spreads and log normalized volume weighted
effective half-spreads. Indices i and t represent stocks and time (days) respectively, v represents one of the four venues: LSE, CHIX,
BATS and Turquoise,HF Tvit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2) developed on quotes update upto the fifth depth level,HHItrdit
represents the market fragmentation proxy, MQ vit represents the average liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i at venue v, HF T vit represents the average HFT intensity at venue v over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i , ln(mktcap) is the log normalized market capitalization, ln(voltintra)vit is the log normalized intraday mid
price range volatility, invprice is the inverse of daily average price, ln(size)vit is the log normalized trade size, ln(value)vit is
the log normalized trading volume, rtkvit is the relative tick size. The estimation is based on a panel dataset of 149 stocks and 2060
days (October 2008–December 2016) and includes both time (the monthly time dummy for each of 99 months included in the panel)
and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are 3SLS , t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, * denote
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A presents the estimates for market quality equations (3.1–3.4) and Panel
B presents those for HFT equations (3.5–3.8).
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
MQvit = Log(quot ed spread s)vit MQ(vit = Log(ef f ect i ve half   spread s)vit
Panel A
MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it
const 4.134*** 4.662*** 3.876*** 4.146*** 3.241*** 3.656*** 3.198*** 3.168***
(198.68) (211.7) (150.98) (165.36) (159.75) (168.25) (128.16) (128.45)
HF Tvit -0.375*** -0.432*** -0.344*** -0.343*** -0.309*** -0.344*** -0.261*** -0.266***
(-283.7) (-320.37) (-230.15) (-231.81) (-235.37) (-255.86) (-173.56) (-177.83)
HHItrdit 0.05*** -0.032*** -0.098*** -0.11*** 0.056*** -0.036*** -0.1*** -0.103***
(34.16) (-18.69) (-50.1) (-57.85) (36.05) (-20.66) (-50.53) (-52.97)
MQ vit 0.162*** 0.186*** 0.298*** 0.274*** 0.065*** 0.125*** 0.245*** 0.233***
(67.44) (100.59) (142.32) (130.59) (22.81) (56.47) (104.72) (94.31)
inv(price)it 13.148*** 12.775*** 15.018*** 15.219*** 15.8*** 16.006*** 17.75*** 19.071***
(61.9) (52.1) (52.66) (54.88) (70.04) (61.86) (60.31) (66.32)
ln(mktcap)it -0.149*** -0.162*** -0.134*** -0.159*** -0.169*** -0.178*** -0.167*** -0.162***
(-79.21) (-76.77) (-54.94) (-67.11) (-85.68) (-81.85) (-67.52) (-66.14)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.066*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.026*** 0.052*** 0.02*** 0.031*** 0.02***
(80.9) (79.53) (92.51) (77.03) (67.14) (60.88) (84.33) (57.42)
Panel B
HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it
const 6.604*** 6.242*** 7.687*** 7.957*** 6.079*** 5.684*** 5.97*** 6.213***
(191.96) (152.71) (164.69) (178.3) (167.18) (142.15) (124.56) (129.78)
MQ(lse)it 0.077*** -0.477*** -0.634*** -0.726*** 0.359*** -1.281*** -1.246*** -1.843***
(6.08) (-40.99) (-47.13) (-56.45) (15.53) (-67.39) (-62.92) (-93.2)
MQ(chix)it -0.561*** 0.071*** -0.662*** -0.36*** -0.782*** 0.608*** -0.636*** 0.031**
(-78.77) (6.13) (-62.59) (-36.39) (-64.93) (37.05) (-41.72) (2.07)
MQ(bats)it 0.199*** 0.156*** 0.328*** 0.3*** 0.308*** 0.268*** 0.944*** 0.494***
(47.63) (31.4) (38.4) (52.52) (52.37) (41.17) (81.08) (62.73)
MQ(turq)it 0.179*** 0.302*** 0.332*** 0.181*** 0.259*** 0.518*** 0.458*** 0.831***
(38.55) (53.87) (49.1) (21.02) (39.46) (67.19) (48.95) (67.26)
HF T  vit 0.36*** 0.434*** 0.428*** 0.413*** 0.372*** 0.445*** 0.506*** 0.488***
(183.93) (199.33) (183.41) (186.26) (161.51) (196.87) (203.51) (199.9)
HHItrdit 0.145*** 0.114*** 0.152*** 0.086*** 0.151*** 0.244*** 0.274*** 0.29***
(51.67) (35.75) (38.93) (23.18) (41.19) (60.71) (56.82) (61.17)
ln(mktcap)it -0.074*** -0.106*** -0.275*** -0.321*** 0 -0.083*** -0.228*** -0.268***
(-19.17) (-24.99) (-60.39) (-75.61) (-0.09) (-19.23) (-46.76) (-57.15)
ln(volume)vit 0.506*** 0.492*** 0.349*** 0.393*** 0.552*** 0.531*** 0.412*** 0.458***
(172.27) (198.29) (160.08) (172.89) (162.7) (226.49) (186.08) (192.92)
ln(size)vit -0.536*** -0.51*** -0.349*** -0.332*** -0.6*** -0.522*** -0.374*** -0.377***
(-125.84) (-120.14) (-102.07) (-89.74) (-98.16) (-127) (-108.02) (-93.64)
rt ickvit -203.879*** -199.162*** -2.578*** -1.168*** -296.621*** -193.904*** -2.476*** -1.018***
(-62.46) (-60.71) (-7.63) (-12.38) (-46.92) (-49.98) (-6.94) (-9.88)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.011*** -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.005 -0.023*** -0.022*** -0.025***
(5.28) (-19.85) (-9.92) (-11.83) (-1.53) (-29.69) (-31.38) (-37.24)
observations 277563 277563 277563 277563 277563 277563 277563 277563
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (MQvit )
0.84 0.86 0.84 0.83 0.79 0.81 0.80 0.79
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (HF Tvit )
0.90 0.88 0.82 0.83 0.89 0.87 0.80 0.80
system weighted Rsqr 0.80 0.76
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Table B.13: The cross-market impact of high frequency trading and market
fragmentation on liquidity: a simultaneous equations model estimation for large
stocks
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation for the system of equations (3.1)–(3.8) using the three-stage least
squares methods for two liquidity measures: log normalized time weighted quoted spreads and log normalized volume weighted
effective half-spreads. Indices i and t represent stocks and time (days) respectively, v represents one of the four venues: LSE, CHIX,
BATS and Turquoise,HF Tvit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2) developed on quotes update upto the fifth depth level,HHItrdit
represents the market fragmentation proxy, MQ vit represents the average liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i at venue v, HF T vit represents the average HFT intensity at venue v over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i , ln(mktcap) is the log normalized market capitalization, ln(voltintra)vit is the log normalized intraday mid
price range volatility, invprice is the inverse of daily average price, ln(size)vit is the log normalized trade size, ln(value)vit
is the log normalized trading volume, rtkvit is the relative tick size. The estimation is based on a panel dataset of 74 large-cap stocks
(above the median market capitalization stocks group) and 2058 days (October 2008–December 2016) and includes both time (the
monthly time dummy for each of 99 months included in the panel dataset) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are 3SLS ,
t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A presents the estimates for market quality equations (3.1–3.4) and Panel B presents those for HFT equations (3.5–3.8).
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
MQvit = Log(quot ed spread s)vit MQ(vit = Log(ef f ect i ve half   spread s)vit
Panel A
MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it
const 4.221*** 4.54*** 4.203*** 4.087*** 3.617*** 3.765*** 3.527*** 3.093***
(163.13) (181.53) (150.67) (150.65) (144.1) (148.97) (131.66) (111.24)
HF Tvit -0.369*** -0.381*** -0.314*** -0.326*** -0.301*** -0.309*** -0.238*** -0.247***
(-227.36) (-263.81) (-193.47) (-215.16) (-195.45) (-216.11) (-151.72) (-160.68)
HHItrdit 0.02*** -0.014*** -0.099*** -0.109*** 0.018*** -0.014*** -0.091*** -0.097***
(9.31) (-6.33) (-40.41) (-44.86) (7.83) (-5.91) (-36.15) (-37.68)
MQ vit 0.174*** 0.143*** 0.24*** 0.232*** -0.059*** -0.01*** 0.149*** 0.16***
(51.33) (48.51) (82.97) (83.41) (-13.56) (-2.7) (43.66) (43.37)
inv(price)it 14.125*** 13.192*** 15.231*** 16.904*** 16.078*** 16.317*** 16.835*** 21.897***
(53.81) (48.39) (49.3) (57.79) (57.03) (55.27) (53.46) (66.47)
ln(mktcap)it -0.136*** -0.163*** -0.157*** -0.139*** -0.173*** -0.186*** -0.189*** -0.142***
(-59.59) (-70.89) (-60.61) (-55.03) (-72.39) (-75.48) (-72) (-52.14)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.035*** 0.024*** 0.033*** 0.019*** 0.031*** 0.012*** 0.027*** 0.013***
(37) (45.86) (72.63) (50.51) (36.92) (25.23) (62.5) (35.08)
Panel B
HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it
const 7.711*** 7.683*** 6.998*** 8.94*** 7.323*** 7.266*** 5.594*** 6.753***
(199.54) (169.58) (106.49) (165.22) (176.9) (170.08) (88.76) (106.82)
MQ(lse)it -0.078*** -0.184*** -0.336*** -0.639*** 0.188*** -1.366*** -1.329*** -2.598***
(-5.05) (-11.65) (-14.16) (-31.7) (4.57) (-39.7) (-26.33) (-52.69)
MQ(chix)it -0.673*** -0.47*** -1.252*** -0.476*** -0.909*** 0.272*** -0.918*** 0.598***
(-54.48) (-28.07) (-57.02) (-24.91) (-32.07) (8.78) (-21.55) (13.98)
MQ(bats)it 0.204*** 0.07*** 0.758*** 0.447*** 0.214*** 0.079*** 1.243*** 0.478***
(30.81) (9.26) (48.52) (45.78) (24.38) (8.55) (63.94) (33.06)
MQ(turq)it 0.118*** 0.291*** 0.37*** -0.214*** 0.136*** 0.541*** 0.648*** 0.886***
(17.57) (37.82) (32.12) (-16.36) (13.15) (47.71) (36.96) (37.51)
HF T  vit 0.318*** 0.321*** 0.393*** 0.305*** 0.316*** 0.321*** 0.408*** 0.377***
(145.44) (128.84) (125.62) (113.83) (127.62) (136.3) (128.72) (121.32)
HHItrdit 0.108*** 0.045*** 0.132*** 0.009* 0.102*** 0.14*** 0.233*** 0.224***
(31.76) (12.08) (23.53) (1.74) (23.59) (31.3) (33.61) (32.06)
ln(mktcap)it -0.118*** -0.139*** -0.169*** -0.311*** -0.087*** -0.16*** -0.106*** -0.236***
(-27.21) (-28.31) (-25.32) (-60.82) (-14.63) (-34.47) (-15.11) (-39.66)
ln(volume)vit 0.457*** 0.481*** 0.43*** 0.403*** 0.492*** 0.502*** 0.49*** 0.516***
(160.28) (169.02) (128.73) (139.82) (165.8) (209.32) (160.74) (153.96)
ln(size)vit -0.511*** -0.488*** -0.393*** -0.322*** -0.563*** -0.479*** -0.414*** -0.398***
(-103.73) (-93.43) (-70.99) (-62.56) (-78.29) (-98.48) (-76.34) (-66.04)
rt ickvit -148.319*** -152.959*** -124.478*** -1.398*** -163.34*** -49.812*** -59.925*** -1.037***
(-24.89) (-23.38) (-15.06) (-4.87) (-14.1) (-6.87) (-5.67) (-3.22)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.022*** -0.003** -0.02*** 0.001 0.02*** 0 -0.033*** -0.02***
(10.91) (-2.38) (-16.9) (1.57) (7.54) (-0.1) (-26.66) (-21.78)
observations 147501 147501 147501 147501 147501 147501 147501 147501
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (MQvit )
0.80 0.82 0.79 0.82 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.78
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (HF Tvit )
0.90 0.88 0.79 0.82 0.89 0.88 0.79 0.78
system weighted Rsqr 0.8 0.79
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Table B.14: The cross-market impact of high frequency trading and market
fragmentation on liquidity: a simultaneous equations model estimation for small
stocks
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation for the system of equations (3.1)–(3.8) using the three-stage least
squares methods for two liquidity measures: log normalized time weighted quoted spreads and log normalized volume weighted
effective half-spreads. Indices i and t represent stocks and time (days) respectively, v represents one of the four venues: LSE, CHIX,
BATS and Turquoise,HF Tvit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2) developed on quotes update upto the fifth depth level,HHItrdit
represents the market fragmentation proxy, MQ vit represents the average liquidity level over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i at venue v, HF T vit represents the average HFT intensity at venue v over all stocks in the same size group
excluding stock i , ln(mktcap) is the log normalized market capitalization, ln(voltintra)vit is the log normalized intraday mid
price range volatility, invprice is the inverse of daily average price, ln(size)vit is the log normalized trade size, ln(value)vit is
the log normalized trading volume, rtkvit is the relative tick size. The estimation is based on a panel dataset of 75 small-cap stocks
(below the median market capitalization stocks group) and 2048 days (October 2008–December 2016) and includes both time (the
monthly time dummy for each of 98 months included in the panel dataset) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are 3SLS ,
t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Panel A presents the estimates for market quality equations (3.1–3.4) and Panel B presents those for HFT equations (3.5–3.8).
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
MQvit = Log(quot ed spread s)vit MQ(vit = Log(ef f ect i ve half   spread s)vit
Panel A
MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it
const 4.333*** 5.486*** 4.398*** 5.289*** 3.311*** 4.315*** 3.771*** 4.234***
(124.24) (134.9) (91.27) (115.87) (97.39) (111.59) (80.82) (97.37)
HF Tvit -0.453*** -0.557*** -0.459*** -0.422*** -0.364*** -0.431*** -0.351*** -0.32***
(-205.2) (-227.73) (-166.63) (-152.8) (-163.03) (-178.48) (-124.2) (-114.83)
HHItrdit 0.068*** -0.049*** -0.1*** -0.105*** 0.071*** -0.063*** -0.12*** -0.111***
(31.69) (-18.14) (-32.15) (-35.5) (31.8) (-23.36) (-37.87) (-36.96)
MQ vit 0.075*** 0.119*** 0.212*** 0.166*** 0.016*** 0.069*** 0.158*** 0.121***
(20.56) (41.79) (61.83) (48.86) (3.83) (21.26) (42.87) (32.28)
inv(price)it 10.013*** 9.285*** 13.389*** 9.465*** 13.21*** 11.921*** 15.391*** 12.68***
(29.04) (20.96) (25.5) (18.8) (35.38) (26.41) (28.64) (25.19)
ln(mktcap)it -0.171*** -0.212*** -0.162*** -0.27*** -0.202*** -0.242*** -0.22*** -0.288***
(-49.04) (-49.97) (-33.12) (-57.68) (-55.52) (-57.28) (-44.07) (-61.44)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.097*** 0.028*** 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.078*** 0.021*** 0.034*** 0.02***
(70.88) (53.87) (59.09) (47.76) (58.07) (42.89) (56.18) (34.67)
Panel B
HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it
const 6.245*** 5.603*** 6.025*** 5.471*** 5.633*** 5.151*** 4.566*** 4.121***
(114.4) (85.62) (76.31) (71.03) (102.54) (83.47) (57.29) (52.82)
MQ(lse)it -0.114*** -0.377*** -0.68*** -0.735*** 0.325*** -0.811*** -1.232*** -1.593***
(-5.61) (-22.62) (-34.61) (-38.59) (9.79) (-34.23) (-47.37) (-61.43)
MQ(chix)it -0.41*** 0.112*** -0.563*** -0.343*** -0.669*** 0.361*** -0.645*** -0.202***
(-49.55) (7.19) (-42.12) (-27.1) (-49.46) (18.91) (-35.27) (-11.77)
MQ(bats)it 0.151*** 0.079*** 0.326*** 0.223*** 0.255*** 0.138*** 0.853*** 0.427***
(28.59) (11.43) (24.83) (27.27) (35.07) (16.41) (52.23) (41.78)
MQ(turq)it 0.197*** 0.318*** 0.54*** 0.649*** 0.269*** 0.517*** 0.778*** 1.242***
(30.24) (37.19) (51.32) (43.38) (29.12) (47.31) (55.84) (65.32)
HF T  vit 0.253*** 0.378*** 0.414*** 0.406*** 0.286*** 0.401*** 0.507*** 0.471***
(75.77) (100.3) (93.86) (94.98) (67.89) (104.61) (107.11) (102.93)
HHItrdit 0.171*** 0.105*** 0.181*** 0.152*** 0.159*** 0.2*** 0.325*** 0.348***
(41.7) (21.25) (29.48) (25.79) (29.5) (33.61) (43.67) (47.75)
ln(mktcap)it -0.058*** -0.072*** -0.194*** -0.143*** 0.032*** -0.054*** -0.154*** -0.087***
(-8.89) (-10.44) (-23.86) (-17.53) (3.57) (-7.86) (-17.71) (-10.13)
ln(volume)vit 0.486*** 0.484*** 0.34*** 0.422*** 0.56*** 0.502*** 0.386*** 0.455***
(96.66) (119.98) (92.23) (101.81) (97.4) (146.9) (107.23) (114.38)
ln(size)vit -0.476*** -0.463*** -0.326*** -0.385*** -0.557*** -0.459*** -0.349*** -0.415***
(-78.2) (-73.8) (-63.54) (-65.05) (-69.74) (-80.65) (-68.8) (-70.17)
rt ickvit -171.337*** -175.994*** -2.463*** -1.273*** -270.638*** -182.192*** -2.613*** -1.162***
(-45.1) (-45.87) (-6.52) (-11.77) (-37.32) (-40.91) (-6.57) (-10.13)
ln(volt int ra)vit 0.028*** -0.018*** -0.012*** -0.023*** -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.026*** -0.035***
(7.36) (-18.69) (-12.91) (-23.87) (-2.74) (-23.17) (-25.35) (-33.5)
observations 127864 127864 127864 127864 127864 127864 127864 127864
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (MQvit )
0.70 0.76 0.70 0.72 0.66 0.71 0.6 0.68
second-stage
adj_Rsqr (HF Tvit )
0.80 0.74 0.58 0.60 0.78 0.74 0.53 0.55
system weighted Rsqr 0.7 0.63
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Table B.15: The cross-market time-varying impact of high frequency trading and
market fragmentation on liquidity: a simultaneous equations model estimation
This table presents the simultaneous equations model estimation for the system of equations (3.1)–(3.8) using the three-stage least
squares methods for two liquidity measures: log normalized time weighted quoted spreads and log normalized volume weighted
effective half-spreads. Indices i and t represent stocks and time (days) respectively, v represents one of the four venues: LSE,
CHIX, BATS and Turquoise, HF Tvit represents the HFT proxy (hf t2) developed on quotes update upto the fifth depth level,
HHItrdit represents the market fragmentation proxy. To conserve space, coefficients forMQ vit ,HF T vit , ln(mktcap),
ln(voltintra)vit , ln(size)vit , ln(value)vit , and rtkvit are not presented. Estimations are based on three subsamples
(2008–2010, 2011–2013 and 2014–2016) divided over the sample period with 149 stock each and include both time (the monthly
time dummy for each months) and stock fixed effects. Coefficient estimates are 3SLS , t-statistics shown in the parentheses below the
coefficient. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Panel A presents the estimates for market quality
equations (3.1–3.4) and Panel B presents those for HFT equations (3.5–3.8).
I II III IV V VI VII VIII
MQvit = Log(quot ed spread s)vit MQ(vit = Log(ef f ect i ve half   spread s)vit
Panel A
MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it MQ(lse)it MQ(chix)it MQ(bats)it MQ(turq)it
2008-2010
HF Tvit -0.318*** -0.371*** -0.34*** -0.238*** -0.254*** -0.288*** -0.261*** -0.152***
(-117.89) (-146.07) (-120.38) (-80.5) (-88.02) (-110.07) (-90.27) (-50.96)
HHItrdit 0.102*** 0.034*** -0.047*** -0.096*** 0.101*** 0.008** -0.056*** -0.098***
(32.1) (9.88) (-11.07) (-22.58) (29.13) (2.14) (-12.74) (-22.29)
2011-2013
HF Tvit -0.288*** -0.366*** -0.322*** -0.295*** -0.234*** -0.265*** -0.235*** -0.227***
(-147.18) (-155.96) (-115.06) (-103.92) (-108.78) (-112.89) (-80.68) (-77.5)
HHItrdit 0.064*** -0.062*** -0.097*** -0.114*** 0.065*** -0.066*** -0.115*** -0.107***
(30.97) (-24.35) (-30.05) (-35.07) (28.83) (-25.68) (-34.77) (-32.35)
2014-2016
HF Tvit -0.405*** -0.418*** -0.347*** -0.394*** -0.306*** -0.326*** -0.26*** -0.312***
(-176.55) (-207.51) (-152.09) (-202.31) (-155.86) (-164.86) (-115.52) (-161.38)
HHItrdit 0.027*** -0.046*** -0.11*** -0.083*** 0.016*** -0.058*** -0.117*** -0.09***
(11.95) (-18.79) (-39.99) (-34.44) (7.27) (-22.58) (-41.65) (-35.99)
Panel B
HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it HF T(lse)it HF T(chix)it HF T(bats)it HF T(turq)it
2008-2010
MQ(lse)it 0.152*** 0.125*** 0.387*** -0.732*** 0.858*** -0.204*** 0.202*** -1.498***
(4.57) (4.13) (9.23) (-17.99) (11.67) (-4.44) (3.17) (-22.55)
MQ(chix)it -1.075*** -0.848*** -1.617*** -0.86*** -1.953*** -0.886*** -2.415*** -1.08***
(-39.52) (-23.7) (-37.47) (-20.91) (-37.96) (-16.68) (-36.2) (-16.1)
MQ(bats)it 0.39*** -0.002 -0.002 0.546*** 0.715*** 0.036* 0.654*** 0.921***
(29.3) (-0.1) (-0.06) (27.1) (32.53) (1.67) (16.14) (28.56)
MQ(turq)it 0.235*** 0.46*** 0.576*** -0.041** 0.209*** 0.773*** 0.977*** 0.865***
(23.12) (40.03) (36.66) (-2.05) (12.4) (45.59) (39.21) (26.1)
2011-2013
MQ(lse)it 0.611*** -0.225*** -0.927*** -0.495*** 0.696*** -0.797*** -1.442*** -0.876***
(23.67) (-10.63) (-35.84) (-19.6) (19.67) (-23.91) (-40.5) (-23.6)
MQ(chix)it -0.474*** -0.059*** -0.065*** -0.015 -0.756*** 0.366*** 0.045 0.099***
(-32.49) (-2.77) (-3.35) (-0.79) (-35.45) (12.47) (1.59) (3.62)
MQ(bats)it 0.067*** 0.097*** 0.688*** 0.053*** 0.138*** 0.151*** 1.035*** 0.13***
(8.93) (12.5) (47.26) (5.52) (15.48) (15.6) (63.52) (11.13)
MQ(turq)it 0.203*** 0.23*** 0.203*** 0.416*** 0.316*** 0.379*** 0.325*** 0.689***
(25.47) (27.75) (19.15) (33.38) (31.03) (34.35) (24.83) (44.98)
2014-2016
MQ(lse)it -0.058*** -0.105*** -0.375*** -0.161*** 0.967*** -1.167*** -1.705*** -1.133***
(-4.73) (-7.09) (-22.07) (-10.27) (25.1) (-36.46) (-54.34) (-34.95)
MQ(chix)it -0.284*** 0.4*** -0.421*** -0.312*** -0.584*** 1.139*** 0.092*** -0.04**
(-37.09) (26.65) (-31.46) (-26.52) (-35.8) (48.66) (4.35) (-2.24)
MQ(bats)it 0.154*** 0.07*** 0.021* 0.153*** 0.328*** 0.218*** 0.728*** 0.349***
(29.89) (9.95) (1.84) (20.63) (35.64) (22.49) (42.94) (34.51)
MQ(turq)it 0.025*** -0.233*** 0.011 0.363*** -0.048*** -0.045*** 0.257*** 0.892***
(3.75) (-25.05) (0.99) (27.61) (-3.85) (-3.25) (15.21) (46.14)
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Fig. B.1: Cross-market trends of quotes update speed and venue participation rate
in the EBBO
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Figure 5: After one partial order of the  investor hits Chi‐X and  leads to a transaction, the co‐located HFT 
then reacts by cancelling duplicate orders on other trading venues. Because HFT have  invested  in ultrafast 
connections  to  trading  venues,  these  cancellations  arrive  at  these  trading  venues  before  the  remaining 
partial orders of the investor do. 
If orders are updated based on an external signal (as was the case in the single market scenario) 
there  can  be  no  question  of  ghost  liquidity.  Orders  were  marketable  at  some  point,  but  the 
market had changed since then. However, in the case of duplicate orders, the partial footprint of 
the larger (split) order enables the HFT to respond and remove liquidity. Can one trade with these 
duplicate orders, or in other words, are they fake or real? 
In principle, all duplicate orders can be traded with, as long as one uses the appropriate execution 
technology  (i.e.,  hit  all markets  at  roughly  the  same  time). Also,  the  intention  of HFT market‐
makers is to trade with every single one of these orders (they do not know at which trading venue 
a new order will come  in), but not with all duplicate orders at the same time. Therefore, strictly 
speaking, these orders cannot be classified as fake, as the intention to trade was present, and in 
principle all orders can be traded with. 
2.3 Conclusion 
There is an obvious conflict of interests between investors seeking large quantities of liquidity and 
HFT market‐makers offering  liquidity. From an  inventory and  risk management perspective of a 
HFT market‐maker,  cancelling duplicate orders  (or  to put  it  in more general  terms,  reacting on 
new market information within fractions of a second) makes sense. However, this makes ‘reading 
the order book’ more difficult than it used to be, since (top of the book) liquidity is ‘less certain’. 
The hypothetical situation given in Figure 3c can have a very negative impact on the trading cost 
of buy‐side firms: they only achieve a partial execution, while their trading intention may become 
exposed  to  the  market  (which  can  generate  even  more  price  impact).  Therefore,  from  the 
perspective of buy‐side  firms wanting  to manage price  impact,  the critique on duplicate orders 
also makes sense. 
(a) Cross-market quote updating
15 
 
Figure 7a to 7d: Cross‐market trading visualization of one HFT firm. Each box shows the trading conduct of 
this HFT on one tr ding venue. The horizontal axis denotes time and the vertical axis the price (axis values 
not shown). The green/red bars represent buy/sell orders from start (left‐hand sid ) to end (right‐hand side), 
whereas the green/red dots represent buy/sell transactions. Larger dots represent larger sized transactions. 
We only show orders and transactions for the one HFT. The grey area represents the spread for the entire 
market. The blue, vertical lines in eac  box represent the time at which the HFT performs its fir t transaction 
on that specific trading venue. The orange vertical  lines, on the other hand, represent the time of the first 
transaction over all trading venues (i.e., the first signal it can react to). 
And  finally,  it  can be asserted  that  latencies differ  for each  combination of broker and  trading 
venue, because trading venues have different geographic  locations. In theory, all the  ingredients 
for LD are available in th  European marketplace. Recently, the AFM sta ted an i vestigation into 
LD. More  specifically,  five  case  studies were  done.  These  case  studies  included  a  fine‐grained 
data‐analysis of trading data across multiple trading venues. We will present our findings  in the 
next chapter. 
3.3 Analyses of Liquidity detection 
The AFM studied the  impact of five  large orders that were dispersed among different European 
trading  venues.  The  focus  in  our  analyses was  both  on  the  trading  conduct  of HFT  up  to  and 
around the execution of these large orders, and on the (price) impact for the investor responsible 
for the large order. We will now provide an extensive report on two of these studies.  
3.3.1 Trading conduct of HFT during the execution of large orders 
Figures 7a  to 7d  show  the  trading  conduct of one HFT around  the  time  that a  large  investor’s 
order  was  routed  to  several  trading  venues.  The  visualizations  are  based  on  trading  data  in 
instruments under supervision of the AFM. Each box visualizes the trading conduct of the HFT on 
that specific trading venue.  
A  B
C  D
(b) Cross‐market trading visualization
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Figure  8a  to  8d:  A more  typical  example  (compared  to  the  a‐typical  one  in  7a  to  7d)  of  HFT  trading 
conduct. In Figure 8a the HFT passively builds up a position with the large investor being the counterparty. It 
then closes the position aggressively on other trading venues (Figures 8b to 8d), typically earning a few cents 
profit per share. There were no additional trades with the incoming (partial) orders of the investor. 
The previously described case, despite some similarities, does not prove  the existence of LD on 
our markets. This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that in all the other investigated cases 
there were no further transactions with incoming orders of the investor following the initial ones. 
Therefore  we  conclude  that  the  HFT  involved  in  our  case  studies  are  not  ‘racing  ahead’  and 
‘profiting from’ the large investor’s orders. 
A typical trading pattern is shown in Figures 8a to 8d. The HFT initially trades with the investor in 
Figure 8a, and then within fractions of a second closes the position on other trading venues. The 
hypothesized  third  step  from  the  LD pattern  is  lacking,  i.e.,  there were no  further  interactions 
with the investor after the HFT had closed the position. The HFT strategy as illustrated in Figures 
8a  to  8d  can  be  classified  as  cross‐market  arbitrage.  The  general  opinion  towards  arbitrage 
strategies is positive. 
3.3.2 Impact of HFT trading conduct on the investor 
In the previous chapter we explicitly looked into the behaviour of HFT. We did not yet cover the 
impact  on  the  investor.  In  all  our  case  studies,  investors  were  confronted  with  a  suboptimal 
execution,  because  latencies  between  the  various  trading  venues  differed.  Different  latencies 
allowed HFT  to update  their orders  and  also  allowed  them  to  execute  transactions before  the 
investor could act. Figures 9a to 9c illustrate the impact for the investor in one of our studies. 
   
A  B
C  D
(c) Cross-market positioning
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Figure 9a to 9c: Figure 9a  illustrates all orders and trades on one trading venue. The orange dotted  line 
represents the time at which the first partial order of the investor is matched on another trading venue. The 
blue dotted  line re resents  the exact  time when  the partial order  f  th   inv s or hits  his  peci ic  trading 
venue. The  red/green bars  represent sell/buy orders,  from begin  (left‐hand side)  to end  (right‐hand side). 
The purple dots represent trades by firms other than the investor, whereas the green dots represent the buy 
trades of the investor. Figure 9b and 9c respectively represent the order book during the orange dotted line 
and blue dotted line. Each bar represents the volume on a particular price level. The vertical axis denotes the 
price and the horizontal axis the volume. Red/green bars represent sell/buy liquidity, whereas the grey area 
represents the spread (which is similar to the grey area in Figure 9a). 
 
In  Figure 9a  the orange dotted  line  represents  the  time  at which  the  first partial order of  the 
investor was matched on another trading venue (i.e., the first signal for HFT to react upon). The 
blue dotted line represents the exact time when the partial order of the investor hits this specific 
trading  venue.  In  the  time  between  the  first  signal  and  time  of  matching  we  see  several 
transactions executed by other  firms  (e.g., by HFT arbitraging between several markets) but we 
see even more order cancellations and prices updates (e.g., by market making strategies reacting 
on new market information).  
Figure  9b  represents  the  order  book  before  the  first  partial  execution  of  the  investor  hit  the 
market, whereas Figure 9c represents the order book at the moment at which the investor’s order 
is  matched  on  this  particular  trading  venue.  The  difference  between  these  two  order  books 
illustrates the impact for the investor in this specific case: sell liquidity on six different price levels 
has disappeared. This example was selected because of  its extreme  impact; typically the  impact 
was smaller. However in all situations that we studied, the investor could have achieved a better 
execution if the difference in latencies between trading venues had been reduced. 
A  B C
(d) Cross-market ord r matching time
Fig. B.2: A typical HFT firm’s market making across markets (source: The
Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (2016))
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hft1 ( messages per minute), mktcap quintile : above the median
LSE (high) CHIX (high) BATS (high) Turquoise (high)
(a) Large stocks
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hft1 ( messages per minute ), mktcap quintile : below the median
LSE (small) CHIX (small) BATS (small) Turquoise (small)
(b) Small stocks
Fig. B.3: Cross market trends in average electronic message rate per-minute (for
the best 10 depth levels)
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Fig. B.4: Trends in time weighted quoted spreads across markets
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Fig. B.5: Trends in volume weighted effective-half spreads across markets
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0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
0
5
0
1
M
ay
2
0
0
5
0
1
Se
p
2
0
0
5
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
0
6
0
1
M
ay
2
0
0
6
0
1
Se
p
2
0
0
6
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
0
7
0
1
M
ay
2
0
0
7
0
1
Se
p
2
0
0
7
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
0
8
0
1
M
ay
2
0
0
8
0
1
Se
p
2
0
0
8
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
0
9
0
1
M
ay
2
0
0
9
0
1
Se
p
2
0
0
9
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
0
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
0
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
0
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
1
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
1
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
1
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
2
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
2
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
2
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
3
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
3
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
3
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
4
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
4
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
4
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
5
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
5
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
5
0
1
Ja
n
2
0
1
6
0
1
M
ay
2
0
1
6
0
1
Se
p
2
0
1
6
price_impact4 (share volume weighted 5-min price impact (bps)) LSE CHIX BATS Turqoise
(b) price impacts
Fig. B.6: Trends in 5-minute realized half-spreads and price impacts across markets
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(a) Large stocks
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Fig. B.7: Trends in average quoted depths (GBP100) at best limit price across
markets
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Fig. B.8: Trends in average trade sizes (number of shares)
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Fig. B.9: Cross-market trends in speed competition and quoted spreads
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